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1  
Part I:  PRELIMINARIES 
 
1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Objectives  
The principal claim made in this thesis is that the existence and practice of 
morality can be explained in terms of a kind of order.  Morality, in David Wong’s 
view, ‘serves two universal human needs.  It regulates conflicts of interest 
between people, and it regulates conflicts of interests within the individual born of 
different desires and drives that cannot all be satisfied at the same time.’1  Some 
significant aspects of morality are evident in what Wong says.  Morality has 
application to both interpersonal and intrapersonal conflicts of interest and desires, 
and it has application to them by means of regulation.   Regulation is concerned 
with rule-setting and rule-observance; the rules with which morality is concerned 
are referred to as ‘norms’.  Norms are unwritten rules that guide us with regard to 
what ought to be done in certain circumstances.  What may be missing from 
Wong’s definition is a basis for the regulations, or norms.  Why is it important 
that conflicts be settled?  Why do we need to settle them?  To what end are 
attempts made to settle them?  It would seem that conflict-settlement is presumed 
to be good, and that settling them gives rise to some kind of good.  To explain 
what good consists in is a major focus of moral theory.       
Another feature of Wong’s definition that I want to highlight is his mention of 
needs.  I will be arguing that interests and desires can be traced to basic human 
needs (such as the need for food and the need for love); and, just as importantly, 
that human beings have a need for morality itself.  Human behaviour, including 
morally relevant behaviour, is generally aimed at the satisfaction of needs—by 
‘morally relevant’ I mean behaviour that is susceptible to judgement in terms of 
good and right or bad and wrong.  I will be trying to demonstrate that need-
satisfaction stems from a fundamental need for order.  How might the term ‘order’ 
be understood?  According to John Finnis, order consists in ‘a set of unifying 
                                                 
1 David Wong, ‘Relativism’, in Peter Singer (editor): A Companion to Ethics (Cornwall, United 
Kingdom: Blackwell, 2003 [first published 1991]), p. 446. 
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relationships.’2  Despite its brevity, the definition captures some important aspects 
of the notion: especially its relational character, whereby parts of various kinds are 
somehow brought together to form a unified whole.  Morality will be held to 
derive from our need for order, via behaviour that is directed towards need-
satisfaction.  I have called the proposed theory the ‘order-based theory of 
morality’.   
The notion of order has been accorded great importance by some thinkers, for 
example Jean-Jacques Rousseau and David Hume.  In Rousseau’s words, ‘the 
love of order which produces order is called goodness, and the love of order 
which preserves order is called justice.’3  Hume not dissimilarly: ‘the same love of 
order and uniformity, which arranges the books in a library, and the chairs in a 
parlour, contribute to the formation of society, and to the well-being of mankind 
….’4  Notwithstanding its importance to eminent theorists such as these, the 
relation between morality and order, as far as I am aware, has never been 
subjected to extensive treatment.  I believe that a gap in our knowledge has been 
left by the inattention, and that the gap is worth trying to fill. 
The idea that the concepts of morality and order might be deeply related grew 
from the juxtaposition of two quite diverse ideas.  The first is Erwin Schrödinger’s 
proposition that life (including human life) depends on disorder-avoidance; non-
life, by contrast, has no need of order.  The second idea is that morality is essential 
to human life.  Both ideas will be explicated in due course.  Schrödinger’s thesis is 
concerned with the physical aspect of life, but morality clearly extends beyond the 
physical.  That being so, if a connection between order and morality were to be 
made, the scope of order would have to be expanded: either that or different kinds 
of order would have to be brought into play.  I reached the conclusion that two 
other kinds of order were capable of completing the picture: social order and what 
I describe as ‘eudaimonic order’, the latter consisting of a kind of psychological 
                                                 
2 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford, Great Britain: Oxford University Press, 
1980), p. 136.   
3 Rousseau quoted by Ryan Patrick Hanley, ‘Rousseau’s Virtue Epistemology’, in Journal of the 
History of Philosophy, Vol. 50,  no. 2 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012), p. 
256.  The quotation is from Emile, which was first published in 1762.   
4 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (London: Penguin Books, 1984 [first published 1739 
and 1740]), 3.1.3.  Rousseau’s and Hume’s ideas are in fact so similar that one might wonder 
whether they grew out of the time of Rousseau’s and Hume’s brief friendship.  But that occurred in 
1766, long after the words first appeared in print.    
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and spiritual order.  The three kinds of order together constitute what I refer to as 
‘homosapient order’, which I think can be shown to be morally relevant.  
Homosapient order is a kind of order that is exclusive to our species, since, as the 
term implies, it requires a particular level of sapience, or cognitive ability—a level 
not yet attained, as far as we know, by other species or organisms.  Social order 
and eudaimonic order stand in an analogical relation to physical order, but I will 
also argue that a high degree of interdependency exists between them—so much 
so, that their amalgam, homosapient order, may reasonably be understood to be an 
operative reality.       
My project is largely metaethical in nature.  One of its aims is to explain how we 
came to be the moral beings that we are.  A moral being is someone who 
understands what it means to be moral.  What it means to be moral consists in 
having beliefs about what is morally good and right or bad and wrong.  Ethics, as 
distinct from metaethics, is concerned with describing what moral good, right, bad 
and wrong all consist in.  Derek Parfit has expressed the hope that metaethics ‘will 
imply conclusions in Ethics.’5  Since any metaethical inquiry conducted by a 
human being is likely to entail some kind of understanding of what it means to be 
moral, it seems to me that the implications referred to by Parfit are nigh on being 
inevitable.6  In any case, my thesis certainly addresses ethical questions, i.e. 
questions of what is regarded as good, bad, right and wrong, and why they should 
be so regarded.  My principal metaethical claim is that that we are moral beings 
because of our need for homosapient order.  I also argue that the need is real, and 
that it is therefore something that is objectively true about us.  The need gives rise 
to morally relevant behaviour when attempts to satisfy our need impacts on the 
needs of others.  This leads to my principal ethical claim: that morally good or 
                                                 
5 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987 [first published 1984]), p. 
447).  The distinction between ethics and metaethics is described by Parfit as follows: ‘Ethics asks 
which outcomes would be good or bad, and which acts would be right or wrong.  Meta-Ethics asks 
what is the meaning of moral language, or the nature of moral reasoning.  It also asks whether 
Ethics can be objective—whether it can make claims that are true’ (Parfit, p. 447). 
6 There would be no inevitability about it if the inquiries were conducted by amoral beings, or 
beings whose moral beliefs were totally different from those of human beings; aliens from other 
worlds and computers possessed of artificial intelligence could ‘see’ things quite differently from 
us.   
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right behaviour is explainable in terms of its effect on the homosapient order of 
those involved.7  
I believe the order-based theory to be novel, although many of the ideas from 
which it has been assembled are not: a lot of them come from antiquity, while 
others are quite recent.  Various sources of Western philosophy both ancient and 
modern will be drawn upon in constructing the theory; support for it will also be 
sought from the physical and human sciences, and from literary fiction.  Science 
and philosophy will be held to be indissolubly linked: science as a means of 
explaining what is, philosophy as a means of understanding what ought to be 
done.8  The link has been well understood by philosophers both ancient and 
modern; for example Pythagoras in the distant past, Immanuel Kant in the 
eighteenth century, and present day thinkers such as William Casebeer and Philip 
Kitcher. 
Casebeer makes use of several sciences in his investigation of ‘natural ethical 
facts’ (the title of his book), including evolutionary biology and cognitive science.  
He writes, ‘[a]s we cast about for a post-Enlightenment normative anchor … it is 
imperative that we demonstrate the possibility of intelligent, useful interactions 
                                                 
7 Dupré writes, ‘[i]t will not be an easy task to provide a convincing argument that that behaviour 
conducive to this interest should be explained not merely as a clearly sensible way to act, but as a 
kind of action driven by a specifically designed part of the mind’ (John Dupré, Darwin’s Legacy: 
What Evolution Means Today (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p.89).  ‘This interest’ 
refers to the detection of violations of social rules, but the comment could be understood to apply 
to ethical interests in general.   The criticism would encompass the kind of explanation I am 
looking for, with ‘homosapient order’ substituted for ‘a specifically designed part of the mind’.  
However, it would seem reasonable to ask of Dupré, why is it clearly sensible?  Answers to that, 
and to any other why questions that follow, could lead to how-type questions being asked.   
8 Both science and philosophy do much more than this simple schema suggests.  Science is also 
deeply concerned with prediction, i.e. with what the case would be if events were to unfold in 
accordance with its explanatory generalisations; and it is concerned with how interventions in the 
‘natural’ course of events might successfully be made, with a view to attaining some kind of 
practical end—this summation is based on Sandra D. Mitchell’s text, Biological Complexity and 
Integrative Pluralism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).  Philosophy is also 
concerned with explanation, at the very least with a view to understanding how and why we came 
to be the moral beings that we are; and this may affect our views on what ought to be done.  
Understanding so attained provides rational justification of the explanatory theory. Philosophy is 
also concerned with understanding what the significance of morality is.  Similarly in science: 
according Einstein and Infeld, ‘[t]he purpose of any physical theory is to explain as wide a range 
of phenomena as possible.  It is justified in so far as it does make events understandable.’  (Albert 
Einstein and Leopold Infeld, The Evolution of Physics: From Early Concepts to Relativity and 
Quanta (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1966 [first published 1938]), p. 40).  Philosophy also 
takes interest in scientific interventions, as contemporary debates surrounding global warming 
demonstrate.   
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between the human sciences and human ethics.’9  In Casebeer’s view, pre-
Enlightenment religious foundations of ethics can no longer be guaranteed, and he 
obviously believes that something is needed to take their place.  To speak of 
establishing interactions between science and ethics as ‘imperative’ in this regard 
suggests that the need for an anchor may be very strong indeed, at least for some 
people.   
In his book The Ethical Project, Kitcher sets out to explain how ethics got started: 
the ethical project, he says, ‘began in response to central human desires and needs, 
arising from our special type of human existence.’10  The central desires and needs 
referred to by Kitcher include our need to live together and cooperate with one 
another.  Kitcher’s aim is to explain the origin of ethics in terms of evolutionary 
biology. He conjectures that the ‘first ethicists were probably concerned with the 
altruism failures that arose with respect to basic needs, but their efforts led to an 
evolved conception of the good life, one in which our interactions and 
relationships with others are fundamental.’11  In other words, altruism of some 
kind has been a long-standing characteristic of Homo sapiens, but it is a 
characteristic that has undergone modification following changes to the 
circumstances in which people have found themselves. 
I will comment further on Kitcher’s ideas in the course of the thesis; for the 
moment, I want to return to Casebeer’s point about the need for an anchor.    For 
an anchor to be effective there must be grounds in which to grip, but the kind of 
grounds in which morality might be anchored is the subject of dispute.  The mere 
fact of the existence of morality would seem to provide sufficient grounds for 
some thinkers.  Hilary Putnam, for instance, maintains that some kind of shared 
sympathy between people is enough.  In his view, ethics is concerned with 
‘alleviating suffering regardless of the class or gender of the sufferer;’ he notes 
that the concern has ‘deep roots in the great religious traditions of the world—not 
in only the religious traditions of the West, but in Islam, Confucianism, Hinduism, 
                                                 
9 William D.  Casebeer, Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2005), p. 1.  Casebeer advocates the use of 
methodological naturalism in ethical research, i.e. methods based on those employed in the natural 
sciences.  He also endorses ontological naturalism, i.e. reality is confined to nature (there are no 
non-natural entities).  I am of the same view. 
10 Philip Kitcher, The Ethical Project (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
2011), p. 8. 
11 Kitcher, p. 327. 
                                                                                                 
6  
and Buddhism as well.’12  Putnam doesn’t go as far as eschewing an articulation 
of ethics, but he certainly denies that its roots need be justified and explained in 
terms apart from the aforementioned shared sympathy.  Instead, Putnam regards 
ethics as a wholly practical response by one human being to another’s suffering, a 
response characterised by sympathy and ameliorative endeavours.  Putnam may 
well have been right about the religious traditions, but I will be arguing that roots 
just as deep can be found in grounds devoid of supernatural elements.13  Non-
supernatural grounds are secular grounds.  My argument is that the need for 
homosapient order provides a secular basis in which morality can be grounded, 
hence the term ‘based’ in the title of the thesis.  ‘Basis’ for my purposes means 
‘cause’: the putative need for homosapient order is the cause of morality for the 
reasons outlined a moment ago: the reasons will be fully explained in due course.     
The idea that morality possesses origins that are susceptible to explanation has a 
long history.  Explanation is the business of philosophers, research scientists and 
theologians, and it is of interest to many other people as well.  Explanation is a 
source of philosophical grounds on which beliefs can be based; it helps us make 
sense of what is going on around us.  The Stoics, Plato, Spinoza and Kant are 
some of the many schools and thinkers who have felt the need for a philosophical 
basis of morality.  For example, in the Laws, Plato maintains that living well 
depends on ‘thinking rightly about the gods;’14 while not everyone would agree 
with him on what ‘thinking rightly’ consists in, the basic idea can be applied more 
generally.  Spinoza spoke frequently of God and sincerely believed in the deity’s 
existence, but God for him was equivalent to nature—or, in another guise, 
equivalent to a single monistic substance: so much so, that Spinoza has attracted 
accusations of pantheism, even atheism.  Spinoza is justly famous for his 
contribution to moral philosophy, most extensively articulated in The Ethics 
(published posthumously in 1677).   The appendix of Part IV of the book deals 
with social order and moral order.  The moral standards promoted there are held to 
emanate from nature, and since nature is all there is, supernaturalism can be 
                                                 
12 Hilary Putnam, Ethics without Ontology (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
2004), p. 23. 
13 My theory is therefore akin to Buddhism in this regard. 
14 Plato, Laws, translated by A. E. Taylor, in Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (editors), The 
Collected Dialogues of Plato (Princeton: Princeton University Press, Bollingen Series LXXI, 1999 
[first published 1961]), X, 888b. 
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discounted.  Spinoza’s attempt to find a basis for ethics in nature was one of the 
inspirations for the present thesis.    
I obviously have a lot of explaining to do, but there is a question that can be 
broached here: might the idea of a philosophical ground be indicative of a need for 
one?  I believe that could well be the case.  In the absence of an anchor in 
fundamental reality, ethics could be regarded as an intellectual abstraction; and, as 
Albert Camus said, ‘virtue has need of justification in order not to be abstract.’15  
Virtue is justified when reasons can be given for abiding by what one believes 
virtue to consist in.  Whether causal explanation can assist in providing 
justificatory reasons is a moot point, but the interplay between metaethics and 
ethics mentioned a moment ago suggests that it might be possible.  I will refer to 
the need for morality to be grounded as the ‘philosophical need’.  Our 
philosophical need gives rise to how and what questions with respect to reality (or 
what we believe to be real).  How did X come about?  What is X?  Answers to 
what questions may help explain why we do certain things, or should do them.  
What we believe to be right provides reasons for behaving the way we do, or 
should do.16                 
‘Philosophical need’ could be regarded as a kind of ‘metaphysical need’, a notion 
that some would baulk at.  Nietzsche, for instance, wrote about taking an axe to 
the ‘root of the “metaphysical need” of man,’17 but very soon after wielding the 
axe he can be found in the same book acknowledging that the ‘question as to the 
origin of moral values is … a question of primary importance to me because it 
determines the future of mankind.’18  In my opinion, the search for origins is 
                                                 
15 Albert Camus, The Rebel, translated by Anthony Bower (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin 
Books, 1962 [first published 1951]), p. 101. 
16 It is not my wish to imply that human nature is wholly explainable in terms of biological factors.  
Biology and contextual factors (nature and nurture) are both influential with regard to human 
behaviour: how (i.e. causal) questions may be answered in terms of either or both of them.  In 
other words, when answers to why questions lead ultimately to how questions being asked, the 
answers to them could refer either to biological factors or contextual factors, and most likely (and 
effectively) to both kinds of factors.  In his book Darwin’s Legacy, John Dupré insists that both be 
taken into account; he is especially critical of evolutionary psychologists for seeking explanations 
predominantly in terms of biology; and within biology, genetic science.  See Dupré chapter 6, 
‘Human Nature’.   
17 Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, ‘Human All-Too-Human’, in The Philosophy of Nietzsche 
(New York: The Modern Library, 1927), s. 6.   
18Ecce Homo, ‘The Dawn of Day’, s. 2.  Moral values are described by Isaiah Berlin as ‘ultimate 
ends’, i.e. ends to which ‘wise human beings, who understand reality, will dedicate their lives’ 
(Isaiah Berlin, Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas, edited by Henry Hardy, 
introduced by Roger Hausheer (London: Pimlico, 1997 [first published 1979]), p. 45).   
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symptomatic of the philosophical need.  What were the origins for Nietzsche?—
eschewing the traditional ‘selflessness’, he gave pride of place to ‘self-
preservation and the increase of bodily energy.’19  Satisfaction of the 
philosophical need by a Nietzschean would be attained without reference to the 
supernatural.  Similarly for the American psychologist Abraham Maslow, who 
spoke of attaining ‘religious states insofar as they are naturalistic.’20  Maslow’s 
theory of needs-based motivation is central to the order-based theory of morality, 
so his ideas on this matter are worth noting.    
Maslow considered the naturalistic religious state to be a condition of maximum 
human potential.  The state of which he speaks could be said to reflect the essence 
of Tao, for he often invoked Taoist thinking when articulating his own ideals.  
According to the Tao Te Ching (Taoism’s ‘bible’), the essence of Tao consists in 
knowledge of ‘the ancient beginning,’21  which is described as ‘natural’.  In the 
words of the book: ‘Man follows the earth. /Earth follows heaven. /Heaven 
follows the Tao. /Tao follows what is natural.’22  Knowledge of the ancient 
beginning would surely go a long way towards satisfying one’s philosophical 
need: it would enable one to form a view of the place occupied by human beings 
within nature.   
In sum, the objectives of the thesis are as follows:  
A. Explain how we came to be moral beings;  
B. Demonstrate that the proposed theory explains what right and good consist in;  
C. Show what kind of moral norms issue from the theory;   
D. Show why adherence to norms generated by the theory is justifiable;  
E. Show that the norms issuing from the theory are consistent with extant moral 
theory, both consequentialist and non-consequentialist;  
F. Differentiate the proposed theory from extant moral theories; and  
G. Show that the order-based theory provides a plausible secular foundation on 
which morality can be based.   
                                                 
19 Ecce Homo, ‘The Dawn of Day’, s. 2. 
20 A. H. Maslow, The Farther Reaches of Human Nature (New York: Penguin, 1993 [first 
published 1971]), p. 124.  Primarily a psychologist, Maslow was also something of a 
philosopher—he was well acquainted with the work of Nietzsche and Spinoza, amongst others. 
21 Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching, translated by Gia-Fu Feng and Jane English (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1972), chapter 14. 
22 Gia-Fu and English , Tao Te Ching, chapter 25. 
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Aims A and G are strictly metaethical issues, while B, C and D are predominantly 
ethical in nature.  E and F pertain to both spheres. 
1.2 An Outline of the Argument 
After dealing with some definitional issues, the argument of the thesis begins by 
addressing the metaethical how question: i.e., how did it come about that we are 
moral beings?  The assumption that we are moral beings is based on the 
observation that most if not all mature adult human beings have a conception of 
right and wrong, good and evil.  Our conceptions may vary, but their mere 
existence is sufficient to confirm that morality helps define what human nature 
consists in.  For the reasons mentioned above, answers to the metaethical  how 
question arguably point towards how ethical what and why questions might also 
be answered, i.e. describing what we believe moral good and right consist in and 
explaining why we should have those beliefs (and act upon them).        
As well as being defined by morality, I will argue that human nature is such that 
we are needful creatures, that what we need are survival and well-being, and that 
the need for these things finds expression in the kinds of needs articulated by 
Maslow.  We have a common set of basic needs, but we set about satisfying our 
needs in various ways, where the means of satisfaction depend partly on our 
social, cultural, geographical and political circumstances.  Our genetic inheritance 
is another determinant of how needs might be satisfied (for example, if we are 
born with impaired vision, the tools we use to obtain knowledge may differ from 
those employed by fully-sighted persons).  The motivational force of the various 
needs may similarly vary between people.  Furthermore, the ways in which we 
satisfy our needs, and which needs are given priority, will also be determined by 
our personal character, which may be either well-disposed towards other people or 
ill-disposed towards them.  Our genetic inheritance and the various circumstances 
in which we find ourselves are likely to have a bearing on our character.  All of 
this is remains to be explained.  For the moment, I simply wish to note that some 
agents will be seen to attend to their needs by interacting with others in a humane 
manner, whereas other agents act inhumanely. 
The thesis is divided into four parts.  Part I consists of the present introductory 
chapter and two further chapters.  Chapter 2 is a synopsis of ethical issues: based 
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on a discussion of means and ends, a distinction is drawn between, on the one 
hand, morally good ends and morally bad ends; and, on the other hand, between 
morally right means and morally wrong means.  Two umbrella terms are 
introduced: ‘moral commendability’, to cover that which is morally good or 
morally right; and ‘moral condemnability’, to cover that which is morally wrong 
or morally bad.  Chapter 3 introduces the concept of order.  The distinction 
between life and non-life is explored, with genetics and entropy-avoidance being 
found to be significant differentiating factors; the notion of order is shown to be 
central to both factors.     
Part II (Chapters 4-6) of the thesis is concerned with the metaethical how question.  
Chapter 4 explicates the concept of homosapient order, which is shown to consist 
of three kinds of interrelated order—physical, social and eudaimonic, the last 
deriving from Aristotle’s conception of the highest form of human flourishing.23  
Homosapient order is said to be necessary to human well-being, i.e., that it is 
needed by us.  It is also shown to be analogous to justice.  Maslow’s hierarchy of 
needs is outlined in Chapter 5, where the motivational force of homosapient order 
is also investigated.  Each of the needs identified by Maslow is described and 
linked to the need for homosapient order.  The contention is that all of the 
Maslovian needs are expressions of the need for homosapient order.  Chapter 6 
presents evidence for the moral relevance of needs.  The answer to the question of 
how we came to be moral beings stems from the fact of our needfulness, that our 
needs are morally relevant, and that our various needs have their basis in the 
putative need for homosapient order.     
Part III (Chapters 7 and 8) focuses on the ethical relevance of the order-based 
theory.  In Chapter 7 the theory is shown to have a utilitarian aspect in the way in 
which moral commendability and condemnability are determined: morally 
classifiable behaviour is held to be condemnable where satisfaction of an agent’s 
                                                 
23 The continuity discerned by Aristotle between politics and ethics could be seen to offer a means 
of linking the concepts of order and morality.  Politics is concerned with government, and 
government is concerned with the imposition of order.  If ethics and politics are indeed 
continuous, then morality would also be concerned with the imposition of order.  And so it is, but I 
will argue that it is order mediated by needs (such as the need for food and shelter), and many 
more kinds of needs reside in individuals than in social entities such as political organisations.  
The Aristotelian connection between politics and ethics will not be pursued at any length in this 
thesis. 
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need occurs at the expense of a respondent’s more basic or weightier need.  
Chapter 8 considers the moral relevance of human character.  The order-based 
theory is shown to encompass a character-based ethics as well as a utilitarian one.   
Part IV of the thesis consists of Chapters 9-11.  Chapter 9 completes the order-
based theory by arguing for the reality of homosapient order.  The need for 
homosapient order is posited as a basis for morality and therefore as a means of 
satisfying the philosophical need of a secularist.  Chapter 10 investigates some 
possible challenges to the theory, namely determinism, moral relativism, whether 
morality can arise independently of needs, genetic fallaciousness and naturalistic 
fallaciousness.  All of the challenges are deemed to be rebuttable.  Chapter 11 
brings the thesis to a conclusion with consideration of whether the theory meets 
the stated objectives.     
A Note on Structure 
The first sections of each of the chapters that comprise the substance of the 
argument of the thesis (Chapters 2-9) include a review of background literature 
pertaining to the issues at hand.  I do not pretend to have covered all of the 
literature that might be deemed relevant—the fields are simply too big.  But I 
hope that the sources I have used at least generate appropriate questions against 
which the order-based theory might reasonably be evaluated. 
Before beginning the argument I should also mention that I will be using the terms 
‘morality’ and ‘ethics’ (and their derivatives) interchangeably, notwithstanding 
variations in usage by proponents of other theories.  For instance, virtue ethicists 
tend to speak more about ethics than they do about morality, whereas, for 
deontologists, the reverse is usually the case.  The virtue ethicist focuses primarily 
on the agent’s character: she asks whether an act is consistent with whatever is 
conducive to living well, i.e. to living virtuously.  Deontologists instead ask 
whether an act is consistent with the maxims of moral law; for example, whether 
someone affected by an agent’s action is being treated as an end in herself, as 
distinct from a means to the agent’s end.  I will elaborate on these matters in the 
next chapter: all I want to say here is that I believe that both theories have good 
and sensible things to say about the ways in which human beings may reasonably 
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be expected to behave: neglect of either of them would produce an outcome of 
dubious worth. 
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2:  ENDS AND MEANS, GOOD AND RIGHT 
 
 
2.1 A Note on Moral Theory 
Over time, numerous moral theories have been proposed, but it is generally agreed 
that the theories resolve into two major kinds, consequentialist and non-
consequentialist; or, in an older terminology, teleological and non-teleological.  
The teleological encompasses virtue ethics and utilitarianism, while the non-
teleological is predominantly deontological.24  Virtue ethics has ancient roots, for 
instance in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, which begins with the words ‘[e]very 
art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at 
some good; and for this reason the good has been rightly declared to be that at 
which things aim.’25  Good action is virtuous action.  Utilitarianism is a more 
recent development, having been initiated in the eighteenth century by Jeremy 
Bentham.  Deontology began with Kant, with the demand that each of us be bound 
by and act in accordance with an internally formulated moral law consisting of a 
set of categorical imperatives.26  ‘Deontological’ derives from the Greek for ‘that 
which is binding’.  Consequentialists prioritise the good, while deontologists focus 
more on the right.   
Since it would be nonsensical to claim that everything that we describe as either 
good or right is of moral relevance, I should emphasise that it is moral good and 
moral right that are in view here.  An ice-cream on a hot day might be considered 
good to eat, and we would have good reason (i.e. it would not be wrong) to 
purchase it: but neither the eating nor the purchasing would be likely to have any 
moral significance.  To explain what is of moral significance is one of the aims of 
                                                 
24 The non-teleological, Pettit observes, ‘is sometimes identified with, and sometimes taken just to 
include, the deontological.’  See Philip Pettit, ‘Consequentialism’, in Singer (editor), A Companion 
to Ethics, p. 230. 
25 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, translated by W. D. Ross (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 
Great Books of the Western World, 1952), Vol. 9, I.1, 1094a. 
26 The Categorical Imperative is a complex notion with several layers of meaning, but its dominant 
sense is that of a self-imposed unconditional principle of conduct, or maxim, that one believes 
worthy of universal enactment.  In another sense, each person is to be treated as an end in him- or 
herself, and not as a means to the achievement of someone else’s ends.  In addition, the maxims 
adopted by any one person should be such that universal adoption of them would give rise to a 
kingdom of ends, where everything has either value or dignity.  Anything that has a value may be 
replaced by something that is equivalent, and is of relative worth.  By contrast, that which 
possesses dignity is irreplaceable; dignity is said to be of intrinsic worth. 
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this chapter.  The results will be used in Chapter 4 to test the moral relevance of 
homosapient order. 
As well as the divide between consequentialist ethical theories and non-
consequentialist ethical theories, another line of demarcation separates cognitivist 
theories from non-cognitivist theories.  Cognitivists maintain that moral attitudes 
are based on beliefs, and issue in propositions that are capable of objective truth 
and falsity.  Non-cognitivists consider moral attitudes to be more like desires:27 as 
Philippa Foot puts it, the non-cognitivist links moral judgements ‘to an individual 
speaker’s subjective state.’28  The deepest roots of non-cognitivism go back to 
Hume,29 who located the basis of morality in what he and others refer to as ‘moral 
sense’, i.e. a kind of instinct that orients people towards benevolence.  I will not 
have very much more to say about this second line of demarcation, which could in 
fact turn out to be unsustainable.  The cognitive neuroscientist Antonio Damasio 
has demonstrated that ‘thinking always involves the emotions;’ and, conversely, 
that ‘our feelings about human relations almost always involve thought.’30  In 
other words, reason and the emotions are generally inseparable, in which case 
cognitivism and non-cognitivism could be found collapsing into one another.  
Instead of either/or, it would be a case of both/and, i.e. emotion and reason in 
conjunction.   
However, assuming for a moment that cognitivism and non-cognitivism can be 
kept apart, the principal issue for both camps would seem to be how 
determinations of good and right are made.  Consequentialists and non-
consequentialists, by contrast, tend to focus more on what is good or right.  The 
two lines of demarcation on that account can be envisaged as intersecting.  Hume 
could reasonably be seen in terms of consequentialism plus non-cognitivism, and 
Kant in terms of non-consequentialism plus cognitivism.  The order-based theory 
will be found to be closer to Hume than it is to Kant, although I hope also to be 
                                                 
27Jonathan Dancy, ‘Intuitionism’, in Singer (editor): A Companion to Ethics, p. 415.  Also, Charles 
R. Pigden, ‘Naturalism’, in Singer (editor): A Companion to Ethics, p. 421.  
28Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010 [first published 2001]), 
p. 8. 
29 Foot, pp. 5-6. 
30 Owen Flanagan, The Problem of the Soul (New York: Basic Books, 2002), p. 302.  Similarly, 
Stephen Pope maintains that the passions ‘include a physiological component, but cannot be 
regarded as purely irrational because their arousal implies an interpretation of the experience, and 
therefore includes a cognitive component’ (Stephen J. Pope, The Evolution of Altruism & The 
Ordering of Love (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 1994), p. 56). 
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able to show that deontological principles such as prescriptiveness in relation to 
conduct can be accommodated without too much difficulty. 
The ice-cream example was about ends and means—cooling down was the end, 
and eating an ice-cream was the means of getting cool.  Morality is also concerned 
with ends and means. 
2.2 Ends and Means      
William Casebeer usefully distinguishes between instrumental norms and final 
norms.31  The distinction is one of means and ends: means are employed as 
instruments to attain certain ends, which are final.  In talking about means and 
ends some ideas from Dewey are worth noting.  Dewey rejected the dualism 
between means and ends, and instead regarded means as ‘intermediates’ or stages 
along the way towards an end, which in turn consists in ‘merely a series of acts 
viewed at a remote stage.’32  In other words, means and ends constitute a 
continuum.  For example, a tool-user would tend to regard the tool as a means of 
getting something done, whereas the tool-maker would see it as an end of the 
process employed in making it.  But the tool-user may also look upon the tool as 
an end, i.e. as one of the intermediate stages referred to by Dewey; and the tool-
maker would very likely regard the tool as a means of earning a living.  
Nevertheless, it will still be useful to retain the terminology of means and ends.  
The terms, I believe, reflect the main issue that separates deontologists from 
consequentialists, with the former being primarily interested in means and the 
latter focusing on ends.  Or, to use slightly different terminology, deontologist 
ethics is action-orientated and consequentialist ethics results-orientated.33  But 
even this distinction is porous, since action generally has some kind of aim, and 
results are usually obtained by means of some kind of action.       
Norms may be associated with either means or ends.  Norms are rules of conduct, 
and can be either morally relevant or not morally relevant.  Rules of etiquette, for 
example, would generally be regarded as being of no moral significance.  In light 
of the differing emphases of consequentialists and non-consequentialists, I am 
                                                 
31 Casebeer, p. 13. 
32 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 2002 [first 
published 1922]), p. 34. 
33 See Onora O’Neill, ‘Kantian Ethics’, in Singer (editor): A Companion to Ethics, p. 184. 
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tempted to link the concept of good to that of ends, and the notion of right to that 
of means.  There would then be four possibilities: morally good ends, morally bad 
ends, morally right means, and morally wrong means.  But that would be too 
simplistic, and a violation of common usage.  For instance, deeds (i.e. means) are 
widely described as either good or bad, and we find a reference in Foot, who is a 
consequentialist, to ‘right ends’ (I will come to that shortly).  Furthermore, Kant, 
the archetypal deontologist, may be presumed to have ends in mind when he 
described the moral law (i.e. the Categorical Imperative) as the summum bonum 
(highest good): in his words, the moral law is ‘the highest good in the world 
possible through freedom.’34  A more plausible taxonomy would be based on the 
final end/intermediate end distinction drawn by Dewey.  For the consequentialist, 
final ends would consist in ultimate goods, such as (on my thesis, yet to be 
demonstrated) homosapient order.  Intermediate ends, which are also means, 
would be viewed by the consequentialist in terms of either good or right.  Some 
ends, either final or intermediate, are morally irrelevant (like the ice-cream).  For 
the deontologist there are no intermediate ends.  Dutiful deeds that accord with the 
Categorical Imperative are final ends; they are actions performed for the sake of 
duty alone.  Whether they are always morally relevant is another matter.   
Morally relevant ends are ends that invite moral judgement: ‘he was right (or 
wrong) to seek attainment of his particular objective’.  Morally relevant means are 
those that also invite moral judgement: ‘he was right (or wrong) to seek 
fulfillment of his objective in the manner that he did’.  Good and right are 
commendable; bad and wrong are condemnable.  Morally commendable means 
will typically be employed in the attainment of morally commendable ends, and 
morally condemnable means will be directed towards morally condemnable ends.  
It is difficult to imagine how morally condemnable means could serve morally 
commendable ends, or how morally commendable means could be directed 
towards morally condemnable ends.  In order to explain which ends and means are 
morally commendable I must first distinguish between morally classifiable 
behaviour and behaviour that is morally irrelevant.  After doing that I will discuss 
moral commendability and condemnability.  
                                                 
34 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgement, translated by James Creed Meredith (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago, Great Books of the Western World, 1952), Vol. 42, s. 87 (henceforth 
referred to as ‘Judgement’). 
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2.3 Morally Classifiable Behaviour 
Morally classifiable behaviour is action by an agent that invites judgement in 
terms of moral right or wrong.  Several conditions need to be fulfilled for moral 
classifiability to obtain.  First, there must be alternative courses of action from 
which to choose; second, the agent must be a human being; third, the agent must 
be capable of choosing between the alternatives; and fourth, the action of the 
agent must affect others in a reasonably significant way.  Each of the conditions 
will now be discussed. 
For behaviour to be morally classifiable there must be alternative courses of action 
from which an agent may choose; this is also a condition of freedom.  The 
alternative courses must also be feasible for the agent: as Daniel Dennett puts it, 
he or she must have the power or ability ‘to do otherwise.’35  In order for choice to 
be possible, alternative courses of action must first be perceived and 
comprehended.  Comprehension may entail assessment of which course would be 
best to adopt.  Community standards and one’s own moral principles would enter 
into the assessment.     
Moral classifiability can arise from non-action as well as action.  An act that is 
chosen is also an act that can be refrained from.  Drunkenness is usually 
avoidable, and morally reprehensible behaviour during a state of drunkenness is 
deserving of sanction, provided the perpetrator is responsible for his or her 
condition (someone whose drink had been spiked may not be).  The same applies 
to impulsive action.  The capacity to refrain from acting is constitutive of 
freedom.  Morality is non-action in so far as it arises from a consciously taken 
decision to avoid a course of action that would be morally wrong.  In the same 
way that right can consist in wrong not done, wrong can arise from not doing 
something that would be right, for example refusal to donate to a deserving charity 
when it is within one’s power to do so.  Morally classifiable behaviour will 
henceforth be understood to encompass non-action as well as action.     
The second and third conditions for moral classifiability will be taken together: 
the agent must be a human being, and must be capable of choosing from the 
alternative courses of action that present themselves.  Morally classifiable 
                                                 
35 Daniel C.  Dennett, Freedom Evolves (New York: Viking, 2003), p. 118.   
                                                                                                 
18  
behaviour is the exclusive province of human beings because, as far as we know, 
human beings are the only entities equipped with (1) the ability to envisage and 
understand alternative courses of action, (2) sufficient powers of rational choice to 
weigh up the consequences of pursuing the various alternatives, and (3) an 
inclination to choose from the alternatives on the basis of right and wrong.  The 
ideas are consistent with Dewey’s understanding of moral agency as an ‘activity 
in a situation where voluntary choice is made between incompatible, character-
determining courses of action by an agent exercising some degree of foresight and 
deliberation.’36   Because reason is necessary to choosing, an inability to reason 
(for example because of intellectual disability, or immaturity) has a bearing on 
moral classifiability.  Morally classifiable behaviour arises from relationships 
between particular kinds of entities, at least one of which must be a human being, 
i.e. relationships between two or more people, or between one or more human 
beings and other entities such as whales and rainforests.   
An agent and at least one respondent are always needed for moral behaviour to 
occur.  As the term ‘respondent’ implies, someone (or something) needs to be 
affected by the agent’s behaviour (or intended behaviour: see below) in order for 
the question of moral classifiability to arise.  The term’s suitability is enhanced by 
the verbal connection between ‘respondent’ and the expressions ‘responsibility’ 
and ‘responsiveness’.  A respondent is someone (or something) to whom (or 
which) an agent has some kind of responsibility—an agent, moreover, who is 
responsible for his or her behaviour, by having chosen it.  Then again, a 
respondent is someone or something to whom or which an agent is required to be 
responsive.37 
Prima facie, the need for an effect on a respondent would seem to disqualify 
unsuccessful attempts at reprehensible action from moral judgement, for example 
where an assassin’s bullet misses the target.38  This raises the question of the 
                                                 
36 Jennifer Welchman quoted by Douglas Anderson in his article ‘Old Pragmatisms, New 
Histories’, in Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol. 47, no. 4 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2009), p. 513. 
37 The notions of responsiveness and anti-responsiveness are central to Nozick’s theory of ethical 
pull, i.e. the moral claims that others exert upon an agent.     
38 According to Foot, when practical rationality is brought to bear in moral decision-making, a kind 
of ‘all-things-considered’ judgement is made (Foot, chapter 4).  She also asks whether 
‘considerations that are about right and wrong’ may be included among ‘rationalizing 
considerations’ Foot, p. 62).  Right and wrong would thereby be among the all-things-considered.   
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moral significance of an agent’s intentions.  Broadly speaking, it would be fair to 
say that intentions are highly significant.  For example, deontologists maintain 
that one ‘is not said to have done something wrong if one did not intend to do the 
thing in question.’39  Hume, who was not a deontologist, seems to have been of 
the same mind: ‘[b]y the intention we judge of the actions, and according as that is 
good or bad, they become causes of love or hatred.’40  A brief discussion of the 
concept of intention will help explain its relevance to morality.      
Kieran Setiya observes that intention can be understood in either of three ways: as 
a plan for the future, or as the purpose or goal for which action is undertaken, or 
as intentional action itself.  To adapt Setiya’s examples, I am writing this with a 
view to completing my thesis by the due date (plan for the future); the words I am 
writing now are intended to recognise the philosophical complexities involved in 
the notion of intention (purposeful or goal-directed action); and I am intentionally 
writing what I am now writing (intentional action).  The three aspects of intention 
have attracted a great deal of philosophical attention.41  All three are indicative of 
ways in which intention would normally be understood and spoken about.              
‘Plan for the future’ intention is distinguishable from its other two aspects by 
virtue of the fact that plans may be unconsummated by action, whereas action is 
necessarily involved in both goal-directed action and intentional action.   Because 
of the consequences entailed in action, the action-orientation of intention is 
certainly important; but its planned-but-not-acted-upon orientation also requires 
recognition.  Just as some consequences of our actions may be unintended, some 
of our intentions might not result in action, or at least the intended action.  A 
driver who speeds through a red light at an intersection and kills someone crossing 
it from another direction would generally not be considered to have intended the 
dreadful outcome of his actions, but he would nonetheless be held to be morally 
responsible.42  A would-be assassin who conspires to kill may have his plans 
                                                 
39 Nancy (Ann) Davis, ‘Contemporary Deontology’, in Singer (editor): A Companion to Ethics, p. 
210. 
40 Hume, Treatise, 2.2.3. 
41 Kieran Setiya, "Intention", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/intention/ 
(accessed 4 November 2012). 
42 He would also be legally culpable, at least in some jurisdictions: the maximum penalty under the 
Victorian Crimes Act 1958 is twenty years imprisonment plus a possible fine (Sec. 318).  
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thwarted, but the conspiracy as an action would still be morally classifiable.43  It 
would also be morally condemnable; why that is so will be explained in Chapters 
7 and 8, under the heading ‘Unconsummated Intentions’.  (The question of 
unintended consequences is examined in the same chapters.)  A plan that gets past 
the conspiracy stage and culminates in an unsuccessful attempt to kill would be 
similarly morally classifiable and condemnable.      
Unsuccessful actions such as those of the ineffectual assassin may nevertheless 
affect their intended victims; and their perpetrators as well.  From the latter’s 
perspective, the very failure would presumably have some kind of effect.  From 
the victim’s perspective, murder might not have occurred, but were the person to 
learn of the assassin’s intentions, he or she would probably feel significantly 
threatened.  Of course that would not be the case if the perpetrator had quietly left 
the scene and no-one else ever became aware of what had happened.  Would his 
action still be morally classifiable?  And who could possibly do the classifying?  
With regard to the first question, I would want to say that the agent’s action is 
morally classifiable, but on what basis?  Who might be the respondent?   As 
implausible as it might sound, I think the would-be assassin himself could be 
regarded as respondent, in addition to being agent.  In other words, agent and 
respondent may be the same person.  Other such cases are imaginable, for 
example excessive self-indulgence such as gluttony (see p. 146).  The glutton 
harms himself by over-eating; the assassin conceivably harms himself by having 
to live with the knowledge of having acted in a way that would generally invite 
opprobrium.  Even a psychopath who feels no remorse would probably be aware 
of the legal consequences of his action and their possible connection with moral 
culpability: otherwise why the stealth?  The remorseful would-be assassin is 
clearly affected by his action.  Either way, remorseful or not, the agent would be 
affected by his (failed) action.  In sum, where the agent’s intentions remain 
unknown to anyone apart from himself, the agent is respondent to his own action.  
As to who might deem the agent’s action morally classifiable, I think the answer 
                                                 
43 It would also be legally punishable.  For example, the Victorian Crimes Act 1958 imposes the 
same maximum penalty for conspiracy to murder as that attracted by actual murder (Sec. 321).  
Attempt to murder likewise (Sec. 321P).   
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to that must also be the agent-cum-respondent.44  Where an agent’s intentions are 
more widely known, respondency would rest with the intended respondent and 
possibly also with society in general.   
Before intentions and acts can become morally significant, an informed 
assessment must be made by an agent of the alternative courses of action that are 
available to him.  As mentioned, some people might not be able to make informed 
assessments; for example young children, and persons suffering from severe 
mental impairment.  If they seem at times to be acting upon a choice from 
alternative courses of action, we would nevertheless generally want exclude them 
from moral responsibility—but on what basis?  When does the capacity for 
responsible choice kick in?  A hard and fast rule would be difficult to devise, and 
would, in any case, be likely to vary depending on time and place.  But some 
broad criteria for responsibility are conceivable.  First, a person would need to 
have had sufficient opportunity to develop an awareness of his or her 
community’s moral standards: young children (how young?) would be excluded 
on this criterion.  Second, a person would need to have the capacity for developing 
such awareness: the young would again be excluded, as would the insane.  Both 
conditions would have to be met before moral responsibility becomes 
applicable.45            
The discussion has brought us to the point where reasoned choice emanating from 
freedom would seem to be sufficient to render behaviour consequent upon the 
choice morally classifiable.  Whenever we choose to act in accordance with a 
choice, our action affects someone or something somewhere, potentially for better 
or worse: that being so, the effect may be measured in terms of moral significance.  
Which brings me to the fourth condition for moral classifiability: the action of the 
agent must affect others in a reasonably significant way.  The significance of an 
agent’s behaviour may be very small, as, for example, action following a choice 
                                                 
44 A theist would have a ready answer to this question: God would deliver the verdict.  But that 
option is not open to an atheistic thinker.  Nor, I believe, could there be recourse to the notion of 
an Archimedean point, i.e. a hypothetical perspective from which an observer might view all of the 
circumstances objectively and independently.   Anyone with the omniscience implied by the notion 
would be rather too much like a supernatural deity—which leaves only the parties (or party) with 
knowledge of the action.    
45 Foot speaks of culpable ignorance, i.e. of not knowing something that one should have known, 
and acting reprehensibly because of it (Foot, p. 71).  The actions of children and intellectually 
disabled people could be excusable on the grounds of non-culpable ignorance. 
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between chocolate ice-cream and vanilla ice-cream.  In this regard, Dewey’s view 
that ‘it would be morbid to subject each act to moral scrutiny’ might be noted.46  
The consequences of choices between ice-cream flavours would be minuscule, 
although the producers of the flavour not chosen could conceivably suffer from it 
in some small way—and we know from chaos theory that large effects can arise 
from small causes.47  On the other hand, the moral significance attached to a 
choice may be momentous, as would be the case if we decide to get drunk and 
then kill someone whilst driving in an inebriated state.   
The conjunction of moral classifiability and moral significance may be viewed in 
the form of a chiasmus, with morally classifiable/not morally classifiable and 
morally significant /morally insignificant as its axes.   
  
Morally Classifiable 
 
 
   
   
Morally Insignificant  Morally Significant 
   
   
 Not Morally 
Classifiable 
 
 
Figure 1: Moral Classifiability of Behaviour 
 
In the north-east quadrant, moral classifiability combined with moral significance 
is the region of all the morally praiseworthy or culpable behaviour that we have 
been discussing.  While some kind of non-triviality test might also be required for 
moral classifiability, there need be no doubt that free and reasoned choice is 
necessary to morally classifiable behaviour.  Moving anti-clockwise, morally 
                                                 
46 See Ruth Anna Putnam, ‘The Moral Life of a Pragmatist’, in Owen Flanagan and Amélie 
Oksenberg Rorty (editors), Identity, Character, and Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1993), p. 71.  Following a point made by Anscombe, 
Foot observes that the ‘use of “should” [which is close to “ought” (Foot, p. 80)] in … practical 
contexts tells us of a possible defect in action, but does not tell us whether or not anything of 
importance is involved’ (Foot, p. 67). 
47 Parfit considers it a mistake to believe that an act cannot be morally wrong merely on the 
grounds that its effects on others are trivial or imperceptible (Parfit, p. 443).   Since most people in 
the present age live in large communities, perceptibly small initial effects can develop into large 
effects.  Reasonable care would need to be taken in deciding what to ignore.  See also Foot on the 
matter of culpable ignorance. 
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classifiable/morally insignificant behaviour involves trivial choices like those 
concerning ice-cream flavours; these should obviously be excluded from scrutiny, 
at least in normal circumstances.  Next, not morally classifiable/morally 
insignificant behaviour is behaviour that is constrained by the unavailability of 
alternative courses of action or an inability to choose on the basis of right and 
wrong; for example, a young child stealing a plum from his neighbour’s fully-
laden tree.  Finally, the conjunction of non-moral classifiability with moral 
significance could appear to be oxymoronic, but betrayal of his country by a 
prisoner-of-war because of brain-washing might be placed here: treachery might 
be dimly viewed, whatever the circumstances.       
To sum up, morally classifiable behaviour is possible only when there are 
alternative courses of action from which a reasonably competent agent may 
choose.  The resultant behaviour will be either morally commendable or morally 
condemnable.  It is time to consider what moral commendability and moral 
condemnability consist in.   
2.4 Moral Commendability and Condemnability 
Moral commendability encompasses the notions of moral good and moral right: it 
refers to either action or results.  For deontologists, what counts is the spirit in 
which morally classifiable behaviour is undertaken and the thought involved in it.  
In Kant’s view, the will is the only thing that can be unqualifiedly good (see p. 
161).  Dutiful action is generally regarded as an end in itself.  Dutiful action is 
right action; it is action that accords with the Categorical Imperative.  
Deontologists also tend to rule some actions totally out of court, typically lying 
and murder; such things are categorically impermissible, no ifs and buts about 
them.48   
Categorically prescribed action (or non-action) would always be regarded as 
morally relevant, and tell us in no uncertain manner what is morally commendable 
                                                 
48 Davis, p. 209.  Davis writes, ‘[f]or the deontologist, an act may be permissible without being the 
best (or even a good) option.  For the consequentialist, however, a course of action is permissible 
when and only when it is the best (or equal best) option to an agent ….’  Davis notes that 
consequentialism has attracted criticism because permissibility under its auspices leaves ‘agents 
with insufficient breathing room’ (Davis, p. 209).  By ‘insufficient breathing room’ I understand 
Davis to mean that a consequentialist agent tends to be overloaded with obligations.  Although 
impermissibility would seem simply to be the obverse of permissibility, i.e. opposite sides of the 
same coin, Davis may well have a point: for instance, the order-based theory finds that there are 
many more ways of doing right than doing wrong.  
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or condemnable.  This is an extreme position, and contemporary deontologists 
such as Nancy (Ann) Davis have sought to modify it.  As Davis says, ‘the notion 
of “wrong” could not intelligibly be regarded as possessing absolute or categorical 
force; faced with the prospect of doing wrong by lying or doing wrong by causing 
harm, the unfortunate agent would have to consider which action would be more 
wrong.  And from here it is but a short step to a view that looks much more like 
some form of consequentialism than deontology.’49  It would look more like 
consequentialism because of the implicit weighting involved in the agent’s 
considerations, and because of the presence in his or her mind of a notion along 
the lines of ‘that which is best’.   
The deontologist’s requirements for moral commendability are also important to 
consequentialists.  Foot considers goodness of the will to be that which determines 
‘the goodness of human beings in respect of their actions.’50  Recalling David 
Wong’s proposition that morality involves conflict resolution (see p. 1), it would 
seem fair to say that moral behaviour requires a willingness on the part of a 
human being to resolve moral conflicts.  However, unlike deontologists, at least 
those deontologists who hold extreme views in respect of the categorical nature of 
prescriptions and proscriptions—unlike them, consequentialists do not regard 
action as its own final end.  Consequentialists also look to the intended purpose of 
an action.  Virtue ethicists like Elizabeth Anscombe are critical of doctrines that 
have no reference to the good.  In the mid-twentieth century, Anscombe had 
become concerned that the notions of moral duty and obligation had been 
rendered ‘anchorless’ because of a lack of understanding of what the good 
consists in.  Without an anchor, ethical doctrines had, in her view, become 
corrupted into unintelligible stipulations such as ‘act not to satisfy any want of 
yours but simply because it’s morally right to do so.’51  Anscombe believed 
doctrines like these to be harmful; as Greg Spence puts it, ‘[v]irtue perniciously 
becomes an end in itself, unattached to human needs and desires.’52   
                                                 
49 Davis, p. 214. 
50 Foot, p. 14. 
51 See Greg Spence, ‘Virtue Theory’, in Singer (editor): A Companion to Ethics Spence, p. 251. 
52 Spence notes that Elizabeth Anscombe helped revive interest in virtue theory in the mid 
twentieth century.  See Spence, pp. 250-251.  Anscombe served as a source of inspiration for 
Philippa Foot.   
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What, then, is there about the consequentialist final end that makes it morally 
commendable?  Philippa Foot has many interesting things to say about the good in 
her book Natural Good.  It is possible, Foot believes, ‘that the concept of a good 
human life plays the same part in determining goodness of human characteristics 
and operations that the concept of flourishing plays in the determination of 
goodness in plants and animals.’53  It is a matter of instantiating ‘the life form’ of 
the relevant species,54 human beings included.  A very important aspect of the 
human life form is what Foot refers to as ‘practical rationality’, which consists in 
action (practice) that is informed by reason (rationality).  Some thinkers tie 
practical rationality to self-interest, or the satisfaction of present desires,55 but 
Foot’s aim is to show that it issues from an individual’s natural goodness and that 
it is therefore good in its own right.  ‘Considerations’, she writes, ‘about such 
things as promising, neighbourliness, and help for those in trouble have … the 
same kind of connection with reasons for action as do considerations of self-
interest or of means to our ends: the connection going in each case through the 
concept of practical rationality and the facts of human life.’56  It is virtue theory 
that is in view here, where virtuous action is held to be guided by that which is 
believed to be good.  For Foot, the good that is practical rationality is a fact of 
human life, and it is practical rationality that guides virtuous actions such as 
promising and the provision of aid.  It also culminates in sociable dispositions 
such as neighbourliness.      
One of Foot’s stated aims is to break the utilitarian nexus between virtue and 
happiness.  She writes,  ‘[w]hat is problematic about the relation between virtue 
and happiness … [comes] from the idea that happiness is Man’s Good, together 
with the idea that happiness may be successfully pursued through evil action.’57  
Similarly, satisfaction of the need for homosapient order, assuming for now that 
such a need exists, may be accompanied by significant pain.  Anticipating the 
argument of Section 8.3, humaneness is an important feature of homosapient 
order, and to act humanely may involve some kind of self-sacrifice.  Aesthetic 
                                                 
53 Foot, p. 44. 
54 Foot, p. 91. 
55 Foot, p. 13. 
56 Foot, p. 18.  Although Foot makes no mention of Finnis’s concept of ‘practical reasonableness’, 
the two ideas are quite close in tenor, as might be expected from the terminology involved.  Both 
carry significant moral weight. 
57 Foot, p. 82. 
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experience and intellectual achievement are also aspects of homosapient order, 
and they too may involve self-sacrifice.  For example, there would surely be few 
who would think of Proust as having lived a life of unadulterated bliss while he 
was piecing together In Search of Lost Time in his cork-lined room in Paris.  On 
the other hand, as Foot points out, a Nazi facilitator of the Holocaust might have 
been perfectly happy in his work.58  It all depends on what one understands 
‘happiness’ to mean.  Enjoyment of an activity consistent with one’s character 
would be part of it.59  Enjoyment gives rise to joy, but even this may be attended 
by suffering.  Proust would be one example; another is the story recounted by 
Foot of a Quaker who suffered a great deal of persecution whilst preaching the 
Word, but who nevertheless described her life as happy.60  All in all, Foot prefers 
to speak in terms of happiness as ‘the enjoyment of good things, meaning 
enjoyment in attaining, and in pursuing, right ends.’62                
According to Foot, then, the good consists in something like ‘good for purpose’.  
As she says, ‘there is no change in the meaning of “good” between the word as it 
appears in “[a tree’s] good roots” and as it appears in “good dispositions of the 
human will”.’63 The emphasis is Foot’s so it is an important aspect of her theory.  
She effectively abolishes the distinction between moral good and all other kinds of 
good, at least in respect of their purposive or teleological nature.  But 
purposiveness is assuredly not sufficient for moral commendability (recall the ice-
cream).  For moral commendability to obtain, something else is required.  Three 
things, I suggest.  First, the end must be such that only morally classifiable 
behaviour can attain it (thereby ruling out the ice-cream).  Second, and this is 
implicit in the first condition, the end cannot be viewed in isolation from the 
means used to attain it: the two go together.  This is why the deontologist’s 
requirements for moral commendability are important, namely the thought that 
goes into decisions, and the spirit in which morally classifiable behaviour is 
                                                 
58 This is why Anscombe’s cautionary words were timely, and still worth heeding.  In the absence 
of reference to any kind of good apart from duty-for-duty’s sake, categorical prescriptions could 
finish up serving the interests of evil.  They might also become trivial, i.e. morally insignificant  
For instance, I regard it as my duty to put the recycled waste out for collection every second week 
and this is probably something that I could reasonably universalise into a categorical imperative.  
But its moral relevance is minuscule.   
59 Foot, p. 83.  See also Spinoza on the subject of joy later in this thesis.   
60 Foot, p. 85. 
62 Foot, p. 97. 
63 Foot, p. 39. 
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undertaken.  A deed done grudgingly is unlikely to be adjudged morally 
commendable, even if its results are good.   
The third requirement for moral commendability is some kind of criterion that 
distinguishes commendability from condemnability.  If one is asked why a 
particular instance of morally classifiable behaviour should be commended, then 
the reason given would probably be based on one’s beliefs with regard to what is 
deontologically right or consequentially good.  And that may well be the end of 
the story.  However, if one were to probe more deeply, along the lines suggested 
in Chapter 1, then a causal explanation may also be hit upon.  The causal 
explanation proposed in this thesis centres on the notion of homosapient order—
the answer to the question of commendability criteria is that morally classifiable 
behaviour is commendable when the quantum (however measured) of 
homosapient order increases across agent and respondent.  How this works is 
explained in Chapters 7 and 8.      
In sum, moral commendability for a consequentialist is a matter of both action and 
results.  However, having said that, there may still be a way of relegating action 
and bringing results into the foreground.  That would be possible if the purposes 
of human beings were understood to include the attainment of morally 
commendable ends; in other words, if we are essentially moral beings.  If that 
were the case, then our purposes would necessarily be served by morally 
commendable action.         
If that is what moral commendability consists in, how might its opposite—moral 
condemnability (wrong, bad)—be defined?  One way would be simply to say that 
it consists in morally classifiable behaviour that is not morally commendable.  
Interestingly, Foot offers a negative definition of goodness (she follows Aquinas 
here): for goodness to prevail, she says, ‘it is sufficient for an action not to be bad: 
if it is no way bad then it is good.’64  But that of course merely shifts the problem.  
How are we to define moral badness?    Foot writes, the ‘social and emotional 
surroundings of our use of the vocabulary of moral censure are very different from 
those in which we speak of rashness, obstinacy, imprudence, and folly.’  
Nevertheless, in the same way that the virtues such as temperance, courage and 
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wisdom should, in Foot’s view, be treated as a whole, she considers that all such 
defects may be labelled ‘evaluations of the rational human will.’  As in cases of 
moral evaluation, they are concerned with ‘voluntary action and purpose.’65  But 
the notion of moral badness still seems rather vague.  One way through the fog 
could be along the lines of—moral badness consists in morally classifiable 
behaviour that is contrary to our natural purposes.  I believe this would be 
consistent with Foot, and it pretty well reflects the essence of the order-based 
theory of morality.       
 2.5 Further Objectives  
Several objectives of the thesis were listed in Section 1.1.  A further two might 
usefully be added, based on the discussion of this chapter: 
H. To show that the order-based theory provides reasonable answers to the 
fundamental questions emanating from the consequentialist/non-
consequentialist divide.  The questions are: for consequentialists, ‘what kind 
of person should I be?’ and for deontologists, ‘what ought I to do?’  In view of 
the putative interplay between results and action (i.e. ends and means), 
plausible answers to both questions are required.     
I. According to Dewey, ‘[t]o say that an end is remote or distant, to say in fact 
that it is an end at all, is equivalent to saying that obstacles intervene between 
us and it.  If, however, it remains a distant end, it becomes a mere end, that is a 
dream.’66  This poses a very serious question for the order-based theory.   I 
need to show that homosapient order is something more than merely a dream, 
that it is not too distant (or even chimerical) to be of any practical (i.e. moral) 
concern.     
To place homosapient order in context, it will help to expand on the concept of 
order.  That is the subject of the next chapter.  
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3: ORDER: AN INTRODUCTION 
 
3.1 General Characteristics of Order 
Finnis’s proposition that order involves a set of unifying relations (see p. 1) is an 
echo of Aristotle.  In a discussion of some ideas of Democritus on the subject of 
substance, Aristotle equates order with ‘inter-contact’ between things,67 where 
‘inter-contact’ can be understood to signify ‘interconnectedness’.  The things of 
which the world is composed were thought by Aristotle to be connected with one 
another; in his words: 
We must consider … in which of two ways the nature of the universe 
contains the good and the highest good, whether as something separate and 
by itself, or as the order of the parts.  Probably in both ways, as an army 
does; for its good is found both in its order and in its leader, and more in the 
latter; for he does not depend on the order but it depends on him.  And all 
things are ordered together somehow, but not all alike,—both fishes and 
fowls and plants; and the world is not such that one thing has nothing to do 
with another, but they are connected.  For all are ordered together to one end 
….68 
The passage raises many issues, including the inherent goodness of order, and the 
interconnectedness of things.  Further discussion of the goodness of order occurs 
later in this chapter; for the moment, I want to focus on the notion of ‘order of 
parts’.  It seems that parts that are interconnected may be ordered either in terms 
of time or place, or in terms of both time and place.  With regard to temporal 
priority, using an illustration provided by Aristotle, we would know something 
was wrong if dinner were served when we would normally expect breakfast.  With 
regard to place, the positions of participants in a ceremonial procession would 
often be determined by their rank, or status.  With regard to the conjunction of 
time and place, we would believe, other things being equal, that queues should be 
ordered in terms of the times that people join them.  We can infer from Aristotle’s 
                                                 
67 See Aristotle, Metaphysics, translated by W. D. Ross (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 
Great Books of the Western World, 1952), Vol. 8, VIII.2, 1042b. 
68 Metaphysics, XII.10, 1075a. 
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account that order denotes a kind of connective relationship between entities, 
whereby wholes are assembled from a variety of parts.       
Definitions of order abound: there are thirty-six of them in the term’s noun form 
in the Web-based Dictionary.com; similarly in other dictionaries.69  Six of the 
definitions relate to the notion of ‘command’, and are of no immediate concern 
here: in that sense, the reference is to a cause of order (a command is given with a 
view to creating some kind of order).  Homosapient order, as I will be defining it, 
excludes order in the sense of command.70  My interest lies more with order as an 
effect, or state-of-affairs (or state-of-being), whilst acknowledging that the effects 
themselves may be causes of things that are important to my study, for example 
beauty and goodness.   
Several of the definitions of order have general application.  They refer to the 
notion of order in terms of arrangements or dispositions of things, and classes of 
things (including persons) that ‘are distinguished from others by nature or 
character.’  Aristotle’s concept of prioritisation is explicit in one of the definitions: 
‘the disposition of things following one after the other, as in space or time; 
succession or sequence.’  Broadest of all we have ‘state or condition generally.’ 
Any of these could be applied to physical matter, to social arrangements, and to 
eudaimonic dispositions.  The notions of composition, coherence, wholeness and 
integration are implicit in the definitions, as I will now attempt to demonstrate.   
Beginning with composition, a thing that is a composite is a ‘state or condition’ 
that consists in an arrangement or disposition of other things; in other words, it is 
a whole of some kind.  Some composites may also be groups.  A group is an 
assemblage of things, i.e. a composite, but it is a composite that is compiled in a 
special way.  Grouping requires an act of abstraction, whereby things that 
constitute a group are considered to be related in some way.  The very act of 
abstraction entails that some things are set apart from other things—of positioning 
                                                 
69 See http://dictionary.reference.com (accessed 3 March 2010).  The Macquarrie Dictionary has 
an almost identical list.   
70 Isaiah Berlin remarks that moral goals are neither ‘states of affairs like growing a tree’ nor ‘facts 
like the fact that Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon.  They are orders or commands, and commands 
… are not something which can be discovered by observation … they do not describe anything’ 
(Isaiah Berlin, Freedom and its Betrayal: Six Enemies of Human Liberty, edited by Henry Hardy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 59-60).  I think Berlin’s point may be conceded, 
but, in the sense in which it is relevant to this thesis, order is discoverable and describable.  Order 
is morally relevant in both senses, Berlin’s and mine. 
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them in a particular way within space and time.  In other words, spatial and 
temporal prioritisation occurs, and with it some kind of order.  To illustrate, 
otherwise disparate human beings might form a group because of a common 
characteristic, or a perception of such, for example shared aims:71 a measure of 
orderly integration might be expected of such an entity, and its aims are what sets 
it apart from those who do not share them.   
The concept of orderly integration mentioned just now is a close relative of two of 
the other general characteristics of order, namely coherence and wholeness.  My 
discussion of them begins with a text from Spinoza.     
By the coherence of parts … I understand nothing but that the laws or nature 
of the one part so adapt themselves to the laws or nature of the other part 
that they are opposed to each other as little as possible.  Concerning whole 
and parts, I consider things as parts of some whole insofar as the nature of 
the one so adapts itself to the nature of the other so far as possible they are 
all in harmony with one another.  But insofar as they are out of harmony 
with one another, to that extent each forms an idea distinct from the others 
in our mind, and therefore it is considered as a whole and not as a part.72           
If parts fail to cohere, Spinoza tells us, each of them would be viewed as a whole 
in its own right, while the entity in which they are combined would not be viewed 
as such.  Coherence connotes good order, for example through the appropriate 
prioritisation of parts, which in turn is cognate with harmony.  Coherence signifies 
that parts have been brought together in such a way as to form a whole; in other 
words, it is a mark of integration and consequently of integrity, in the sense of 
good working order.  Coherence, wholeness and integrity therefore have a 
functional aspect.  They may also have an aesthetic one, for we find Aquinas 
associating wholeness with perfection, which he identifies as one of three 
conditions of beauty.  The other conditions of beauty are said by Aquinas to be 
due proportion and clarity: due proportion is equated with harmony, and is 
therefore cognate with coherence and order; clarity is likened to brightness, 
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whence, Aquinas maintains, ‘things are called beautiful which have an elegant 
colour.’73    The mention of elegance of colour suggests that Aquinas had aesthetic 
beauty in mind when he was writing this.  On Aquinas’s reading, a beautiful thing 
is necessarily an integrated coherent whole.  But the reverse does not apply: a 
whole need not be beautiful.     
The concept ‘unity’ can also help explain that of ‘whole’.  In his treatise 
Metaphysics, Aristotle defines unity—or oneness—in terms of indivisibility, of 
‘being essentially a “this” and capable of being isolated either in place, or in form 
or thought.’74  Various kinds of unities are catalogued, including those that exist 
by virtue of being continuous (such as dots that are joined to form a line), those 
whose substrata are identical (water and ice would be an example), and those with 
parts that together constitute a particular form (Aristotle’s example is that of a 
shoe and the materials used to make it).  With regard to formal unity, the 
composite entity is such that the totality of the parts is not ‘a mere heap;’ the parts 
are brought together by a cause consisting in form.75  A thing’s form, Aristotle 
says, is its shape,76 which can be understood to refer to its structure; and a whole 
is said to be a thing that has unity of form.77  A unified whole is a particular kind 
of composite entity, from which it would follow that a unified entity, in at least 
one sense of ‘unified’, is an entity that evinces order.     
The final general characteristic of order that I want to consider is its goodness.  
The etymology of the term ‘good’ is indicative of its relation to ‘order’.  As 
Robert Nozick observes, ‘good’ stems from the root ‘Ghedh’, which means ‘to 
unite, join, fit, to bring together:’78 the relationship between unity and order again 
comes into view, now with the addition that an orderly thing is also good in some 
sense of the term ‘good’.  What sense?  It is apparent from the earlier quotations 
(see p. 2) that Rousseau and Hume were clear about the goodness of order, and 
                                                 
73 Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica, translated by Fathers of the English Dominican 
Province, revised by Daniel J. Sullivan (Chicago: The University of Chicago, Great Books of the 
Western World, 1952), Vols. 19-20, I.Q39, Art.8. 
74 Metaphysics X.1, 1052b.  
75 Metaphysics VIII.6, 1045a.  Non-random organisation would be another way of putting it.   
76 Metaphysics X.1, 1017b. 
77 Metaphysics V.6, 1016a. 
78 Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1994 [first published 1981]), p. 418.   
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that its goodness for them extended to moral goodness.79  I will address the 
question of whether order (specifically homosapient order) is morally good in 
Section 4.4; here I wish simply to note that order is good in a very general sense 
of the term ‘good’.  General goodness may or may not be moral goodness.     
Two of the dictionary definitions of order are concerned with general goodness.  
First, we see that order is ‘a condition in which each thing is properly disposed 
with reference to other things and to its purpose; methodical or harmonious 
arrangement.’  Second, we have ‘proper, satisfactory, or working condition.’  
Goodness in respect of purpose is obviously contrary to badness in that respect, on 
which account there could be no such thing as ‘bad order’.  Orderliness is good 
because it contributes to the fulfillment of the orderly thing’s purpose; conversely, 
disorderliness is bad because disorder works against attainment of the disorderly 
thing’s purpose.  This is consistent with a definition from Spinoza: ‘[b]y good I 
shall understand what we certainly know to be useful to us.’80  If the shoes 
mentioned by Aristotle fail to fit their intended wearer, they fail in their purpose; 
they are therefore bad, although, prima facie, without moral significance.81  Order 
is an organising principle whose end is fitness for purpose of the orderly object.  
Orderliness in this general sense is fundamental to life, including the life of Homo 
sapiens.  Order contributes to the attainment of a very basic purpose of living 
entities—the purpose being, to stay alive.  The distinction between life and non-
life is examined in the next section.   
3.2 The Orderliness of Life  
Life on Earth is generally believed to have begun approximately 5.5 billion years 
ago, and Earth and the universe of which it is a part is thought to be several times 
older than that.  Every physical existent can be understood to be composed of 
material that has existed since the beginning of time—material in the form of 
either matter or energy.  This might come as something of a surprise.  Much of life 
as it is now understood is based on the processes of cell division and 
                                                 
79 Cf. Midgley’s description of the converse of good, namely evil.  Evil, she say, is ‘something for 
which we are equipped to do and to which we are drawn—but outrageous, damaging to the proper 
arrangement of the whole’ (Mary Midgley, Beast and Man: The Roots of Human Nature (London, 
Routledge, 2002 [first published 1979]), p. 77).   
80 The Ethics, 4d1. 
81 If the shoe-maker intentionally puts a shoddy product on the market, morality would then be 
involved.      
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differentiation (in mitosis and meiosis)—where does the material for new cells 
come from?  Science tells us that the material’s primary source is the sun’s 
thermonuclear conversion of atomic particles into the light energy that plants use 
to convert CO2 and water into life-giving carbohydrates, by means of 
photosynthesis.  Plants serve as food for our mothers and us, and for the animals 
eaten by us and our forebears.  On this view, our universe and everything in it 
consists of ever-changing assemblages of material.  Material that was energy and 
which becomes matter takes the form of particles (quarks, electrons, and so forth; 
perhaps strings) that in turn are aggregated into the composites we perceive as 
physical entities, such as stones, trees, and people.  All of this is fully consistent 
with what Antoine Laurent de Lavoisier in the eighteenth century posited as the 
supreme principle of chemistry: ‘matter is neither created nor destroyed, all it 
knows is transformation.’82   
How should life be understood, as distinct from non-life?  According to the 
biologist Ernst Mayr, ‘life must be able to replicate itself and make use of energy 
either from the sun or from certain available molecules, like sulfides in the deep 
sea vents.’83  Non-life possesses neither of these characteristics.  The notion of 
order will now be shown to be involved in both of them, beginning with genetics. 
The geneticist H. J. Muller considered life to be defined by the ability of 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) to replicate itself, either in its original form or in a 
form that has undergone some kind of change.84  Things that have forever been 
devoid of life are devoid of DNA.  DNA in its own right may be viewed as a form 
of life, demonstrated most remarkably by the still-potent DNA often retrieved 
from dead organisms, including fossilised ones.  DNA can be used to replicate a 
dead organism, or some part of it.  But for that to happen, the DNA would first 
need to be implanted in a living host, perhaps a cell of some description—which is 
what genetic engineering is about.      
James Watson and Francis Crick found order to be central to fundamental life 
processes.  DNA was the key, but instead of being explained merely by the 
                                                 
82 Quoted in Ken Alder, The Measure of All Things: The Seven-Year Odyssey that Transformed the 
World (London: Abacus, 2004 [first published 2002]), p. 143. 
83 Ernst Mayr, What Makes Biology Unique? (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 
210. 
84 See Bruce Wallace and Joseph O Falkinham III, The Study of Gene Action (Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 243. 
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chemical constituents of the molecule, life and genetic inheritance were shown by 
them (assisted by others) to depend on the way in which base elements are 
symmetrically arranged along its two helical strands.  As Brenda Maddox says, 
‘the DNA molecule is a set of chemical instructions which reverses the tendency 
of matter to become disordered and allows new molecules to be the same as the 
old.’85  The term ‘symmetry’ is used here in its general sense of ‘harmony of 
proportions’, which derives from its etymological sense of ‘similarity of measure’, 
i.e. commensurability.  (Mathematically, symmetry obtains when an object 
remains perceptibly the same after having undergone some kind of motion, for 
example rotation.)  As well as symmetry, equivalent amounts of the four base 
elements of the molecule and identically shaped pairings of them were found to be 
features of its organisation. 
Symmetry, equivalence, identical shapes—all are suggestive of order.  Perhaps 
more than merely suggestive, for some scholars have considered the relation to be 
very close indeed.  In a commentary on George Birkhoff’s theory of aesthetic 
value, the mathematician Mario Livio virtually equated symmetry with order.  
Very briefly, Birkhoff proposed that aesthetic value may be represented by the 
formula ‘order divided by complexity,’ implying that aesthetic value increases 
when order increases relative to complexity.86  Livio’s chief interest was 
symmetry, but, according to him, ‘for most practical purposes, the order is 
determined primarily by the symmetries of the object.’87  In Livio’s words, 
symmetry has been ‘identified as the foundation from which all the laws of nature 
ultimately spring;’88 nature’s laws on that account would surely be instantiations 
of order.  Bearing that out, we find the mathematician Hermann Weyl declaring 
‘[a]s far as I see, all a priori statements in physics have their origins in 
symmetry.’89  The physics referred to by Weyl included relativity theory and 
quantum mechanics, as well as earlier theories such as Newton’s.  Symmetry can 
                                                 
85 Brenda Maddox, Rosalind Franklin: The Dark Lady of DNA (New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 2003), p. 204. 
86 Nozick also refers to Birkhoff’s theory, noting that it bears some resemblance to his description 
of organic unity as ‘unity in diversity.’  Organic unity is central to Nozick’s ethical theory, and is 
equated with ‘value’.  See Nozick p. 415.   
87 Mario Livio, The Equation that Couldn’t be Solved: How Mathematical Genius Discovered the 
Language of Symmetry (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), p. 13.  
88 Livio, p. 197.   
89 Hermann Weyl, Symmetry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989 [first published 1952]), 
p. 126. 
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reasonably be regarded as a mathematical lens through which physical order 
might be perceived.   
Perceptible order via symmetry has long been the subject of comment.  For 
instance, in his book The Garden of Cyrus, first published in the seventeenth 
century, Sir Thomas Browne remarks on the various kinds of symmetry in animals 
and plants; which, he says, ‘doth neatly declare how nature Geometrizeth, and 
observeth order in all things.’90  All things, it should be noted, non-living as well 
as living.  The geometry of non-living nature is typified by the sinuosity of rivers 
(my example, not Browne’s).  Sinuosity is the ratio between, on the one hand, the 
distance travelled by a river along its entire winding course, and, on the other 
hand, the distance as the crow flies between mouth and source.  For the average 
river, sinuosity works out to be about the same as the ratio between a circle’s 
circumference and its diameter, i.e. pi.  From the realm of living nature, snail 
shells provide a similar example.  Gaston Bachelard was in awe of them: ‘[a] snail 
shell,’ he declares, ‘is one of the marvels of the universe ….  The shell is the 
clearest proof of life’s ability to constitute forms.’91  Snail shells, indeed mollusc 
shells in general, take the form of spirals which conform to another mathematical 
rule, the Golden Ratio, whose signature is the Greek letter phi.92  The form taken 
by a shell is largely governed by the organism’s genetic components, which are 
themselves structured symmetrically—symmetry and order, therefore, from 
beginning to end.  The sinuosity of rivers shows that order is evident in at least 
some non-living entities, but the genetic conveyance of information that finds 
expression in successive generations remains the exclusive property of life.   
Order in nature runs deep, so deep, I suggest, that its reach extends to human 
nature and from there to morality.  But these are matters for later parts of the 
thesis: the other factor that differentiates life from non-life still has to be 
considered.  Besides genetics, life is also distinguished by the capacity to make 
                                                 
90 Browne quoted by D’Arcy Thompson, in On Growth and Form (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997 [first published 1961]), p. 103.  Whether God (possibly in the guise of 
nature) is the geometer, or whether it is us, is a question that would divide theists from atheists.    
91 Bachelard quoted by Jonathan Bate, The Song of the Earth (London: Picador, 2000), p. 155. 
92 Refer Mario Livio, The Golden Ratio: The Story of Phi, the Extraordinary Number of Nature, 
Art and Beauty (London: Review, 2003), p. 9.  As defined by Euclid, the Golden Ratio is the ratio 
between the greater segment and the lesser segment of a straight line that has been divided in two 
in such a way that the ratio thus obtained is the same as the ratio borne by the whole line to the 
greater segment.  Its approximate value is 1.6.    
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use of energy from either the sun or certain kinds of molecules.  Organisms take in 
energy and they also discharge it.  The processes involve what I will refer to as 
‘entropy-avoidance’.93  The concept of entropy comes from physics and 
cosmology, where the Second Law of thermodynamics stipulates that closed 
systems such as the universe tend towards disorderliness.  Closed systems are 
those that are unable to interact with their external environment (the universe in its 
entirety has no external environment).  Disorderliness culminates in 
thermodynamic equilibrium, i.e., within a system, an even spread of matter that is 
utterly without composition or design.  Thermodynamic equilibrium is the 
ultimate entropic condition: it is the state of maximum thermodynamic disorder, 
and is generally held to be irreversible.94   
Erwin Schrödinger, whose work is known to have influenced Watson and Crick, 
argued that ‘the device by which an organism maintains itself stationary at a fairly 
high level of orderliness (= fairly low level of entropy) really consists in 
continually sucking orderliness from its environment.’95  By sucking in 
orderliness, life-forms are able to avoid (or forestall) thermodynamic 
disequilibrium.  Organisms are living entities; non-living entities are not 
organisms.  Entropy is an inevitable product of life, and to compensate for it, 
thereby avoiding death, organisms extract what is called ‘negative entropy’, or 
orderliness, from the external environment.  To illustrate, life depends on 
nutrition, which involves the absorption of energy from foodstuffs, in exchange 
for an increase in energy in the form of heat in the surrounding environment.  The 
initial absorption represents the extraction of orderliness, and the consequential 
heat contributes to the disorderliness of the encompassing system.  The process of 
exchange is what we call ‘metabolism’, in which, Schrödinger says, ‘the essential 
thing is that the organism succeeds in freeing itself from all the entropy it cannot 
help producing while alive.’96   
                                                 
93 Some of the following on entropy previously appeared in my MA thesis, Harmony in and 
between Aesthetic Experience and Moral Experience (Melbourne: Deakin University, 2007). 
94 See, for example, Paul Davies, The Fifth Miracle (London: Penguin Books, 1999), pp. 27-28. 
95 Erwin Schrödinger, What is Life? (London: Folio Society, 2000 [first published 1944]), p. 91. 
96 Schrödinger, p. 88.  In recent years the process of exchange of orderliness has been couched 
more in terms of ‘Gibbs free energy’ than Schrödinger’s ‘negative entropy’.  Schrödinger himself 
referred to free energy (see Note to Chapter 6 of his book), but felt that the technicalities involved 
were beyond the grasp of the average reader.  For the purposes of this thesis, the technicalities are 
not important.  What is important is that life necessarily involves the transfer of entropy (i.e. 
disorder) to the external environment, whereas non-life does not.   
                                                                                                 
38  
A propos of the foregoing, some comments on the aetiology of order, specifically 
physical order, would be timely.  What, if anything, first brought orderliness into 
being?  Assuming for now that order exists, what might have been responsible for 
its beginning?  Those who believe in an infinite deity would probably respond—it 
was God: some might even identify order with God, in which case order would be 
eternal.97  Atheistic thinkers would of course have to look elsewhere; Schrödinger 
may be able to help here as well.   
We know that bacteria were the first living inhabitants of Earth,98 and that one of 
the steps crucial to the emergence of life is the development of mechanisms that 
provide energy.99  The photosynthesis previously referred to is one such 
mechanism: photons from sunlight are used by plants and some bacteria to 
produce food.  Plants, Schrödinger says, ‘have their most powerful supply of 
“negative entropy” in the sunlight.’100  More generally, energy is needed to 
transform disorder into order, so it would seem that energy was implicated in 
some way in the first appearance of order.  But no more than as an efficient cause 
thereof: ‘supply’ as used by Schrödinger connotes ‘source’, which connotes 
‘cause’.  Energy alone is not sufficient to produce order; other factors or materials 
are also required.  Can any conclusions with regard to primal order be drawn from 
this?  If entropy-avoidance were the only means of producing order, then the 
origin of order would consist in ‘life processes’ themselves, for example 
metabolism; or, even more succinctly, in life per se.  On that basis, while disorder 
(i.e. entropy) certainly existed before life, order (negative entropy) would only 
have come into being with the emergence of life.  After its inception, life’s 
reproductive processes would have brought further instances of entropy-avoidance 
                                                 
97 The last might be regarded as a Spinozistic solution, and therefore amenable to a naturalistic 
interpretation.  The notion of eternity is itself problematic, especially if time is considered to have 
begun with the Big Bang, as proposed by Stephen Hawking in A Brief History of Time.  If 
Hawking is right, then timelessness may be presumed to have preceded the Big Bang, and in a 
timeless state there would be no arrow of time, and therefore no entropy.  If order were equivalent 
to the absence of entropy, then, in this scenario, order would have prevailed before the Big Bang—
timelessly and therefore eternally.  This is all very speculative, and I will not pursue the line of 
thought any further.         
98 Richard Southwood, The Story of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007 [first published 
2003]), p. 16.  Southwood notes that ‘prokaryota’ would be more precise than ‘bacteria’, but the 
latter is the commonly used term.  At a very basic level, organisms are divided into two groups: 
Prokaryota, the cells of which lack a nucleus, and Eukaryota whose cells have nuclei.  Animals 
and plants are eukaryotes.        
99 Southwood, p. 12. 
100 See Schrödinger, p. 92.   
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into being.  As one of the section headings in Schrodinger’s book says, order is 
based on order.101   
But Schrödinger also has this to say: ‘[l]ife seems to be orderly and lawful 
behaviour of matter, not based exclusively on its tendency to go over from order 
to disorder, but based partly on existing order that is kept up.’102  For its inception, 
life depended on the capacity of carbon to form chains, rings and polymers,103 all 
of which are composite structures: their various shapes suggest that they were 
(and still are) non-random, i.e. orderly.  The order that was characteristic of the 
first life-forms was therefore based on the orderliness of their constituent non-life-
forms.  Vestiges of order predate even such rudimentary forms of life as single-
celled organisms with their organelles.  In other words, while life is sufficient for 
order it is not necessary to it; and, conversely, although order is necessary to life it 
is not sufficient for it.     
We are no closer to finding the origin of primal order, and I am unsure whether 
further investigation would bear any fruit.104  However, Schrödinger’s position on 
which came first, order or life, is clear—it was order.  If that is accepted, then 
order per se could not be that which differentiates life from non-life.  Rather, the 
distinction would consist in Schrödinger’s notion of disorder-avoidance.  Life can 
be seen as having first come into being when a particular arrangement of matter 
enabled a composite thing to resist the effects of the Second Law of 
thermodynamics, i.e. to resist disorder.        
To sum up, life as distinct from non-life is generally characterised by disorder-
avoidance.  As a consequence, life is always structured in an orderly fashion, at 
least to some extent, whereas non-life may not be.  The biologist Steven Rose 
encapsulates the point in his assertion that the persistence of life ‘depends above 
all on the maintenance of order: order within the cell, order within the organism, 
order in the relationship of the organism to the world outside it.’105  Genetics and 
                                                 
101 Schrödinger, p. 84. 
102 Schrödinger, p. 85. 
103 See Richard Fortey, Life: An Unauthorised Biography (London: Folio Society, 2008 [first 
published 1997]), p. 67.   
104 The inconclusiveness leaves the door ajar through which a religionist might enter with a 
supernaturalistic explanation.  The possibility cannot be dismissed, but neither can the possibility 
of a naturalistic explanation.   
105 Steven Rose, Lifelines: Life Beyond the Gene (London: Vintage, 2005 [first published 1997]), 
p. 137.      
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entropy-avoidance both point in that direction.  Order, then, is essential to life.  
That being the case, living beings can reasonably be said to have a ‘need for 
order’, in some sense of the term ‘need’, and in some sense of the term ‘order’.  In 
precisely what sense or senses will soon be explained, but here I should make 
clear that the concept ‘need for order’ is central to my thesis.  The need in 
question will be found in Chapter 5 to be implicated in the various human needs 
identified by Maslow, and those needs will be shown in Chapters 7 and 8 to 
provide a means of explaining moral commendability and condemnability.  
An Objection: Biochemical Asymmetry  
A possible objection to the primacy of order in the demarcation of life from non-
life can be considered at this stage.  While physics points to order as a means of 
differentiation through entropy-avoidance, chemistry seems to take a different 
direction.  It has been known for some time that life depends on the asymmetric 
properties of the biological chemicals, i.e. the amino acids and sugars.  Amino 
acids and sugar molecules are asymmetric in their chirality (i.e. handedness): the 
first are left-handed and the second right-handed, a feature that refers to the way 
they rotate a polarised plane of light.  Non-biological chemicals are devoid of the 
characteristic, which led Louis Pasteur, in 1860, to speculate that ‘this was 
perhaps the only well-marked line of demarcation that can be drawn … between 
the chemistry of dead and living matter.’106 The principle remains as much in 
force today as it was then.   
The chemical technicalities are irrelevant to this study, but the dependence of life 
on asymmetry is not.  Symmetry has been seen in this section to be viewed by 
some (for example Livio) to be akin to order, even identical to it, in which case 
the asymmetrical nature of the building blocks of life could cast doubt on the 
proposition of an order-based demarcation.  However, in defence of the 
proposition, asymmetry could be said to culminate in orderliness by virtue of its 
contribution to an organism’s ability to survive and propagate.  Furthermore, 
balance between the asymmetrical elements is required: life obviously depends on 
the existence of both kinds of molecules, and on cooperation between them.  
Balance is implicit in order, and it reaches deep into nature.  For instance, there is 
                                                 
106 Pasteur quoted by D’Arcy Thompson, pp. 137-138. 
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Goethe’s law of ‘compensation or balancement of growth,’ according to which—
in Goethe’s words (quoted by Darwin)—‘in order to spend on one side, nature is 
forced to economise on the other side.’107  D’Arcy Thompson observes that 
Goethe’s law is fundamentally underwritten by Aristotle’s principle of unity, 
which maintains that a whole is not simply a ‘bundle of parts but an organisation 
of parts.’108  Orderliness is implicit in organisation, i.e. parts need to be in the 
right places at the right times.  As has been noted, order is an organising principle.  
Etymologically as well as physically, organisms are supreme forms of 
organisation.  Symmetry and balance are not necessary to the organisation of non-
living entities, but the survival of living organisms depends on them.       
This completes the preliminary part of the thesis.  The second (metaethical) part 
begins with an explanation of the concept of ‘homosapient order’.    
  
                                                 
107 Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species (Chicago: The University of Chicago, Great Books of 
the Western World, 1952), Vol. 49, p. 71. 
108 D’Arcy Thompson, p. 264. 
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Part II: ORDER-BASED METAETHICS 
 
4: HOMOSAPIENT ORDER 
 
4.1 Why Order?  
Since the concept of homosapient order is new, any attempt to find support for it 
(or refutation of it) in the existing literature would presumably be a futile exercise.  
But we can at least say that order of some kind is fundamental to life; we might 
also infer from Rousseau and Hume that the relevance of order (again, of some 
kind) extends beyond the physical (see p. 2).  William James seems to have been 
thinking along similar lines to Rousseau and Hume when he wrote, ‘[t]he course 
of history is nothing but the story of men’s struggles from generation to 
generation to find the more and more inclusive order.’109  For James, order is an 
evolving phenomenon.  For another writer of interest, Nicolas Malebranche, a 
Roman Catholic priest and philosopher, it was an immutable reality.   
Around the turn of the eighteenth century, Malebranche proposed that God’s 
power is subordinate to the ‘immutable order’ (Malebranche’s term), not 
dissimilarly to Plato’s subordination of the gods to the Forms.  Stephen Nadler 
explains that, for Malebranche,  
Order consists in the eternal, immutable verities that stand above all things.  
These are pure logical and mathematical truths, absolutely true with the 
highest degree of necessity, but also moral and metaphysical principles 
about what Malebranche calls “relations of perfection”….  The dictates of 
Order serve as universal reasons for everything He does.…  Thus, when 
God, considering the infinite possibilities in His understanding, chooses to 
create a world, Order sets one of His attributes (simplicity) above the 
others.…  God’s wisdom, the dwelling place of Order, stands above his will 
and guides it.110   
                                                 
109 William James, ‘The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life’, in Susan Haack (editor) with 
Associate Editor Robert Lane, Pragmatism Old & New: Selected Writings (New York: Prometheus 
Books, 2006), p. 264. 
110 Stephen Nadler, The Best of All Possible Worlds: A Story of Philosophers, God, and Evil in the 
Age of Reason (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), pp. 137-138.  Hume’s conception of 
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Further, ‘the immutable, necessary dictates of Order surpass the laws of nature 
and grace.’111  Order is immutable and expressed through God in natural 
phenomena.  Order was obviously of huge importance to Malebranche.   
Although homosapient order might be absent from the literature, its three 
components—physical order, social order and eudaimonic order—have all been 
subjected to extensive treatment.  With regard to physical order, Stephen Buckle 
observes that Aristotle adopted a biological model ‘for explaining all kinds of 
natural forces.’  For Aristotle, ‘a thing’s nature is its inner principle of change, and 
a change will be natural if it is the work of this inner principle.’112  Aristotle was 
an essentialist, i.e. he subscribed to the view that entities such as human beings are 
characterised by at least one thing that is unique to the kind of entity in question, 
and that the particular kind of entity would cease to exist if the characteristic or 
characteristics were to vanish.  My postulated ‘need for homosapient order’ is of 
that nature: it is a defining feature of humanness; were it to disappear, the species 
Homo sapiens would disappear with it.   
Besides being an essentialist, Aristotle was also a teleologist, which is to say that 
the natural changes referred to by Buckle work towards some kind of end, or 
purpose.  The following from Philippa Foot is apposite in this regard: ‘the 
teleological story [of human beings] goes beyond a reference to survival itself.’113  
Within the context of order, ‘survival’ can be understood to be a matter of 
physical order; in the terminology of Section 3.1, physical order is characterised 
by ‘general goodness’ because it contributes to the purpose of our survival.  
However, as Foot says, human purposes are not confined to survival.  As well as 
having purposes pertaining to physical order, I would want to say that we also 
have purposes related to social order, and others related to eudaimonic order.  I 
                                                                                                                                      
primal or fundamental order is not dissimilar.  Finnis writes that Hume acknowledged the 
‘orderliness of the world, and seems to have ascribed to it an “internal, inherent principle of order” 
which “first arranged, and still maintains, order in the universe” and “bears … some remote 
inconceivable analogy to the other operations of Nature and among the rest to the economy of 
human mind and thought”’ (Finnis, p. 381, including quotations—shown in double inverted 
commas—from Hume). 
111 Nadler, p. 202. 
112 Stephen Buckle, ‘Natural Law’, in Singer (editor): A Companion to Ethics, p. 163.  See also 
Mariska Leunissen, ‘Aristotle on Natural Character and Its Implications for Moral Development’, 
in Journal of the History of Philosophy Vol. 50, no. 4 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2012), pp. 507-530.  Leunissen argues that Aristotle’s theory of moral development is 
informed by the physiological theory set out in his natural treatises. 
113 Foot, p. 43. 
                                                                                                 
44  
believe that homosapient order constitutes an important part of the story referred 
to by Foot, though not just as an end, but also as a beginning, in the form of a 
human need.  Foot speaks of ‘human necessities,’ which consist of ‘what is quite 
generally needed for human good.’114  They might also be called what Elizabeth 
Anscombe referred to as ‘Aristotelian necessities’, which Foot glosses as things 
necessary ‘because and in so far as good hangs on it.’115  The need for 
homosapient order, I will argue, is one such necessity. In addition to survival, 
such things as ‘the mental capacity for learning language’ and ‘powers of 
imagination that allow [us] to understand stories’ are considered by Foot to be 
aspects of human good.116  Foot also speaks of the need for ‘the ability to form 
family ties, friendships, and special relations with neighbours;’117 these are what I 
regard as expressions of one of the components of the need for homosapient order, 
namely the need for social order.   
I signalled earlier that social order and eudaimonic order may be regarded as 
analogues of physical order.  What the three kinds of order consist in and how 
they combine to form homosapient order will now be explained.       
4.2 The Components of Homosapient Order 
Physical order and social order are not alien ideas, but eudaimonic order may be 
for some people.  Very briefly, and as mentioned earlier, eudaimonic order entails 
psychological and spiritual order, and involves a sense of flourishing.  The three 
classes of order together constitute what I am referring to as homosapient order, 
which encompasses various kinds of order, but not all kinds.118  The term 
                                                 
114 Foot, p. 43. 
115 Foot, p. 15. 
116 Foot, p. 43. 
117 Foot, p. 44.  Some people may be unable to enjoy the goods referred to by Foot.  For example, 
an intellectual disability may prevent a person from acquiring verbal skills.  But an inability to 
attain any of the goods would not preclude them from membership of the human family.  Their 
inability, or disability, merely debars them from participation in some of the goods that are 
considered necessary by most human beings.  It is important to note the qualifier ‘generally’ in the 
quotation from Foot. 
118 Other taxonomies are also conceivable.  For instance, there is one that may be inferred from an 
essay by Isaiah Berlin.  Berlin uses the image of ‘crucial line’ to divide ‘surface’ from ‘depth’ in 
relation to ‘what human will and human reason can do.’  Above the line, there is ‘the world of 
perceptible, describable, analysable data, both physical and psychological, both “external” and 
“inner”, both public and private, with which the sciences can deal, although they have in some 
regions—those outside physics—made so little progress.’  Below the line, we have ‘the order 
which, as it were, “contains” and determines the structure of experience, the framework in which 
it—that is, we and all that we experience—must be conceived as being set, that which enters into 
our habits of thought, action, feeling, our emotions, hopes, wishes, our ways of talking, believing, 
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‘homosapient’ obviously derives from the scientific title given to our species, 
Homo sapiens.  It is meant to signify that homosapient order is universally 
applicable to human beings, and that it is exclusive to us: distant ancestral species 
are unlikely to have had a need for eudaimonic order, and are therefore excluded; 
for the same reason, homosapient order is not applicable to non-human 
organisms.119  In the discussion that follows, explanations are offered with regard 
to what each of the kinds of order is and why it exists (i.e. the purposes it serves).  
I begin with physical order. 
P-Order 
‘P’ = Physical.  P-order refers to arrangements of the elementary parts of which 
composites exist.  The parts range from sub-atomic particles (or whatever else the 
smallest or most fundamental components of nature happen to be) to composites 
thereof.  The orderliness entailed in genetically controlled propagation and 
entropy-avoidance is physical in nature.  All of the general characteristics of order 
discussed in Section 3.1 are manifested in P-order.     
Various kinds of composites can be P-orderly, non-living as well as living.  
Within each realm, there are things that may be described as being in a ‘state of 
nature’ (i.e. things whose basic structure is uninfluenced by human beings), and 
other things that are not in a state of nature (i.e. things whose basic structure has 
been influenced by human beings).  P-orderly composites in a state of nature 
include mountains (non-life) and trees (life).  P-orderly composites not in a state 
of nature include machines (non-life) and genetically-modified crops (life).  Non-
living composites that are not in a state of nature are wholes whose parts are 
sufficiently integrated for them to be able to fulfill their respective functions; for 
example, solar-heating installations.  Similarly for living composites, for example 
well-structured anthers and carpels that contribute to the reproduction of flowering 
plants.   
                                                                                                                                      
reacting, being.’  See The Hedgehog and the Fox (Chicago: Elephant Paperbacks, 1993[first 
published 1953]), pp. 67-68.  Two classes of order are perceptible here, ‘surface’ and ‘deep’: as I 
envisage it, homosapient order would apply to both of them.  Berlin’s words testify to the 
pervasiveness of order. 
119 Kitcher sets the age of the ‘ethical project’ (the title of his book) at approximately 50,000 years.  
In other words, ethics is assumed to have begun 50,000 years ago, although pre-ethical altruistic 
leanings would almost certainly have existed long before then.  On that basis, the ethical project 
would be confined to the genus Homo (Latin for ‘man’) and the species Homo sapiens within that 
genus: the species is believed to have originated some 120,000 years ago.  
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P-order is necessary to life, including human life, but it is not necessary to non-
living entities.  P-order is good in the general sense of the term ‘good’: its 
existence is a mark of orderliness with respect to purpose.  Since P-order is 
needed by all living entities, regardless of whether they are morally good, the need 
for P-order can be considered pre-moral, i.e. neither morally commendable nor 
morally condemnable.     Enough was said about P-order in the discussion of the 
orderliness of life to enable us to move on to the next component of homosapient 
order.   
S-Order      
‘S’ = Social.  S-order is confined to the realm of life.  It refers to the collecting of 
organisms into groups in ways that enable the groups and their members to satisfy 
some kind of need or serve a particular purpose.  S-orderly groups can be found in 
many branches of life, including insects, birds, chimpanzees and human beings.  
They can also be found in other life forms besides animals.  With regard to the 
latter, Sandra Mitchell describes how slime mold periodically transforms itself 
from ‘a collection of individual single cells moving through space in search of 
food,’ into ‘a multicellular slime mold made up of a stalk and fruiting body.’  The 
transformation occurs when food becomes scarce.120   
Many kinds of insects are what we call ‘social insects’, for example honeybees 
and ants.  Such insects congregate in colonies, which, Mitchell explains, are 
complex systems.  A colony is compositionally complex by virtue of ‘being 
constituted by a whole made up of many, non-randomly structured parts.’121  
Colonies are generally characterised by orderly and complex patterns of division 
of labour—members take on specific and specialised tasks such as cell-cleaning, 
brood and queen care, food storage and foraging.122  All of these behaviours also 
find expression in human societies, and congeries of many other kinds of animals 
as well.  We know, for instance, that birds of a feather flock together and that 
dolphins congregate in pods, presumably because of the safety afforded by 
numbers.  A sense of conviviality may also play a part in flocking and grouping 
behaviour: formations of birds are often seen circling, swooping and soaring, 
                                                 
120 Mitchell, p. 155. 
121 Mitchell, p. 210.  ‘Dynamical’ and ‘evolutionary’ complexities are also recounted. 
122 Mitchell, pp. 210-211. 
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apparently for the sheer fun of it, while dolphins are especially frolicsome.  
Chimpanzees also form quite distinct social groups that are in many ways similar 
to human society; chimps, it may be noted, are genetically close to humans.123  
But it is in respect of human beings that social order is especially pertinent to this 
study, because of its relevance to morality.  Its moral relevance will be explained 
in due course; my immediate objective is to describe human social order more 
fully.   
Most of the dictionary definitions of order are applicable to human S-order, in 
either of two senses: on the one hand, orderliness of social organisations 
themselves; or, on the other hand, orderliness of relations between members of 
social organisations.  Under the aspect of organisation we find, inter alia, ‘a rank, 
grade, or class of persons in a community;’ and ‘a group or body of persons of the 
same profession, occupation, or pursuits.’  What we have in view here might be 
termed ‘social differentiation’.    Under the aspect of social relations, the main 
item refers to ‘conformity or obedience to law or established authority; absence of 
disturbance, riot, revolt, unruliness, etc.’ Peace and S-order are close in 
connotation though not synonymous (a prison environment may be orderly but not 
peaceful).124   
In his Politics, Aristotle famously describes human beings as social animals.  
When isolated, a person is said to be ‘not self-sufficing,’ and is therefore ‘like a 
part in relation to the whole.’  Moreover, Aristotle writes, ‘he who is unable to 
live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be 
either a beast or a god ….’125  In view of what we now know about insects, birds 
and other animals, one might be inclined to think, not even a beast.  To condemn 
self-sufficiency might seem strange, especially when we find Maslow placing it 
                                                 
123 Dupré wisely cautions against inferring too much from the genetic proximity.  The correct 
inference, he writes, is ‘that neither we nor chimpanzees are identical to our genomes’ (Dupré, p. 
96).    
124 But the enmities and violence that may exist would be attributable to the characters of the 
inmates and prison officials rather than the orderliness of the institution.      
125 Aristotle, Politics, translated by Benjamin Jowett (Chicago: The University of Chicago, Great 
Books of the Western World, 1952), Vol. 9, 1.2, 1253a.  Spinoza was of the same view: ‘since fear 
of isolation is innate in all men inasmuch as in isolation no one has the strength to defend himself 
and acquire the necessities of life, it follows that men by nature strive for a civil order, and it is 
impossible that men should ever dissolve this order.’  Spinoza quoted by Hasana Sharp, ‘Eve’s 
Perfection: Spinoza on Sexual (In) Equality’, Journal of the History of Philosophy Vol. 50, no. 4 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012), p. 571, footnote no. 82.  The quotation is 
from Spinoza’s Political Treatise, 2.15.   
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among the qualities of most value to us.126  For Maslow, self-sufficiency is a 
positive trait and something to which human beings should aspire—apparently in 
stark contrast to Aristotle.  As I read Maslow, the opposite of self-sufficiency 
leads to over-reliance on others, which would make sense.  But Aristotle’s 
position also appears to be correct: the overwhelming majority of us are certainly 
not self-sufficient.  Maslow and Aristotle are obviously both right, each in his own 
way.  While self-sufficiency for Maslow entails a sense of ‘doing the best one can 
for oneself’, recognition of one’s self-insufficiency from Aristotle’s perspective 
would conceivably involve appreciation of the fact that doing the best for oneself 
almost invariably requires interactions with other people—ideally in a non-
exploitative manner, whence cooperation and community-mindedness.   
To this point I have been talking mainly about what S-order is and why it comes 
into being.  With respect to what, all of the general characteristics of order are 
embodied in it: composition in the form of grouping, together with coherence, 
integration and wholeness.  With respect to why, survival is a function of S-order 
for all life-forms to which it is relevant; but S-order also facilitates diverse 
behaviours such as play and ritual for some species.  How, then, might S-order 
come into being?   
Returning for a moment to the social insects, Mitchell notes that the ‘standard 
account of the ordered complex pattern of division of labour has been an 
adaptionist one,’127 i.e. natural selection has generally been held responsible for 
forms of social organisation such as the one mentioned.  Mitchell conjectures, 
however, that ‘self-organization models of aggregate emergent traits provide for 
the possibility that natural selection alone is not the appropriate agent to explain 
some complex traits.’128  What that means is that individuals within a colony 
become specialists either because of their peculiar genetic make-up, or because of 
the availability of different kinds of work, or because of information received in 
the course of its life—or because of various other factors.  Regardless of which 
model is chosen, adaptionist or self-organisation, division of labour arises from a 
                                                 
126 The Farther Reaches of Human Nature, p. 309. 
127 Mitchell, p. 211. 
128 Mitchell, p. 211.  Mitchell explains that self-organisation ‘refers to processes by which global 
order emerges from the simple interaction of component parts in the absence of a preprogrammed 
blueprint’ (Mitchell, p. 168).  In the absence of any such blueprint, the order that attends self-
organisation may be understood to come about by means of bootstrapping.    
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trait that enhances survival and reproductive opportunities.  Division of labour is a 
means of social organisation across the entire spectrum of S-orderly life, including 
human life.  Communication is another means. 
In the same section of the Politics quoted from a moment ago, Aristotle maintains 
that human beings are uniquely furnished with the gift of speech, along with a 
sense of good and evil, which together enable us to talk about injustice and 
justice.129  These help to define our essence; they are characteristics that 
differentiate our species from other species.  The same characteristics, or gifts, 
also enable us to articulate principles of justice and to encode them in laws that 
contribute to the formation of states.  In simple terms, communication is essential 
to community.  Even the verbal similarity is suggestive of a relation, one in which 
the complexity of communication might both reflect and be reflected in social 
complexity—in other words, where complexity in one varies directly with 
complexity in the other.   Language is primarily social in nature: its origin lies in 
the impulse or need for members of a group to communicate with each other, 
either orally or in writing or by some other means, for example sign language and 
body language.  Since birds, dolphins and chimpanzees are just some of the other 
creatures that communicate with each other by means of sonic signals and 
gestures, Aristotle’s attribution of the ‘gift of speech’ uniquely to human beings 
must be questioned: indeed, chimpanzees have been shown to be able to learn and 
use a fairly complex sign language.130  Nevertheless, it is fair to say that human 
language has reached a higher degree of complexity than that of any other 
creatures we know of.   
Human society requires S-order; in other words, S-order is necessary to human 
social life, which is to say human life per se, for we are assuredly social beings.  
S-order is also necessary to the P-orderliness of human life: much if not all of the 
nourishment and nurture that human beings require would be impossible in the 
absence of efficient social organisation.  S-order serves many purposes, and is 
therefore a general good.  But it need not be morally good.  A Machiavellian 
prince needs S-order as much as his most benevolent subject needs it.  
Accordingly, the need for S-order must be regarded as pre-moral. 
                                                 
129 Aristotle, Politics, 1253a. 
130 See, for example, the Washoe experiments recounted in Midgley’s Beast and Man, p. 206. 
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E-Order 
‘E’ = Eudaimonic.  The term ‘eudaimonic’ derives from the Aristotelian notion of 
human flourishing, i.e. to arrangements of things, ideas and activities that 
contribute to individual fulfillment through, for example, intellectual achievement 
and aesthetic experience.    Unlike P-order and S-order, E-order is exclusive to 
human beings.  E-order consists in wholeness in the sense alluded to by David 
Bohm when he asserted that human beings have ‘sensed always that wholeness or 
integrity is an absolute necessity to make life worth living.’  Flourishing by means 
of wholeness entails a sense of healthiness of body and soul—as Bohm notes, 
‘whole’ in English derives from the old Anglo-Saxon word ‘hale’, which means 
‘health’: ‘holy’ has the same etymological origin.131     
Since the prefix ‘eu’ denotes ‘good’ and ‘daimon’ signifies ‘spirit’, ‘eudaimonic’ 
can be understood to mean ‘good spiritedness’, although not necessarily in any 
religious sense (Maslow’s reference to religious states in so far as they are 
naturalistic might be recalled here; see p. 8).  The term is admittedly esoteric, but 
it conveys the sense of personal excellence I was looking for—excellence in terms 
of Platonic orderliness of the soul,132 attainable, perhaps, through the development 
of ‘imagination, wit, beauty and grace.’  According to John Rawls, the latter are 
‘excellences’ that are goods both for the person who possesses them and others as 
well; they are ‘a condition of human flourishing.’133  A description of saintliness 
from William James is also apposite: ‘[a]ll of the mind’s objects and occupations 
[are] ordered with reference to the special spiritual excitement which is now its 
keynote.’134  Religious conviction may not be a necessary condition for 
eudaimonic order, but conviction per se almost certainly would be.      
                                                 
131 See David Bohm, Wholeness and the Implicate Order (London: Routledge Classics, 2002 [first 
published 1980]), pp. 3-4. 
132 Nozick observes that the development of the soul as envisaged by Plato involves oppression of 
the lower parts by the intellect, and so should not be described as ‘harmonious’.  Nevertheless, he 
does not dismiss the possibility of ‘harmonious hierarchical ordering,’ and considers this to be ‘the 
goal of self-development’ (Philosophical Explanations, p. 507).   
133 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, revised 
edition 1999 [first published 1971]), p. 389.   
134 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature (London: 
Folio Society, 2008 [first published 1902]), p. 247.  An open question at this stage is whether 
homosapient order in general, and E-order in particular, might provide sufficient ‘spiritual 
excitement’ to satisfy one’s philosophical need, should one feel such a need.  But I am tempted to 
propose a degree of similarity between it and Einstein’s God, who was Spinoza’s God.  In 
Einstein’s words, ‘I believe in Spinoza’s God who reveals himself in the harmony of all being, not 
in a God who concerns himself with the fate and actions of men.’  Einstein quoted in Donald 
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I suggested a moment ago that intellectual achievement and aesthetic experience 
can contribute to human fulfillment.  These will now be discussed, with a view to 
clarifying the nature of E-order.   
One of the definitions of order comes from biology: ‘the usual major subdivision 
of a class or subclass in the classification of organisms.’ ‘Order’ constitutes one of 
taxonomic elements of the modernised Linnaean system: it sits between class and 
family.  For my purposes, however, the important thing about this is the ordering 
process that gives rise to the taxonomy.  Biological taxonomies—or any kind of 
taxonomy for that matter—are human constructions that are fundamental to our 
cognitive ordering of the world.  There are other means of cognitive ordering 
besides classification; indeed, each of the categories included by Kant in his 
analysis of the understanding135 serve precisely that purpose.  Regardless of how it 
is achieved, cognitive ordering facilitates understanding of our place in the 
scheme of things, and contributes to the attainment of E-order.     
One of the groups of Kantian categories is called ‘quantitative’, and is therefore 
concerned with mathematics.  As a form of symbolism, and as one of the highest 
intellectual pursuits that human beings can engage in, mathematics properly 
belongs in the realm of human accomplishment.  One often finds mathematical 
theories being praised on account of their simplicity and elegance.  Indeed, the 
same qualities will often be significant in decisions between competing theories: 
so long as it works, the simpler and more elegant the theory the better.  Simplicity 
and elegance are cognate with order; since they are essentially aesthetic qualities, 
they are also relevant to art.   
Aesthetic order in works of art is a function of what Marcia Muelder Eaton refers 
to as ‘formal unity’.  The same expression was encountered a short while ago in 
the discussion of Aristotle’s explanation of unity, and Eaton’s use of the term is 
fully consistent with Aristotle.  For Eaton, formal unity is concerned with the way 
in which the various features of a work of art ‘are put together—patterns or the 
organisation of parts that an object displays such as repetition or symmetry.’136  
                                                                                                                                      
Goldsmith and Marcia Bartusiak (editors), E = Einstein: His Life, His Thought, and His Influence 
on Our Culture (New York: Sterling Publishing Co., Inc., 2006), p. 300.    
135 The categories are discussed in Section 5.3. 
136 Marcia Muelder Eaton, Basic Issues in Aesthetics (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing 
Company, 1988), p. 48. 
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The ‘putting together’ that occurs in a work of art results in a blending of parts, 
and, in so far as it is the work of a human being, it will almost always be 
thoughtfully done.  Thoughtful blending is one way of describing the process of 
artistic creation.  Thoughtfulness in the blending of parts by an artist culminates in 
(or aims at) formal unity and aesthetic order.  Formal unity and aesthetic order are 
the purpose that the artist seeks to fulfill in the object that he or she produces.  
Fitness for purpose as an aesthetically satisfying object is the organising principle 
of artistic production.  Because of the close connection between thoughtful 
blending and order, wherever unity is brought into being by means of thoughtful 
blending, order will follow.  Physical entities become blended, but it is the thought 
that counts.       
Maslow can also contribute to the discussion of E-order.  According to him, 
The value-life (spiritual, religious, philosophical, axiological etc.) is an 
aspect of human biology and is on the same continuum with the “lower” 
animal life (rather than being in separated, dichotomized, or mutually 
exclusive realms).  It is probably therefore species-wide, supracultural even 
though it must be actualized by culture in order to exist.137   
Maslow equated the so-called ‘value-life’ with the spiritual or ‘higher’ life, and he 
can be understood to have been referring to human flourishing.  Value-life 
corresponds to E-orderly life.  When Maslow describes the value-life as ‘an aspect 
of human biology,’ he is saying that it is ‘part of the human essence:’138 i.e., in his 
terminology, it is ‘instinctoid’ rather than ‘learned’.  For Maslow, the value-life ‘is 
a defining characteristic of human nature, without which human nature is not full 
human nature.’139   Aristotle would have concurred: as well as having ‘vegetative’ 
and ‘appetitive’ faculties in common with other life-forms, human beings are said 
by him to be uniquely possessed of the faculty of reason, which may be either 
practical or theoretical.  Practical reason is the source of ethics, while theoretical 
reason is regarded as ‘the divine element of the soul.’140  Without going into what 
‘divine’ meant for Aristotle, it is clear that it was held by him to be of high value.   
                                                 
137 The Farther Reaches of Human Nature, p. 313.   
138 The Farther Reaches of Human Nature, p. 314. 
139 The Farther Reaches of Human Nature, p. 314. 
140 http://www-philosophy.ucdavis.edu/mattey/phi001/platelec.htm (accessed 17 March 2011).  
Finnis speaks of ‘practical reasonableness in relation to the good of human beings who, because 
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It is worth noting how S-order and E-order are connected in the excerpt from 
Maslow, in the dependence of the value-life on the existence of culture.  The 
likelihood of culture would be severely diminished if society were non-existent; 
indeed, if culture is understood to consist in ‘the sum total of ways of living built 
up by a group of human beings, which is transmitted from one generation to 
another,’141 then the absence of society would render culture impossible.  On that 
basis, if there were no society, neither human S-order nor E-order could eventuate.   
Finally, I have claimed that P-order and S-order are necessary to human life: can 
the same be said for E-order?  Well, based on the foregoing, it is obviously 
necessary to a flourishing life; but it is also necessary in another sense.  The kind 
of society and S-order that we now need, and will continue to need, to meet our 
requirements for nourishment and nurture would clearly be impossible in the 
absence of scientific and artistic advances.  Such advances are arguably the work 
of individuals who attain or approach excellence in their respective fields.  In 
other words, we need E-order as much as we need P-order and S-order.  However, 
as was the case with P- and S-order, the need for E-order should be regarded as 
pre-moral.  As I have described it, E-order is clearly something that most of us 
would find desirable, because of the various excellences that it entails: wholeness, 
healthiness, soul-balance, flourishing, and so forth.  But moral goodness would 
not seem to be a pre-requisite for many of the excellences.  An evil genius who 
comes across as being witty and elegant is readily imaginable: Voldemort, in J. K. 
Rowling’s Harry Potter books, for example.142      
P-order, S-order and E-order are all needed by us, and they share the same general 
characteristics.  The question now is, how do the three kinds of order come 
together to form homosapient order?  Precisely what is homosapient order?  
                                                                                                                                      
they live in community with one another, are confronted with problems of justice and rights, of 
authority, law, and obligation’ (Finnis, p. 351).  As he explains it, practical reasonableness 
‘involves that one seeks to bring an intelligent and reasonable order into one’s own actions and 
habits and practical attitudes.’  Such order, he says, has both an internal and an external 
dimension; and it is ‘complex, involving freedom and reason, integrity and authenticity’ (both 
quotations are from p. 88 of Finnis’s book).  The principles of practical reasonableness that drive 
this concern are described by Finnis as ‘unchanging’; moreover, they are ‘pre-moral’ principles, 
not to be derived ‘from any facts, whether metaphysical or otherwise’ Finnis, p. 34). 
141 The Macquarrie Dictionary. 
142 Voldemort is an evil, clever schemer, who managed to conceal his true nature by means of 
cleverness and politeness.  Refer http://villains.wikia.com/wiki/Category: Evil_Genius (accessed 
20 March 2012). 
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4.3 Homosapient Order 
The answer to last question is that homosapient order is a compound formed from 
P-order, S-order and E-order, when all three kinds of order are brought into some 
kind of relationship with one another—in particular, a relationship of dependency.  
P-order has been seen to be historically prior to the other components of 
homosapient order: it is the basis of life, non-human as well as human.  S- and E-
order are properties of various kinds of entities, which depend for their existence 
on P-order.  In that very fundamental sense, S-order and E-order can be said to be 
dependent on P-order.  In contrast, P-order can exist independently of S-order and 
E-order; therefore, as well as being historically prior, P-order is ontologically 
prior to the other kinds of order.  (The ontological status of homosapient order is 
examined in Chapter 9.)   
As well as a relationship of dependency, the general characteristics shared by the 
three kinds of order are indicative of a relationship of similarity between them.  
Since wholeness, coherence, integrity and composition are all concerned with 
structure (the shape of things and the way their parts are interrelated), P-, S- and 
E-order are all like one another in terms of basic structure.143      
In Figure 2, each of the components is shown as being connected to the other two 
components.       
                                                                                     S-order 
 
                                           P-order   
 
                                                                                     E-order 
 
Figure 2: Homosapient Order and its Components 
 
The diagram reads in the usual way, from left to right.  P-order is shown on the 
left in recognition of its temporal and biological priority: temporal because P-
order existed in the universe long before human beings evolved; biological 
                                                 
143 Paul Davies writes that biological order ‘is recognized because the diverse component parts of 
an organism cooperate to perform a coherent unitary function’ (see The Cosmic Blueprint: New 
Discoveries in Nature’s Ability to Order the Universe (Philadelphia: Templeton Foundation Press, 
2004), p. 74.  S-order and E-order could be described in very similar terms. 
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because it existed in life-forms that pre-dated Homo sapiens.  Nor could human 
life have begun without P-order.  The arrows pointing from P-order to S-order and 
E-order are indicative of its priority; P-order is the cornerstone of homosapient 
order.  But the arrows also point in the opposite direction.  The one from S-order 
to P-order signifies the cooperative effort required for the production of means to 
satisfy our material needs (food, shelter, etc.).  Similarly for E-order and P-order, 
where the attainment of a balanced soul may culminate in a temperate and 
thoughtfully considered life-style; a life-style, perhaps, that conduces towards 
physiological harmony and environmental awareness.  S-order and E-order are 
also connected by a two-way arrow.  They are interrelated by means of the 
influence of social and cultural products (such as science and art) on eudaimonic 
fulfillment—and the influence that the latter may have on social order, for 
example from having found one’s proper place in the world and perhaps peace of 
mind.   
Human beings need homosapient order in its entirety, and satisfaction of the need 
would bring homosapient order into effect.  P-, S-, and E-order have each been 
shown to be necessary to human life: it follows from their interrelatedness that 
homosapient order is also necessary.  Further, for the same reasons that the need 
for each of its parts is pre-moral, the need for homosapient order would also be 
pre-moral—good and bad people alike need it.  By being brought into effect, the 
three kinds of order become conjoined to one another.  Since human beings need 
homosapient order in its entirety, and because of the interconnectedness of its 
components, homosapient order can reasonably be spoken of as if it were a unity.  
But there is still a long way to go before it can be connected to morality: a further 
step towards creating the link will now be taken, by considering whether 
homosapient order is morally good.  
4.4 Homosapient Order and Moral Good    
I have claimed that homosapient order is necessary to human life.  We need it: it is 
essential that we attain it, at least to the extent of avoiding maximum homosapient 
disorder.  If homosapient order were non-existent, we also would be non-existent.  
Its possession is coincident with the fulfillment of our purpose.  Since the extent 
to which things fulfill their purposes determines whether they are good or bad in a 
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general sense, homosapient order may reasonably be claimed to be good in that 
sense.   
Homosapient order is also of the nature of a Footian natural good.  For Foot, 
natural goodness ‘is attributable only to living things themselves and to their parts, 
characteristics, and operations, [and] is intrinsic or “autonomous” goodness in that 
it depends directly on the relation of an individual to the ‘life form’ of its 
species.’145  In virtue of being autonomous, natural goodness performs a self-
regulatory role with respect to an individual’s conformity to the life-form of the 
species of which it is a member.  The life form of a species consists fundamentally 
in what is considered to be normal for the species: for an oak tree, there would be 
norms of sturdiness and life span; for a cat, norms of speed, agility and 
playfulness would usually be thought to apply.  For a human being, norms would 
seem to be applicable to each of the elements of homosapient order, and therefore 
to homosapient order in total.  For example, a measure of healthiness would be 
associable with P-order, a measure of cooperativeness with S-order, and a 
measure of personal fulfillment with E-order.  The sum of such norms (there 
would be many more besides those mentioned) constitutes the human life form.  I 
have argued that the need for homosapient order is pre-moral; whether the norms 
of the natural goodness that is homosapient order are morally relevant is a far 
trickier matter.  Although the testimony of Malebranche, Rousseau, Hume and 
James is indicative of the moral normativity of (some kind of) order, that hardly 
constitutes an argument.   
In the terminology of Chapter 2, the question is whether homosapient order is a 
morally good end, in the form of either intermediate end or final end.  It is clearly 
a Footian natural good, but, based on the argument of Chapter 2, moral goodness 
depends on the involvement of morally right means (i.e. commendable morally 
classifiable behaviour).  In other words, morally commendable interaction has to 
occur between moral agents and respondents.  Must homosapient order involve 
such interaction?  The discussion in this chapter suggests each of the components 
of homosapient order may involve some kind of interaction: for example, in 
obtaining medical treatment in the maintenance of P-order; in interactions with 
family members and colleagues in upholding S-order; and in dialogue with 
                                                 
145 Foot, pp. 26-27. 
                                                                                                 
57  
teachers and philosophers in the quest for E-order.  But need there be any 
compulsion for the interactions to be morally commendable?  The answer would 
seem to be no, as indicated by the Machiavellian prince and Voldemort examples.  
Nevertheless, I believe homosapient order to be morally significant.   Two 
arguments will now be offered in support of that contention.  The first examines 
the proposition that homosapient order is similar in many respects to justice, and 
may therefore be imbued with the same kind of moral goodness that is 
characteristic of justice.  The second argument is based on some ideas from Foot, 
the main points being (a) homosapient order and moral goodness are two of the 
natural goods whose norms help constitute the life form of our species, and (b) 
natural goods must be compatible with one another.  
First argument: homosapient order and its similarity to justice. 
The concept of justice will first be explored in order to identify some of its salient 
characteristics.  The same characteristics will be found to be common to 
homosapient order,  The proposition is that the commonality of characteristics 
brings justice very closely into alignment with homosapient order—that they are, 
in effect, natural allies.   
What, then, is justice?  From the standpoint of an individual, justice has both an 
external dimension and an internal dimension.  Externally, interactions between 
the individual and other people may be described in terms of just or unjust.  
Internally, the individual may be similarly described: ‘she is a just person’; ‘he is 
unjust’.  The Greek concept of justice (dikaiothyne in their language) encompasses 
both dimensions.  It entails a sense of order, both external and internal—
externally, orderly relations between the individual and his or her natural and 
social environments; internally, harmony between an individual’s reason, feeling 
and will.  Plato considered justice to be inseparable from the virtues of wisdom, 
courage and temperance: to attain one would be to attain all.148  As such, E-order 
would be brought into view, together with S-order.  Wisdom is the province of the 
rational aspect of the soul, courage reflects its spirited aspect, and temperance its 
appetitive aspect.  Proper balance between the three aspects in the performance of 
their functions constitutes Platonic justice, in a similar way to a city, where justice 
                                                 
148 Plato, Republic, translated by Paul Shorey, in Plato: The Collected Dialogues, edited by Edith 
Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, IV, 427e.  
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was held to consist in the perseverance of the various social classes in the 
performance of their respective functions.149   
Contemporary notions of justice often emphasise its external dimension.  
According to Finnis, the elements of justice are threefold: other-directedness, duty 
and equality.  Other-directedness is concerned with ‘one’s relations and dealings 
with other persons;’ duty consists in ‘what is owed … or due to another, and 
correspondingly of what that other person has a right to;’ and equality is aligned 
with the notions of proportionality, equilibrium and balance.150  The number of 
terms that Finnis associates with equality is indicative of the difficulty involved in 
explaining it, but the fact that his commentary refers to what someone ‘needs or 
with what is fitting for him if he is to remain alive and well’151 is significant.  
Justice is clearly concerned with the notion of order, and with the need to avoid 
harm.152  Rawls also focuses on the external dimension of justice. For him, a just 
society is a ‘rightly ordered’ society,153  and the concept of justice means ‘proper 
balance between competing claims.’154  Further, proper balance between 
competing claims is held essentially to be a matter of fairness.  Very briefly, 
justice as fairness in a society requires the enjoyment of equal basic liberties 
(conscience, speech, etc.) by everyone, that social and economic opportunities are 
the same for everyone, and that no-one benefits from altered socioeconomic 
arrangements unless the least advantaged members of the society also benefit.155   
                                                 
149 Republic IV, 435b-c. 
150 Finnis, pp. 161-163. 
151 Finnis, p. 163. 
152 The idea is very old; Epicurus, for instance, had this to say: ‘[t]he nature of justice is a pledge 
of reciprocal usefulness, [i.e.,] neither to harm one another nor be harmed.’  Refer Epicurean 
Principal Doctrine XXXI, as listed by Diogenes Laertius, in The Epicurus Reader, translated and 
edited by Brad Inwood and L. P. Gerson (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1994), 
p. 35.       
153 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 20. 
154 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 9. 
155 See Rawls, A Theory of Justice.  Rawls describes his theory as contractarian.  When it comes to 
ethics, primacy in such theories is accorded to rationality relative to the emotions.  The same 
applies to the Platonic and Kantian traditions, but, according to Laurence Thomas, with a 
difference: ‘[t]he difference between the two is that for [Platonists and Kantians] the rational self 
discovers morality, whereas for [contractarians] the rational self creates it.’  (See ‘Trust, 
Affirmation, and Moral Character: A Critique of Kantian Morality’, in Flanagan and Rorty 
(editors), Identity, Character, and Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology, p. 236.)  On this 
account, the order-based theory will be found to fit comfortably into the Platonist and Kantian 
mould.  I should add, however, that Rawls also classified his theory as deontological (A Theory of 
Justice, p. 26), which would steer it in the direction of Kantianism.  The distinction drawn by 
Thomas may not be as clear-cut as one would like, but that could be true of the lines that 
purportedly separate many moral theories. 
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In contrast to Finnis and Rawls, Maslow turns his psychologist’s gaze inwards and 
speaks predominantly of the internal dimension of justice.  He associates several 
so-called ‘metapathologies’ (ill-effects) with injustice, including insecurity, anger, 
cynicism, mistrust, lawlessness and total selfishness.156  These are all personal 
characteristics: it is perfectly conceivable that we might describe a person as 
cynical, or mistrustful, or insecure, or ‘metapathological’ in any other way, 
without having any particular action in mind.  For Maslow, the effects of injustice 
are very similar to those of disorder: the latter include lawlessness, breakdown of 
authority, insecurity, wariness, loss of safety, necessity for vigilance, alertness and 
tension.157  Implications for homosapient order are evident in all of the Maslovian 
metapathologies.  Insecurity poses a threat to physical order; mistrust and 
lawlessness are contrary to social order; while anger and cynicism are inimical to 
eudaimonic order.  Then there is ‘total selfishness’, which would certainly be 
contrary to both Finnis’s and Rawls’s conceptions of justice—it works against 
other-directedness, duty, equality and fairness, all of which are morally relevant.  
Total selfishness may  be regarded as a cause of injustice as well as being an 
effect of it; both cause and effect, or reciprocally reinforcing, where one’s own 
selfishness precipitates selfishness in another.   
Total selfishness on the part of an agent manifests either as indifference towards 
the needs of respondents, or as deliberate infringement of them.  In other words, 
the need that respondents have for homosapient order is paid little or no heed by 
the selfish agent.  Our species’ pursuit of homosapient order does not preclude the 
possibility of aberrant individuals, i.e. people whose purposes diverge from the 
norm, such as the Machiavellian prince and Voldemort (see Section 6.5 for further 
discussion).   In the terminology of this thesis, totally selfish agents could even be 
said to need to inflict homosapient disorder on those with whom they engage in 
morally classifiable transactions.  The only things that matter for such agents are 
their own needs.   Whence the selfish need?  It is a matter of character, of good-
will versus ill-will.  Those who either ignore or set about thwarting the needs of 
others in morally classifiable transactions are persons of ill-will: their selfishness 
culminates in injustice.  An unjust person’s character will be characterised by 
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Footian natural defectiveness as distinct from natural goodness; her morally 
classifiable behaviour accordingly tends towards that which is morally 
condemnable.  Conversely for a just person’s morally classifiable behaviour: her 
behaviour will tend towards moral commendability.  I leave the first argument 
with the observation that homosapient order and justice share several 
characteristics, including balance, harmony, proportionality, and avoidance of 
harm.         
Second argument: compatibility of natural goods. 
Foot argues for the existence of ‘a logical structure that belongs to the evaluation 
of all living things “in their own right”, or “autonomously”.’158  The expressions 
‘belongs to’ and ‘in their own right’ suggest that the logical structure referred to is 
natural to the things in question.  Foot introduces the term ‘conceptually 
verdictive’ to describe actions that, from a practical point of view, ‘entail a “final” 
“should” or “should not”.’159  Verdictives would seem to relate to the norms that 
constitute the life form of a species: something that is perceived to conform to a 
norm will elicit a ‘should’; conversely for something that does not conform.  The 
term ‘verdictive’ conjures up the notion of judgement, which in turn evokes the 
notion of justice—to act justly would be to act well (as one should, i.e. in 
conformity with a norm), and to act badly would be to act unjustly (as one should 
not, i.e. contrary to a norm).  Now while that might seem to point towards moral 
evaluation, Foot insists that verdictives have nothing to do with the rights or needs 
of others, nor with public morality (my emphasis).  (The preceding sentence 
would better reflect the facts if conjunctions were substituted for the disjunctions, 
since, I will argue, public morality is very much concerned with the rights and 
needs of others.)   
We can certainly agree with Foot that verdictives such as ‘foolish’ and 
‘imprudent’ may be attributed to behaviour that has little or no moral relevance; or 
even when no particular actions are involved, as, for example, when we say ‘he is 
a foolish person’, or ‘she has little presence of mind’.  On Foot’s account, 
verdictives can be understood to issue from conceptions of whether actions 
conform to norms that are morally irrelevant from the perspective of public 
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morality.  In which case, the norms that are applicable to the human species, and 
which constitute the species’ life form, would also be morally irrelevant from the 
perspective of public morality.  Since conformity to one’s life form constitutes 
one’s natural good, and since homosapient order is an aspect of the human life 
form, it must be concluded that homosapient order, on Foot’s thesis, is likewise 
morally irrelevant.   
A dead-end appears to have been reached.  But all may not be lost.  The notion of 
‘public morality’ that featured in the foregoing account may hold the key to a way 
forward.  A counterpart notion could find expression as ‘private morality’.  For I 
think one might reasonably maintain that verdictives such as those mentioned are 
relevant to the issue of virtue, or personal character.  Should that be the case, all of 
the classical virtues (and vices, or ‘defects’ as Foot would call them) would come 
into view: knowledge, understanding, wisdom, prudence, fortitude, temperateness 
and justice. Support for the alignment of morally commendable justice with 
homosapient order can be inferred from Foot’s theory.   
In Section 2.2 it was noted that Foot’s concept of ‘practical rationality’ 
encompasses matters such as promising, neighbourliness and giving help to those 
who are in trouble, which are all morally charged and would arguably belong just 
as much to the realm of public morality as they do to that of private morality.  
Practical rationality is said to be an aspect of the life form of our species, in which 
case moral goodness would be seen as being consistent with the species’ natural 
purpose.  The life form of the species includes a parcel of natural goods, 
including, in our case, practical rationality and homosapient order.  It is 
inconceivable to me how any of the natural goods could be incompatible with one 
another, i.e. work against or frustrate one another.  How, for instance, could 
neighbourliness and physical health be at cross-purposes?  Neighbourliness entails 
concern for our neighbour’s interests, and health would surely be among their 
interests.  Similarly with regard to homosapient order and practical rationality.  As 
has been explained, homosapient order depends on cooperation between people, 
the same kind of cooperativeness that is involved in practical rationality.  No 
incompatibility between them is evident.  Incompatibility would surely lead to 
contamination of the natural goods involved and vitiation of the species’ life form.  
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Evil, it may be concluded, is incompatible with our species’ need for homosapient 
order.           
Based on the foregoing, I believe homosapient order may reasonably be regarded 
as morally relevant.  According to the first argument, homosapient order looks 
something like justice, and the second argument found that evil is incompatible 
with it.   The first argument is admittedly inconclusive, since analogical 
relationships such as the one proposed have little or nothing definitive to say 
about whether a real relationship exists.  But a reasonably positive conclusion can 
be drawn from the second argument.  If evil is incompatible with homosapient 
order, then it seems unlikely that evil would be capable of bringing homosapient 
order into effect.  That, in turn, could imply that moral good is capable of bringing 
homosapient order into effect.  On the grounds discussed to this point of the 
thesis, the implication cannot be regarded as rock-solid (something altogether 
different from moral good may be responsible for homosapient order), but it 
reflects the position I will be taking on the matter.  Further argument for it will be 
found in ensuing chapters, along the following lines.   
As I see it, an agent’s morally classifiable behaviour will be either commendable 
or condemnable depending on the relationship between the effects on the 
homosapient order the parties involved.  It will be condemnable if the overall level 
of homosapient order diminishes, and commendable if no such diminution occurs.   
In addition to that, I will argue that the relativities of the effects of morally 
classifiable behaviour on homosapient order depend to a very large extent on the 
character of the agent.  The character of the agent, as reflected in the goodness (or 
badness) of her will, has a strong bearing on the commendability (or 
condemnability) of her morally classifiable behaviour.  As noted in Section 2.2, 
goodness of will is of paramount importance to the theories of ethics advanced 
both by deontologists and by consequentialists; I am simply reinforcing the point.  
But the order-based theory will have to be further explained before all of this can 
be confirmed. 
4.5 Homosapient Order and the Order-Based Theory of Morality 
The connection between homosapient order and morality that I am looking for has 
begun, but it needs to be strengthened.  In the chapters that follow I will attempt to 
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show that homosapient order constitutes the basis of both of the theory’s ethical 
facets; i.e. its utilitarian facet and its character-based facet, which, very roughly, 
may respectively be seen to coincide with public morality and private morality.  
Here is an outline of the approach that will be taken.   
The need for homosapient order will be shown to find expression in various basic 
needs, such as those described by Maslow.  The needs that are expressions of the 
need for homosapient order are themselves expressed in behaviour.  The needs 
that are expressions of the need for homosapient order will also be seen to be 
subject to hierarchical ordering.  Some of our needs are more pressing than other 
needs, although precisely which needs take precedence may vary between people.  
When an agent acts to satisfy a need, his action may or may not impact on the 
needs of others.  If it does, the action will be morally relevant.  A negative impact 
will be described as morally condemnable.  An impact that is not negative will be 
described as morally commendable.  The last four sentences have taken us into 
ethical territory, as distinct (if they can be kept distinct) from metaethics.  To 
repeat, it is probably impossible to prevent the two domains from overlapping—in 
order to explain why the order-based theory is a metaethical theory, and not, say, a 
general theory of motivation, its ethical significance must also be established.  But 
all of this lies ahead, beginning with the relationship between homosapient order 
and human needs.   
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5: HOMOSAPIENT ORDER AND HUMAN NEEDS 
 
5.1 Basic Needs  
Needs are described by David Wiggins as ‘states of dependency (in respect of not 
being harmed), which have as their proper objects things needed ….’160    If this 
were to be understood as a definition, then it would probably be dismissed on 
account of circularity: ‘state of dependency in respect of not being harmed’ would 
be sufficient.  To avoid being harmed organisms generally depend on objects 
capable of preventing possible harm; so much would seem clear.  It is also clear 
that some needs are generally the same for all people, at least in broad terms.  We 
all need food and water, and most of us require shelter, security, love and esteem: 
to be deprived of any of them would entail harm.  But there are many different 
ways in which people go about satisfying their needs, and those ways are deeply 
influenced by physical, social and cultural factors, including conventions and 
traditions.   
Conventions and traditions often govern the means people employ to satisfy 
general needs, giving rise to what might be called ‘specific needs’.  For example, 
Hindus of certain sects will specifically need vegetarian food rather than just any 
kind of food, while orthodox Jews will reject food that is not kosher.  Mary 
Midgley observes that facts about ‘our whole system of needs … have come to 
determine what sort of culture, what rational way of life, can suit us.’161   That 
would be especially true of specific needs: needs affect culture, culture affects 
specific needs.  Abraham Maslow refers to general needs as ‘instinctoid’, and 
differentiates them from learned needs; the latter are what I have termed ‘specific 
needs’.   
Maslow’s theory of needs is a theory of human motivation: it responds to the 
question, ‘why do we do what we do?’  In the 1943 paper in which he first 
presented his hierarchy of needs, Maslow acknowledges that there are other 
determinants of behaviour besides needs, although needs are said to 
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Philosophy of Need (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 233. 
161 Midgley, Beast and Man, p. 309. 
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predominate.162  A distinction is drawn between ‘coping behaviour’ and 
‘expressive behaviour’.  Coping behaviour is need-motivated goal-seeking 
behaviour, while expressive behaviour is behaviour that is expressive of an 
agent’s character: ‘a stupid man,’ Maslow writes, ‘behaves stupidly, not because 
he wants to, or is motivated to, but simply because he is what he is.’163   But the 
two kinds of behaviour are not mutually exclusive: average behaviour, Maslow 
observes, ‘is usually both.’164  A stupid man, like any other kind of person, has 
needs, and may be motivated by them.   
The aim of this chapter is to establish a connection between human needs and 
homosapient order.  Maslow’s hierarchy of needs is introduced in Section 5.2, and 
Section 5.3 goes on to link each of the Maslovian needs to the need for 
homosapient order.  The linkages are crucial to the formulation of the order-based 
theory of morality.  They provide the connection between the theory’s metaethical 
roots and its ethical offshoots.  The roots consist in the need for homosapient 
order and its various expressions in the Maslovian needs; these, according the 
theory, explain why we are moral beings.  The offshoots consist in an 
interpretation of moral commendability and condemnability in terms of the 
aforementioned needs.  Section 5.4 considers whether there are any significant 
omissions from Maslow’s schema. 
Although Maslow’s theory focuses on motivation rather than morality, his ideas 
feed directly into significant issues confronting ethical theory—at least I hope to 
be able to show that they do.  Besides Maslow, the works of some thinkers whose 
moral theories have their basis in human needs will also be discussed, including 
David Wiggins, Gillian Brock and David Braybrooke.  But Maslow is my starting 
point.   
5.2 Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs: an Introduction 
According to Maslow, the needs that motivate human behaviour can be 
understood in terms of a hierarchy, ranging from (at the bottom) physiological 
needs such as the need for food and water to (at the top) self-actualisation needs 
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such as the need to fulfill one’s potential.  For Maslow, a need’s position in the 
hierarchy reflects its motivational force, or ‘prepotency’:165 lower-order needs 
must be satisfied before higher-order can assume full motivational force.  For 
example, a person dying of starvation would be unlikely to be concerned with 
fulfilling her intellectual potential.  George Orwell saw as much a decade before 
Maslow: writing on the condition of tramps, he remarked, ‘[t]hey have nothing 
worthy to be called conversation, because emptiness of belly leaves no speculation 
in their souls.’166  Here is Maslow’s hierarchy.167    
 Self-actualisation needs: self-fulfillment, realisation of one’s potential. 
 Aesthetic needs: appreciation of and creation of beauty. 
 Cognitive needs: inquiry, knowledge, and understanding. 
 Esteem needs: achievement, competence, approval, recognition. 
 Belongingness and love needs: affiliation, acceptance, belongingness. 
 Safety needs: security, safety. 
 Physiological needs: elimination of hunger, thirst, etc. 
Maslow grouped the needs under two headings: the lower ones were called 
‘deficiency needs’, and the higher ones ‘metaneeds’.  The line between them was 
drawn between the need for esteem and the need for cognition.168  Metaneeds can 
also be called ‘being needs’, in recognition of the importance that Maslow 
attributed to the concept of being.  According to him, there is a ‘B-realm’ and a 
‘D-realm’, where ‘B’ and ‘D’ stand respectively for ‘being’ and ‘deficiency’.  
Distinct forms of cognition, values and language are said to reside in each of the 
realms.  B-values were of great consequence to Maslow; he equated them with 
metaneeds.169  B-cognition is described as ‘veridical, because [it is] detached, 
desireless, unselfish, “disinterested,” Taoistic, fearless, here-now …, receptive, 
humble (not arrogant), without thought of selfish profit, etc.,’ and optimal with 
                                                 
165 The ‘lower’ the need the greater its prepotency; in general, a need does not assume 
motivational force until those below it in the hierarchy have been satisfied.  
166 George Orwell, Essays (London: Penguin Books, 2000), p. 10.  The quotation is from the essay 
‘The Spike’, which was first published in 1931. 
167 See Ernest R. Hilgard, Rita L. Atkinson and Richard C. Atkinson, Introduction to Psychology 
(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1979 [first published 1953]), p. 316. 
168 See The Farther Reaches of Human Nature, p. 271. 
169 The Farther Reaches of Human Nature, pp. 294, 301.  The relationship between values and 
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respect to perception of reality.170    Beauty, truth and goodness are listed among 
the B-values, and gratification or fulfillment of such values (and therefore 
satisfaction of the metaneeds) was regarded by Maslow as a means of human 
development; it was also seen as being characteristic of self-actualising (i.e. 
psychologically healthy) people.171  I will have more to say on these matters later, 
but for the time being I will refer to metaneeds as ‘being needs’, or ‘B-needs’, 
because of their strong association (indeed identity) with B-values.   
It may be remarked that intellectual achievement (a cognitive need) and aesthetic 
experience (an aesthetic need) are often instrumental in the attainment of self-
actualisation, as well as constituting needs in their own right.  In his seminal 1943 
paper, Maslow speaks of his then-unconfirmed impression ‘that it is possible to 
distinguish the artistic and intellectual products of basically satisfied people from 
those of basically unsatisfied people by inspection alone.’172  Basically satisfied 
people are those who are best prepared for self-actualisation—‘it is from these that 
we may expect the fullest (and healthiest) creativeness,’ he writes.173  Maslow 
came to discover that the force of the various being needs tends to differ among 
people: for example, while some might rate aesthetic experience above intellectual 
achievement, others would reverse the sequence.174  However, while no evidence 
of a generalised hierarchy of prepotency among the being needs could be found, 
everyone was found to have a hierarchy of some kind.  On the whole, Maslow’s 
broad ‘D’ and ‘B’ classifications appear to be appropriate.  Hunger and danger 
would commonly be thought of in terms of an absence of something, namely food 
and safety, while self-fulfillment would justifiably be seen as an elevation, or 
perhaps unification, of one’s very being; similarly for the intervening categories. 
Although Maslow initially grouped motivational needs under two heads, he later 
came to think that they might also be accommodated within a threefold 
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classification—lower basic needs, higher basic needs, and metaneeds.175  Lower 
basic needs are the physiological and safety needs at the bottom of his hierarchy, 
higher basic needs are belongingness and esteem, and the metaneeds at the top 
encompass aesthetic experience, intellectual achievement and self-actualisation.  
The lower basic needs are in effect ‘subsistence needs’: food and shelter are 
needed in order for us to subsist, i.e. they help make physiological survival 
possible.  Maslow’s higher basic needs are ‘social needs’: their satisfaction 
depends on particular kinds of relationships with other people.  Metaneeds 
correspond to the being needs of the original two-tiered taxonomy.      
Maslow’s hierarchy will be further explained in Section 5.3, where the various 
needs are related to the need for homosapient order.  For the present, I wish to 
note that alternative ways of classifying needs have been proposed by other 
theorists.  For instance, there is a taxonomy from Wiggins, in which ‘unforsakable 
or vital needs’ are differentiated from ‘instrumental needs;’176  and another from 
Braybrooke, who refers to basic needs as ‘course-of-life needs’ and distinguishes 
them from ‘adventitious’ needs and preferences.  According to Braybrooke, the 
need for something can be considered basic if it is essential either to living or to 
normal functioning; such needs are crucial to social policy, which is his chief 
interest.177  Braybrooke also speaks of ‘derived needs’, i.e. needs that derive from 
either ‘conceptual connections’ or ‘scientific laws and empirical 
generalizations.’178  To illustrate, on the one hand, a conceptual connection may 
be formed between the need to restore the body ‘so far as repairs can restore it’ 
and ‘the need to preserve the body intact;’ or, on the other hand, empirical science 
may identify a physical failing ‘as one that can be remedied by a known 
means.’179  In Braybrooke’s opinion, ‘[n]eeds are capable of expanding 
dramatically in the sense that derived needs may multiply under new social 
arrangements as technology, growing more complex, becomes capable of 
producing new sorts of goods, and, growing more efficient, becomes capable of 
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supplying goods both old and new in greater abundance.’180  Example (mine): 
those infected with HIV in reasonably affluent societies may now be said 
derivatively to ‘need’ AZT or something similar; in less affluent societies, or in 
days gone by, the need would simply not have existed, either because of the 
drug’s unavailability or because of its prohibitive cost.  
Braybrooke also argues that derived needs can eventually become course-of-life 
(i.e. basic) needs:181 which seems right, at least to some extent (the qualification 
will be explained in a moment), for it is hard to see how we could get along in 
today’s world without computers and the Internet.  Braybrooke’s ‘derived needs’ 
coincide initially with the specific or learned needs that I have referred to, but they 
may become installed as quasi-basic needs (and uninstalled as well).  I use the 
qualification ‘quasi’ because the underlying Maslovian instinctoid need would 
conceivably remain unaffected; consisting, as it were, as a kind of nucleus around 
which satellite derived-cum-course-of-life needs orbit.  In the case just mentioned, 
the instinctoid need could be any one of a number those specified by Maslow (for 
example, belongingness, intellectual achievement), and the products of 
information technology would be the quasi-basic needs (for example, e-mail, 
Facebook, scientific and design software, and so on).  More plausibly, and perhaps 
more simply, the quasi-basic needs might be better regarded as means of 
satisfying the core instinctoid needs: again, in the case at hand, the products of 
information technology could very clearly be viewed as tools that are used in the 
satisfaction of the various instinctoid needs that have been mentioned.    
Braybrooke is critical of attempts such as that made by Maslow to grade needs: all 
of the basic needs, he says, are of equal rank.182  In Braybrooke’s opinion, the 
Maslovian hierarchy is an overly ambitious ‘conceptual innovation,’ and a more 
conservative approach would be to ascertain ‘how long people can survive 
unharmed without meeting various needs.’183 From a Maslovian perspective, 
however, such an approach would seem to be implicit in the distinction between 
deficiency needs and being needs.  Survival is more likely to be threatened by the 
non-satisfaction of deficiency needs than the non-satisfaction of being needs, 
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although harm of some kind would attend both.  In defence of Braybrooke, the 
equality of basic needs might well be appropriate for social policy, without 
detracting from the hierarchy’s moral relevance.  
The concept of hierarchical ordering of needs has also been questioned by 
Mahmoud Wahba and Lawrence Bridwell.  A statistical study conducted by them 
in 1976 found only partial support for the concept, and little or no support for 
other aspects of Maslow’s theory.184  Scientific confirmation of a need hierarchy 
still seems to be wanting, but in 1991 Andrew Neher concluded from an analysis 
of Maslow’s work that ‘there is probably some sort of need hierarchy, in that our 
basic needs are ordinarily more urgent in their demands than are higher-level 
needs.’185  Like Wahba and Bridwell, Neher had reservations about other aspects 
of Maslow’s theory, including the proposition that satisfaction of lower-level 
needs is necessary to the emergence of higher-level needs, and a perceived 
inattention on Maslow’s part to the need for cultural input to the attainment of 
higher-level needs.   
Both of Neher’s reservations have force.  Higher-level needs may well be 
motivationally potent notwithstanding deprivation with regard to lower-level 
needs; for example, a writer who forgoes the temptations of a lucrative career in 
public relations in order to pursue his dream of a literary masterpiece.  But the 
writer will still need to eat, and obtain shelter: satisfaction of his physiological and 
safety needs may be seen as necessary to his being capable of even feeling a need 
for aesthetic accomplishment.  This, like the counter-example of Orwell’s hungry 
tramps, demonstrates that the various needs are connected to one another.  With 
regard to Neher’s other reservation, I am sure that there would be little doubt as to 
the importance of cultural input, for example in the form of education.  However, 
even if Neher’s criticisms are just, they have no bearing on my thesis.  For my 
purposes, all I need is the concept of a hierarchy of needs, and interconnectivity 
between the elements of the hierarchy.  In spite of Wahba’s and Bridwell’s 
inconclusive findings, I believe few would question the proposition that some 
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needs are more fundamental than other needs: and being more fundamental, it 
may reasonably be said that it is better for us that they be met relative to other 
needs.  ‘Better’ invokes the notion of ‘good’, and, as James Griffin has said, ‘[i]t 
does not take us much reflection to see that goods differ in degree.’186  Needs, like 
goods, differ in degree.  The satisfaction of our basic needs is good, certainly in 
Philippa Foot’s sense of ‘natural good’, and possibly also in the sense of ‘moral 
good’.  The relationship between needs and morality is the subject of Chapter 6; 
for now, there is further criticism of Maslow’s theory that I want to consider.     
Onora O’Neill has proposed that some of the needs specified by Maslow might 
not be needs at all.  By way of example, O’Neill acknowledges that human beings 
undoubtedly need adequate food and shelter, but whether we also need 
‘companionship, politics, and culture, or food for the spirit’ could, in her view, be 
controversial.  She maintains that ‘at least some people have led long lives that 
were not evidently stunted’ without such things.187  No doubt O’Neill would be 
right in saying that some people get by without the things she mentions, but the 
operative word could be ‘some’.  ‘Some’ might be very few; so few in fact as to 
leave Maslow’s principles unscathed.  Companionship appears to be an almost 
universal need, while politics and culture are features of the societies that most 
people live in: they are inescapable, and, even if we choose to ignore them, we 
submit to their influence as if in tacit admission of their importance to our 
survival.  The need for ‘food for the spirit’ might not be so evident, especially in 
people subjected to economic hardship, but it may nevertheless emerge as a 
motivationally significant need when, say, food for the body becomes more 
readily available and there is time to think about spiritual nourishment.  Maslow’s 
theory suggests as much, but it also stipulates that ‘higher’ needs such as spiritual 
ones would remain ever-present, even in times of economic deprivation.  For 
Maslow, all of the needs in his hierarchy are of a general nature and universally 
applicable; they are instinctoid, and are therefore part of what it means to be 
human.   It would follow that general or instinctoid needs remain unaffected by 
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socioeconomic change.  For them to be affected, something more radical would 
have to happen, perhaps at the level of biology.         
A further objection to Maslow might be inferred from a proposition advanced by 
John Baker and Charles Jones.  According to them, ‘[i]ndividuals and cultures 
have very different conceptions of human well-being, and these conceptions 
generate differences in their lists of basic needs.’188  Braybrooke’s so-called 
derived needs are apposite here: basic needs could take on different appearances 
with the passage of time and under the influence of technological advancement.  
However, if Baker and Jones are saying that instinctoid needs themselves can 
vary, then I must disagree.  Food and shelter have always been needed by us; and, 
at the other end of the scale, ancient cave paintings suggest that the need for 
aesthetic experience (and therefore self-actualisation) has also long been part of 
the human condition.  If Baker and Jones are not talking about instinctoid needs, 
and their point is merely that rankings of needs are variable, then the proposition 
would be straightforwardly correct.  For instance, some Muslims would rather die 
than eat pork: for them, food is of less importance than religious observance, 
which would usually be aligned with belongingness, esteem and self-actualisation.  
Similarly, a hunger-striker’s need to fulfill a political ideal may become more 
‘basic’, i.e. lower than subsistence on his particular scale of needs.  Different 
things are valued differently by different people at different times—whence the 
possibility of moral relativism.    
I will address the issue of moral relativism in Section 10.3 but it can be noted here 
that Maslow’s rankings are themselves indicative of its pervasiveness.  In middle 
and upper class mid-twentieth century Western civilisation, i.e. Maslow’s milieu, 
self-actualisation may well have become the supreme goal, but that has not always 
been the case, and still is not for some people.  Honour and esteem, for instance, 
would probably be ranked ahead of everything else in warrior cultures, including 
modern criminal societies such as the Mafia.  However, to repeat, while 
hierarchical rankings of needs may vary from one age or culture to another, the 
basic instinctoid needs themselves remain unaltered.  The fact that they are 
                                                 
188 John Baker and Charles Jones, ‘Responsibility for Needs’, in Brock (editor): Necessary Goods, 
p. 230.    
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basic—that they help define what it means to be human—suggests as much.189  
The possibility of changes in general needs arising from genomic adaptations 
must be acknowledged, but whether we would then still be human in the present 
sense of the term might come into question.  Would we be ‘human’ if the need for 
belongingness were to vanish?  I do not think so; similarly for the other Maslovian 
needs.  Commonality amongst our basic needs may contribute to an understanding 
of others, including people from different ages and cultures.  An appreciation of 
the variability of hierarchical rankings could help us understand how and why 
ultimate values differ.190     
As well as redundancy in Maslow’s list of needs, there is the opposite possibility 
to consider: some motivationally significant needs could be missing from it.  
Whether that is so is discussed in Section 5.4, but, for the time being, I will 
proceed on the basis that there are no significant redundancies in Maslow’s list 
and that it is reasonably comprehensive.   
5.3 Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs and the Need for Homosapient 
Order 
In the section just completed three classes of needs were identified: subsistence, 
social, and being.  It should already be apparent that the classifications correspond 
very closely to the three-tiered taxonomy that was employed to describe 
homosapient order.  Furthermore, the two taxonomies could be similarly 
integrated within themselves.  Let us look first at the correspondence between 
them.   
To say that living entities have a need for subsistence (in the form of food and 
shelter) is the same as saying that they need P-order.  P-order is a product of 
entropy-avoidance and is reflected in the ways in which composite living things 
                                                 
189 The development of a coherent ethics based on the Maslovian needs could serve to confirm the 
latter’s comprehensiveness.  Such an ethics is of course is the aim of the present thesis.  
Nevertheless, even if the ethics were deemed a failure, Maslow’s theory would still stand as a 
powerful explanation of human motivation.   
190 In an essay dealing with the ideas of Giambattista Vico, Isaiah Berlin writes: ‘to understand 
history is to understand what men made of the world in which they found themselves, what they 
demanded of it, what their felt needs, aims, ideals were …’ (Against the Current, p. 105).  Needs 
could be understood to feed into aims and ideals.  Berlin also considers Vico to have initiated a 
schism between, amongst other things, ‘culture-bound’ and ‘timeless’ principles (p. 109 of 
Berlin’s text).  That may well have been the case, but I would argue that the notion of hierarchical 
ordering of needs could qualify as a timeless principle, one that helps explain culture-bound 
principles.  
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are structured, i.e. in the forms they take.  P-order arises from the satisfaction of 
subsistence needs.  The social needs for belongingness and esteem and the need 
for S-order also map onto each other with very little overlap.  Social organisation 
is largely concerned with ranks and roles, including roles involved in cooperative 
relationships and organisation for care and welfare.  It focuses on social structures 
that provide an environment in which social needs can be addressed.  The 
mapping from E-order onto the realm of being needs is also quite precise.  ‘E-
order’ is shorthand for beauty, understanding and justice.  As such, it encapsulates 
the values described by Maslow as B-values.  B-values correspond exactly to 
being needs, from which it follows that E-order and being needs also correspond 
to one another.   
The correspondence between the two models is very close; what then of their 
internal integration?  The Maslovian needs are holistically interactive.  For 
example, subsistence and being needs could conceivably be satisfied in the 
absence of human society, but only rarely, and even then perhaps only 
temporarily.  Imagine a sole survivor of a shipwreck who manages to reach an 
uninhabited island that is well-stocked with sources of food and building 
materials.  The survivor—call her Ruth—might neither starve nor suffer exposure, 
but she would probably soon come to miss human company.  Without it, her 
social needs go unsatisfied.  Neither belongingness nor esteem would be possible, 
the latter in the sense of acknowledgement by others of her sense of self-worth.  
The beauty of the island could engender a sense of wonder in Ruth, and find 
expression in poems that she scratches into some rocks.  Further, the island’s 
complex ecology might hold sufficient interest for her to exercise her mind in an 
attempt to understand it.  Her aesthetic and cognitive needs could accordingly tend 
towards satisfaction, but her isolation may nevertheless prevent her from attaining 
a sense of fulfillment—there would always be something wanting with respect to 
her being needs. 
My argument is this.  On the premise that needs are closely connected to one 
another, and on the further premise that needs as a whole correspond closely to 
homosapient order as a whole, then a close connection can also be said to exist 
between the components of homosapient order.  If the two premises are valid, as I 
believe them to be, then the conclusion would be sound.  If the conclusion is 
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sound, then to the extent that we have a need for some kind of order, one would 
reasonably be able to speak in terms of a need for homosapient order—or as it 
might otherwise be called, the need to avoid homosapient disorder.191        
The primary proposition on which this section rests is that the Maslovian needs 
are expressions of the need for homosapient order.  The proposition derives from 
the importance of homosapient order to human life, and the secondary proposition 
that satisfaction of the needs designated by Maslow brings homosapient order into 
effect.  Each of the Maslovian needs will now be examined to test the validity of 
the two propositions. 
Homeostasis 
Maslow observed that physiological needs are related to the concept of 
homeostasis, which ‘refers to the body’s automatic efforts to maintain a constant, 
normal state of the blood stream.’192  Or, as one dictionary defines it: 
‘physiological equilibrium within living creatures involving a balance of functions 
and chemical composition.’193  Physiological needs are homeostatic needs, which, 
when satisfied, serve to sustain life.  Such needs are the most basic and most 
potent of all the needs: basic and potent in the sense that they must usually be 
satisfied before other more highly ranked needs can attain motivational force.  As 
Maslow remarked, a hungry person is likely to direct all of his or her capacities to 
finding food,194 although exceptions may occur, such as the hunger-striker 
previously referred to.  Procreation by sexual means would belong at this most 
basic level of needs: unsatisfied desire on the part of anyone who experienced it 
could disturb personal equilibrium.   
                                                 
191 Recall that no excluded middle exists with respect to order: if something is not disorderly, then 
it is orderly, and vice versa.  
192 A Theory of Human Motivation, p. 372. 
193 The Macquarrie Dictionary.  ‘Homeostasis’ is defined more broadly by Antonio Damasio as 
‘life regulation’.  Damasio distinguishes between ‘basic homeostasis’ and ‘sociocultural 
homeostasis’, both of which are said to ‘promote the same goal—the survival of living organisms 
…’ (Antonio Damasio, Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain (London: Vintage 
Books, 2012), p. 27.  The basic Maslovian homeostatic needs correspond to Damasio’s basic 
homeostasis.  Needs further up the Maslovian hierarchy correspond to sociocultural homeostasis; 
the latter, Damasio writes, are concerned with such things as ‘justice systems, economic and 
political organization, the arts, medicine, and technology’ (p. 26).  Ethics also, as later parts of his 
book maintains (see especially Chapter 11, ‘Living with Consciousness’).  A breakdown in 
homeostasis in Damasio’s sense of the term would result in homosapient disorder.          
194 A Theory of Human Motivation, p. 373. 
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The terminology itself—‘stasis’, ‘constant’, ‘normal’—is probably enough to 
confirm that P-order is deeply implicated in needs of this kind.  That being the 
case, and since P-order is a constituent of homosapient order, homeostatic needs 
can reasonably be regarded as expressions of the need for homosapient order 
(primary proposition).  Physical and mental disorder would soon arise if food and 
water were to become unavailable, or if sexual needs went unrequited.  With these 
most basic needs unmet, higher needs may also go unsatisfied.  That would 
certainly be so with mental disorder, which could be expected to impact adversely 
on E-order.  S-order would also come under threat if a hungry person were to use 
violence against others in the pursuit of food; more so in a famine, when large 
numbers of people experience starvation.  P-disorder, therefore, can detract from 
homosapient order in its entirety.  Conversely, satisfaction of the homeostatic 
needs, and therefore satisfaction of the need for P-order, opens the way to 
satisfaction of the need for homosapient order (secondary proposition).   
Safety 
The need for safety is the next most basic need in Maslow’s hierarchy.  Since 
physical survival would be at risk in the absence of shelter and exposure to 
danger, such needs serve as very powerful motivators.  Danger may also take a 
more subtle form than direct threats of physical harm.  According to Maslow, 
injustice, unfairness and inconsistency on the part of parents are among the things 
that make children feel unsafe.  An indication of a child’s need for safety, Maslow 
observed, is a ‘preference for some kind of undisrupted routine or rhythm;’ i.e., 
the child ‘seems to want a predictable, orderly world.’195  Similarly for adults, for 
whom  
other broader aspects of the attempt to seek safety and stability in the world 
are seen in the very common preference for familiar rather than unfamiliar 
things, or for the known rather than the unknown.  The tendency to have 
some religious or world-philosophy that organizes the universe and the men 
in it into some sort of satisfactorily coherent, meaningful whole is also in 
part motivated by safety-seeking.196   
                                                 
195 A Theory of Human Motivation, p. 377. 
196 A Theory of Human Motivation, p. 379. 
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The latter tendency amounts to the philosophical need that I have posited and it 
would have a lot to do with higher-order (less basic) needs including esteem, 
intellectual achievement and self-actualisation.  I will come to those shortly, but 
for the moment we might recall that stability, organisation, coherence and 
wholeness are all characteristic of homosapient order; justice as well, albeit 
analogously.  In so far as satisfaction of the need for safety contributes to any of 
these, the need for safety may reasonably be regarded as an expression of the need 
for homosapient order.  It follows that satisfaction of the need for safety helps 
bring homosapient order into effect.       
Before moving on to the next of the needs, Maslow’s mention of ‘stability’ 
warrants a moment’s reflection.  Is stability a reasonable desideratum?  If stability 
were understood to mean something like always the same, or unchanging, and 
these are common connotations of the term, then there would immediately be 
trouble.  Ongoing change is a fundamental characteristic of the world, and if 
homosapient order (or anything else that purports to describe the world) were 
inconsistent with change then it would have to be rejected as unrealistic.  Are the 
notions of stability and homosapient order inconsistent with that of change?  
Fairly clearly, they need not be.  Parts can be added to or removed from a 
composite object without disturbing its orderliness—a truism, almost, since any 
object in the world, including beautiful artefacts, harmonious families and sublime 
natural settings, would always be undergoing some kind of change, at levels 
ranging from the sub-atomic to the macroscopic, all the while leaving their 
orderliness unaffected (or, more accurately, moving from one orderly state-of-
being to another orderly state-of-being).  Change and homosapient order need not 
be at odds with one another.  Furthermore, homosapient order itself may be 
inherently dynamic, exemplified by the processes required for homeostasis.  
Environmental stability can be seen in the same light, i.e. as P-orderliness within a 
context of inexorable change.  A natural environment could hardly be otherwise, 
because of the influence of evolution and other natural processes.  Stability may 
be understood as signifying maintenance of structure by means of either orderly 
succession or orderly replacement.   
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Belongingness 
Little difficulty has been encountered in showing how homosapient order depends 
on the satisfaction of the most basic kinds of needs, but the task becomes more 
intricate as we move up the hierarchy.  As described by Maslow, the need for 
belongingness involves the need for affection and the need for a place in the 
groups one belongs to.  Most people would participate in many groups, in a 
structure akin to a series of concentric circles.  For example, from innermost to 
outermost: self; family; friends; social, cultural and sporting societies and clubs; 
political parties; municipality; state and nation; humanity; and, ultimately, nature 
at large.  Bonding factors include affection and duty—there are others, such as 
legal ties, trade union membership, political allegiances, and so on; but affection 
or duty (or both) could be regarded as the emotional and rational glue that enables 
all of these to maintain their viscosity.    
Affective bonds would probably be strongest within the smaller inner circles that I 
have mentioned, while duty would tend to hold denizens of the outer ones 
together.  We love ourselves, our children, other close family members and close 
friends, but our obligations to strangers are usually couched in terms of duty.  The 
proposition is based on the cliché that like attracts like, where likeness consists in 
shared bodily and mental properties: kinship would be an example of the first, 
while like-mindedness is a common enough phenomenon within alliances.  I 
hasten to add that the suggested orientations towards affection and duty should be 
regarded as no more than tendencies, since duty would also be relevant to family, 
and some people appear to be capable of loving humanity in general.  Two 
significant theories of morality are implicit in the conjecture: affective bonds 
constitute the basis of moral sense theory, while dutiful bonds lie at the heart of 
deontological ethics.           
The difference between affect and duty can be used as a point of entry into the 
investigation of the relationship between belongingness and homosapient order.  I 
begin with affective bonds, the nature of which can be summed up in a single 
word—love.  Indeed, in the 1943 paper in which Maslow introduced his hierarchy 
of needs, belongingness went under that title.  Love occupied the median position 
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within the original five-member hierarchy,197 a fact that may have some 
significance, for I will be suggesting that the need for love bears on all of the other 
needs, those notionally below it and those above it.        
Although the feelings we have for the various people and things we love might be 
called love, there are clearly differences between them.  Some thinkers claim that 
all love is sexual (for example Arthur Schopenhauer, who exerted a strong 
influence on Nietzsche in his younger days), but I believe that to be wrong.  Many 
kinds of love, including parental love for offspring, friendship and patriotism, 
have little or nothing to do with sex (notwithstanding Schopenhauer, and Sigmund 
Freud after him).  However, to the extent that it is sexual, the need for love would 
tend to bear on the ‘lower’ need for homeostasis, and therefore play a part in the 
attainment of P-order.   
Affective bonding is the subject of one of the great works of philosophical 
literature, Plato’s  Symposium.  It is the story of a drinking party at which the 
meaning of love is discussed.  Socrates is one of the participants, and he relates 
how love was explained to him in his youth by the prophetess Diotima.  
According to Diotima’s teaching, love comes in different forms, each of which is 
represented by a rung on a ladder.  The bottom rung is occupied by love of a 
particular person, which is said to begin with the perception by the lover of the 
beloved’s beauty.  The top of the ladder is reached when love of a particular 
person is transformed into love of the universal Platonic Forms, as represented by 
truth and beauty.  The transformation occurs when the beauty of the particular is 
seen to be identical to universal beauty, not simply a manifestation thereof.  For 
Plato, beauty consists in good measure and proportion,198 while soberness is 
extolled as ‘a kind of beautiful order.’199  Beautiful order can be understood to 
consist in harmony of the soul: as Socrates remarks in the Republic, ‘the man who 
has the spirit of harmony will be the most in love with the loveliest’200—so 
understood, harmony of the soul would amount to E-order.  
                                                 
197 The same as the seven-member table shown earlier, minus cognitive needs and aesthetic needs, 
both of which were subsumed under self-actualisation.   
198 Plato, Philebus, translated by R. Hackforth in Hamilton and Cairns (editors): Plato: The 
Collected Dialogues, 64e. 
199 Republic IV, 430e.  Soberness is the mark of the practitioner of the ancient virtue of 
sophrosyne. 
200 Republic III, 402d (Jowett translation). 
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In classical terms, love is usually regarded as being one of three kinds.  It can be 
either sexual love, or friendship, or charity (in the original Greek, eros, philia, 
agape; and in Latin, amor, amacitia or dilectio, caritas).  According to Plato, all 
love is essentially erotic, in a particular sense of the term ‘erotic’.  In his Cratylus, 
eros is found to have derived from the word esron, which means ‘flowing in’.  
The ‘stream’ is said to be ‘an influence introduced through the eyes.’201  
‘Inflowing’ is clearly metaphorical, but I suspect that all descriptions of love are 
bound to be of that nature: Diotima’s ladder is a prime example.  Plato claims that 
inflowing is characteristic of love in general; indeed, one can find caritas being 
spoken of in similar terms.202  As the equivalent of the Greek agape, caritas is the 
highest form of unconditional, self-sacrificing love.203  In love of this kind, the 
lover effectively assimilates the needs and interests of the beloved, and acts in 
such a way as to satisfy the beloved’s needs and promote the beloved’s interests; 
or, more generally, the lover acts for the beloved’s sake. 
The notion of ‘sake’ is highly significant, and can be understood in this context in 
either of two ways.  First, in the sense of loving the beloved simply because the 
beloved is who (or what) he or she (or it) is—the parenthetical ‘what’ and ‘it’ are 
meant to cover non-human beloveds.  The latter include abstractions like the 
patriot’s flag and the bibliophile’s books: what would generally be regarded as 
perversions such as ‘the miser’s money’ might also be included—perversions they 
may be, but they can still be loved.  This first sense of the term sake is captured in 
the idiom ‘art for art’s sake’, and in Kant’s invocation to act ‘for the sake of duty’.    
The second sense of ‘sake’ involves the notion of purpose, or end; for example, 
again idiomatically, doing something ‘for the sake of her well-being’.  The second 
sense of sake is Aristotelian in tenor; and, unlike the first, necessarily involves 
action, with the agent acting solely out of concern for the being in whose interest 
action is undertaken.   
As well as being a feature of caritas, which encompasses friendship, mutual 
inflowing would conceivably be involved in loving sexual relationships; for, as 
                                                 
201 Plato, Cratylus, in Plato, translated by Benjamin Jowett (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 
Great Books of the Western World, 1952), Vol. 7, 420a. 
202 For Aquinas, caritas is characterised by mutual indwelling; he quotes scripture, ‘he who dwells 
in love is dwelling in God, and God in him’ (1 John 5.16-17).  Indwelling, it may be presumed, 
would result from inflowing. 
203 See http://en.wikipedia.com (accessed 28 March 2011).   
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many know, the people concerned are constantly in each other’s thoughts.  Since 
mutual inflowing is accompanied by the notion of ‘for the sake of’, sake (in both 
of its senses) enables us to grasp what it is that inflows in various kinds of loving 
relationships.  It is the delight taken by the lover in the beloved’s being, and the 
interests of the beloved that are joyfully served by the lover.  The first—the 
delight—could be understood to be an influence taken in by the ‘eyes’, as Plato 
said (again metaphorically).  The lover would be interested in bringing about the 
beloved’s flourishing, and facilitation of the beloved’s flourishing would be 
gratifying for the lover.  In other words, flourishing would be reciprocal.  As 
Spinoza said, ‘he who has done something which he imagines affects others with 
joy will be affected by joy, together with a consciousness of himself as the cause 
….’204   Flourishing, it may be assumed, would be accompanied by joy.  This 
could be the case even where the lover’s love is not reciprocated.  One-sided love 
is common enough: ungrateful children, for example, are usually still loved by 
their parents.  A lover whose love is unrequited may still strive to do whatever is 
believed to be best for the beloved, and obtain a sense of accomplishment from 
the beloved’s joy.   
Reciprocation would be impossible in the case of non-human beloveds (flags, 
books and money have no passion to return), but a feeling of accomplishment 
could nevertheless eventuate in a lover who advances the beloved’s cause in a 
significant manner.  All of this might be expected of anyone who associates, as 
Spinoza did, the idea of external cause with the elation that attends love.205  
According to Amelie Rorty, true love in Spinoza’s view ‘is the elation that comes 
of true knowledge, an intuitive grasp of the world, seen as a whole, immanent 
within one’s ideas.  Because such love is the expression of an individual’s most 
vital activity, it carries the greatest possible self-realisation.’206  ‘Greatest possible 
self-realisation’ sums up the notion of personal flourishing very well.    
Because of its connection to harmony of the soul and personal flourishing, as well 
as its relevance to the satisfaction of lower-order (for example, sexual) needs, I 
leave the discussion of affective bonding with the conclusion that the need for 
                                                 
204 The Ethics, 3p30d. 
205 The Ethics, 3p13s, 3def6.   
206 See Amelie Rorty, ‘Spinoza on the Pathos of Idolatrous Love’, in Robert C. Solomon and 
Kathleen M. Higgins (editors): The Philosophy of (Erotic) Love (Lawrence, Kansas: University 
Press of Kansas, 1991), p. 370. 
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belongingness in the form of love is itself a form of the need for homosapient 
order, which was the primary proposition mentioned at the beginning of the 
section.  Satisfaction of the need for love may therefore be expected to bring 
homosapient order into effect (secondary proposition).    What, then, of dutiful 
bonding?   
One of the tenets of Kantian ethics is that ‘the highest good possible through our 
agency should be realised.’207  Such is our duty, and actions that are performed for 
the sake of duty are the mark of what is called ‘a good will,’208 even to the extent 
of holiness.209  In the Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals the 
moral law is held by Kant to be entirely rational in nature.210  It is entirely rational 
because it can only be known a priori: it cannot be derived from experience.211  
Nor can it be derived from the attributes of human nature, because, Kant says, that 
would be to confine its application to human beings, to the exclusion of other 
rational beings.212  In the discussion of intellectual achievement later this chapter, 
rationality will be seen fundamentally to be an ordering function, one that answers 
to our need for homosapient order.  Rationally-inspired dutiful bonding is 
explainable in terms of the same need.   
Kant distinguished duty from inclination, defining it as ‘the necessity of acting 
from respect for the law,’213  where ‘law’ refers to the moral law in the form of the 
Categorical Imperative.  The moral law is a law of one’s own making, and is 
internalised as a set of maxims, which Kant described as subjective principles of 
volition.214  The law and its associated maxims issue in autonomous action, as 
distinct from heteronymous action.  Heteronymous actions are actions that are 
motivated by external influences rather than duty; they include actions performed 
from inclination.  While actions performed from inclination may be honourable 
and praiseworthy, they are not, Kant maintained, deserving of esteem—esteem 
                                                 
207 Kant, Religion, p. 5. 
208 Immanuel Kant, Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by W. Hastie (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago, Great Books of the Western World, 1952), Vol. 42, pp. 257-8.  (Text 
henceforth referred to as ‘Morals’.) 
209 Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, translated and introduced by 
Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (New York: Harper & Row, 1960 [translation first 
published 1934]), p. 42.  (Text henceforth referred to as ‘Religion’.)   
210 Kant, Morals, p. 271. 
211 See Kant, Religion, p. liv.  
212 Kant, Morals, p. 270. 
213 Kant, Morals, p. 259.   
214 Kant, Morals, p. 259. 
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was reserved for dutiful action originating in goodness of will.  Further, ‘the 
firmly grounded disposition strictly to fulfill our duty’ was regarded by him as the 
essence of virtue.215  Esteem that is consequent upon dutiful action and bonding 
would be conducive to social order, and therefore homosapient order.    
Dutiful bonding based on reason alone could be more egalitarian than affective 
bonding.  ‘To be beneficent when we can,’ Kant asserted, ‘is a duty,’216 and 
beneficent behaviour devoid of inclination would have nothing other than the 
moral law in view.217  Superficially at least, there is nothing in the various 
formulations of the moral law, i.e. the Categorical Imperative, to say why one 
human being should be preferred to another; for example, why family members 
should be preferred to total strangers.  But even a die-hard Kantian would surely 
have to regard absolute impartiality such as this as an unattainable ideal: the 
overwhelming majority of human beings would be guided, to some extent, by 
affection as well as by duty, and affection would arguably decide such cases.  
Besides, there might even be rational reasons for giving preference to one’s 
family, thereby giving rise to a duty to prefer them.218  For example, if we were 
caught in a burning hospital where our child is a patient, it would be reasonable to 
try to rescue the child in preference, say,  to the stranger in the next bed, whoever 
it happened to be.  Why reasonable?  Our love for our child would suffice, even if 
the other person were a magnate capable of lavishing riches on his rescuer.  Why 
would that suffice?  Because that is the way most people are made.  
Universalisation of preference for one’s children as a maxim of moral law is more 
consistent with our nature, and therefore makes more sense to us than 
universalisation of preference for strangers.             
In sum, the need for belongingness is equivalent to a need for bonding of either an 
affective or dutiful nature, or a mixture of the two.  Both kinds of bonding 
                                                 
215 Kant, Religion,  note to p. 19.     
216 Kant, Morals, p. 258. 
217 A distinction between beneficence and benevolence may be noted here.  As explained by Sarah 
Clark Miller, ‘[w]hereas the duty of benevolence, which commands the abstract wishing for the 
well-being of all humans, “costs us nothing”, beneficence requires that individuals with the means 
to do so take action by responding to the true needs present in others.’  Sarah Clark Miller, ‘Need, 
Care and Obligation’, in Reader (editor): The Philosophy of Need, p. 147.   Clark Miller observes 
that Kantian ethics centre on beneficence.   
218 Thanks are due to my supervisor Professor Stan van Hooft for raising the possibility.  This is 
just one example of Professor van Hooft’s assistance, which saved me from many omissions and 
mistakes.  The mistakes that remain are of course all my own doing. 
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evidently result in homosapient order—in other words, satisfaction of the need for 
belongingness brings homosapient order into effect, either in the form of personal 
fulfillment, or by finding our place in the world, within family and society.  In 
either form, a feeling of personal worthiness, or self-esteem, could accompany 
satisfaction of the need for belongingness.  This brings me to the next of 
Maslow’s needs.   
Esteem 
According to Maslow, people generally ‘have a need or desire for a stable, firmly 
based, (usually) high evaluation of themselves, for self-respect, or self-esteem, 
and for the esteem of others.’219  Spinoza can help deepen our understanding of 
what is involved here.  All of the emotions (including esteem) are said by Spinoza 
to originate in three primary emotions: joy, sadness and desire.  With respect to 
esteem, Spinoza refers to the ‘love of esteem,’ which he defines as ‘joy 
accompanied by the idea of an internal cause’—this is also given as the definition 
of self-esteem.  The joy concerned is that which arises from the belief that one is 
praised.220  Conversely, should sadness accompany the idea of internal cause then 
repentance comes to pass, and shame is felt when sadness arises from the blame of 
others.221  Spinoza’s definitions are obviously concerned with the need for respect, 
but there is another aspect of esteem that should also be considered, namely the 
need to respect.  Most of the ensuing discussion is concerned with the former, but 
I will have something to say about the latter towards the end. 
Spinoza’s definition of self-esteem is succinct, but there is a deep truth embedded 
in it, or something that would generally be recognised as a deep truth.  For what 
Spinoza is in effect saying is that self-esteem is a product of freedom, or 
autonomy.  How one gets from freedom to self-esteem is derivable from the terms 
used in the definition.  Joy, for Spinoza, is the product of a person’s ‘passage from 
a lesser to a greater perfection,’222 where the passage consists in an increase in 
one’s power of acting.223  Now the power of acting resides in one’s ability to 
                                                 
219 A Theory of Human Motivation, p. 381.  Self-respect and self-esteem are synonymous. 
220 The Ethics, 3p30s. 
221 The Ethics, 3p30s.     
222 The Ethics, 3def2.   
223 The Ethics, 4pref. 
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cause things, which is held to be the hallmark of freedom;224 from which it 
follows that the joy experienced in self-esteem derives from freedom.  The other 
part of the definition—‘accompanied by the idea of an internal cause’—tells us 
that self-esteem requires that we be aware of our ability to cause things to happen.  
The ‘cause’ spoken of here can be understood to be of an internal nature; if it were 
external, it would be contrary to the self-causing nature implicit in the joy 
obtained from the power of acting.  All of this makes perfectly good sense: most 
of us tend to feel better about ourselves when we feel that we are in control of 
things.            
Also with regard to the need for respect, Owen Flanagan and Amélie Rorty 
conjecture that the key to self-respect consists in consonance and consistency 
between a person’s ideals, character and mode of life.225  Similarly Rawls, for 
whom self-respect has two aspects: positive self-evaluation (cf. Maslow, Spinoza), 
and ‘confidence in one’s ability, so far as it is within one’s powers, to fulfill one’s 
intentions.’226  The confidence of which Rawls speaks would conceivably 
contribute to one’s positive self-evaluation.   
With these remarks in mind, the issues attending the need for esteem can usefully 
be structured in terms of a chiasmus, which is shown on the next page.  One axis 
represents the individual’s self-evaluation, its poles consisting of self-esteem and 
self-disesteem; the other axis represents the public’s evaluation of the individual, 
its poles being esteem and disesteem.  Consideration of the four quadrants of the 
chiasmus will help clarify the relationship between the need for esteem and 
homosapient order. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
224 Michael Della Rocca, Spinoza (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 188.  This is an application of 
what is known as the principle of sufficient reason.  For Spinoza, explanation consists in 
identifying the complete chain of causes that brings an explanandum into existence.  Della Rocca 
maintains that virtually all of Spinoza’s philosophy can be understood as an application of the 
principle. 
225 Flanagan and Rorty, Identity, Character, and Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology, p. 4. 
226 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 386. 
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 Individual Self-Esteem 
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Figure 3: Public and Private Evaluation in Esteem and Self-Esteem 
 
 
First quadrant: individual self-esteem, public esteem.  Here the individual is 
pleased to have achieved consistency between his or her actions and ideals and the 
actions of the individual are in reasonable accord with the public’s ideals, thereby 
eliciting the approval of others.  S-order would be facilitated by the latter, E-order 
by the former.   With regard to S-order, this is where the Kantian ‘dutiful bonding’ 
that was discussed in the previous subsection might be expected to occur; 
according to Kant, actions performed for the sake of duty (as distinct from those 
performed from inclination) are deserving of esteem.  Dutiful bonding as a form 
of belongingness conduces towards esteem.  Since belongingness and 
homosapient order have been found to be positively related, esteem would be 
similarly related to homosapient order.  With regard to E-order, constancy and 
consistency between one’s ideals, action and character would seem to be part of 
human flourishing.  Rawls speaks of self-respect as ‘perhaps the most important 
primary good,’ vis-à-vis other primary goods such as rights, liberties, 
opportunities, income and wealth.227  On that basis, one’s sense of self-worth 
would depend on one’s assessment (and the assessment of others) of the justness 
of one’s characteristic actions.   
Second quadrant: individual self-esteem, public disesteem.  This is where the 
individual’s plans, ideals and character are all in harmony, but actions consequent 
upon them are inconsistent with the plans and ideals of the public.  S-order would 
be inhibited while E-order on the part of the self-respecting individual remains a 
possibility: he or she is joyful, but without the support of an admiring public.  A 
                                                 
227 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 386, 54. 
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rebel with a cause would be an example; especially if the cause subsequently 
turned out to be generally commendable—by which time the admiration of others 
might have been secured.     
Third quadrant: individual self-disesteem, public disesteem.  Here the individual is 
afflicted with shame, in the knowledge of his or her culpability for what may be 
presumed to have been serious misdeeds, compounded by an awareness of others’ 
knowledge of them.  Sadness and disapproval prevail.  From the perspective of the 
individual, S- and E-order would both be out of the question.   
Fourth quadrant: individual self-disesteem, public esteem.  This is the domain of 
the guilty secret, where Spinoza’s ‘repentance’ becomes manifest.  Other people 
are largely unaware of the individual’s lapses, and still consider his or her actions 
to be consistent with their own plans and ideals; their respect remains 
undiminished.  Now the mere fact of respecting another may contribute to S-order, 
possibly by reinforcing social stability.  It is a question of whether the need to 
respect can contribute to homosapient order, and I will come to that in a moment.    
However, E-order on the part of the respected individual would be highly 
unlikely: pervading repentance is not conducive to flourishing.    
The analysis suggests that satisfaction of the need for respect results in 
homosapient order, in which case the need for esteem may reasonably be viewed 
as an expression of the need for homosapient order.  I turn now to the need to 
respect.  The relevant issues are (1) whether such a need exists; (2) if it does exist, 
how it might be characterised; and (3) whether satisfaction of the need culminates 
in homosapient order. 
With regard to the existence of a need to respect, respect on the part of the person 
who respects in the manner described would clearly tend to enhance S-order.  
Against that, it might be argued that the importance of respect (for one’s elders, 
one’s leaders, and so forth) is less today than it once might have been.  Bonding 
today may arise more from constraints imposed by economic cooperation and a 
sense of equal basic rights, especially in liberal democracies.    Do we, then, still 
need to respect?  I think we do: a sense of equal basic rights is fairly widespread, 
as evidenced by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (see Section 6.3)—to 
respect the rights of a person is tantamount to respecting the person.   
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If we do indeed need to respect, what can be said about its nature?  Spinoza’s 
definition of esteem is inappropriate, because of its orientation towards the one 
who is respected rather than those doing the respecting.  But his definition of love 
fits the bill, i.e. joy accompanied by the belief of an external cause.  The joy felt 
by one who respects (or loves) derives from having witnessed the joy felt by the 
respected person upon fulfillment of his or her proper purposes.  Such fulfillment 
would constitute an external cause.  But the notion of internal cause should not be 
totally dismissed.  The joy experienced upon witnessing fulfillment of the 
respected person’s purposes would be augmented if the one who respects were to 
believe herself to be in some degree responsible for their fulfillment.  Should that 
occur, Spinoza would have a ready explanation for any joy that is felt by the 
person who respects.  As we have seen, joy for Spinoza consists in being the cause 
of things—in making things happen, thereby achieving autonomy.  Now there are 
two broad ways in which the one who respects might bring something into effect: 
either by virtue of the respect itself, or by taking a more direct hand in the 
achievement of the object’s purposes.  With regard to the first, the one doing the 
respecting would certainly be doing something, simply by virtue of respecting.  
Can the act of respecting bring something into effect?  I think it can.  The actions 
of anyone who respects could contribute directly to the fulfillment of the respected 
object’s purposes.  Such would be the case with regard to the environment, where 
a contribution is made to ecological balance (a form of P-order) by means of 
respectful action—S-order as well, through the cooperativeness that is implicit in 
the notion.228  In either case, the act of respecting another would open a pathway 
to Spinozistic self-respect and with it the possibility of E-order.      
In sum, both the need for respect and the need to respect may reasonably be 
regarded as expressions of the need for homosapient order.  Accordingly, 
satisfaction of either kind of need would contribute to the realisation of 
                                                 
228 Aldo Leopold, a co-founder of the Wilderness Society, maintained that ‘a land ethic changes 
the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it.  
It implies respect for his fellow-members, and also respect for the community as such.’  See Aldo 
Leopold, A Sand County Almanac: with Essays on Conservation from Round River (New York: 
Ballantine Books, 1970 [A Sand County Almanac first published 1949, Round River first published 
1953]), p. 240.  The community referred to by Leopold is the biotic community; i.e., the 
interdependent collection of flora and fauna that populates a region at a particular time.  Leopold 
had a very clear idea of what the world should be like, and the ethics required for the realisation of 
the ideal, as he envisaged it, centred on the principle of respect. 
 
                                                                                                 
89  
homosapient order.  The discussion of this highly complex subject has been all too 
brief, but I must continue the ascent of Maslow’s hierarchy. 
Intellectual Achievement 
Most if not all human beings need to apply their minds to problems and issues that 
confront them.  The need arises from other needs—from, say, ‘where is my next 
meal going to come from?’ and ‘what would be the best way to deal with global 
warming?’  Playfulness would also often be involved: crosswords, cribbage, 
chess, and so forth.  Besides having to use our wits sometimes merely to survive, 
we generally like to use them.  Satisfaction from having solved a difficult puzzle 
is a sufficiently common feeling to warrant believing that the need for intellectual 
achievement is universal.  The need would be related to the philosophical need 
that I have posited, i.e. our need to explain and justify things.  My aim here is to 
show that satisfaction of the need for intellectual achievement results in 
homosapient order.   
Solving problems and coming to terms with issues involves the use of reason, 
judgement, understanding and imagination, all of which are forms of cognition.  
Cognition involves thinking, which I take to be necessary to intellectual 
achievement, but not sufficient for it.  I also presume that intellectual achievement 
is continuous with cognition, and that it consists in a heightened level of thinking.  
I will endeavour to explain what it is that takes cognition to the required heights in 
a moment.  First, though, a few words on the ordering nature of cognition per se 
may help explain how homosapient order and intellectual achievement are related.  
The proposition is this: if cognition is essentially an ordering process, then, on the 
assumption that intellectual achievement results from cognition, intellectual 
achievement would also involve ordering.  A further contention is that intellectual 
achievement involves a heightened form of ordering (specifically E-ordering), a 
heightening that follows the path from basic cognition to intellectual achievement.  
I begin with the ordering nature of basic cognition.  Kant can help point the way.  
Ideas were regarded by Kant as being dependent on what he called ‘categories of 
cognition’, which can be thought of as principles of thinking.  The categories are 
employed in the faculty of understanding of a perceiving and knowing subject to 
produce objective judgements from sense-perceptions.  The faculty of reason, in 
                                                                                                 
90  
which the power of inference resides, is used to relate judgements to one another.  
The categories that bring order to our intuitions fall under four main headings: 
relation, quantity, quality and mode.  Relational concepts and judgements are 
concerned with substance-accident, cause-effect and reciprocity; quantitative ones 
with unity, plurality and totality; qualitative ones with reality, negation and 
limitation; while modal concepts apply to possibility-impossibility, existence-
nonexistence and necessity-contingency.  Although Kant’s theory is by no means 
the only theory of cognition, it seems clear that something like what he was 
talking about does indeed happen: the moulding of raw sense data into usable, 
orderly information.  Kant’s categories cover a very broad spectrum—he would 
have said the complete spectrum—of our means of cognition, but their order-
creating function is of especial relevance here.   
Some ideas from W. V. Quine are also worth mentioning.  According to Quine, 
we and other animals share a capacity for detecting similarities and contrasts 
between things—a capacity that appears to be innate.  The capacity is said to be 
prior to language, and necessary to learning language:229 it works by identifying 
uniformities in things, and consequently involves categorisation, i.e. putting like 
with like (or what are perceived as such—perhaps wrongly).  It is a matter of 
sorting, of situating things in space and time, in the manner of Aristotelian 
prioritisation and Kantian categorisation; it is therefore concerned with ordering.   
That will suffice for the ordering nature of basic cognition.  My task now is to 
explain how intellectual achievement differs from basic cognition, and, in so 
doing, link it to homosapient order.  Spinoza, Maslow and Midgley will be the 
main contributors to the discussion. 
Spinoza described cognition in terms of three faculties: imagination, reason and 
intuition.230  Knowledge acquired through the imagination was deemed by him to 
be inferior to the products of reason, which in turn stood below those of intuition.  
Inferiority arose from a comparative lack of clarity and distinctiveness, in 
accordance with criteria proposed by Descartes.  Intuition led the way, because, in 
Spinoza’s estimation, it is the only means of accessing the limited stock of things 
                                                 
229 W. V. Quine, ‘The Scope and Language of Science’, in Roger F. Gibson, Jr. (editor): 
Quintessence: Basic Readings from the Philosophy of W. V. Quine (New York: The Belknap Press 
of Harvard University Press, 2004), p. 196. 
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that might be known of God.  ‘Knowledge of God,’ he declared, ‘is the mind’s 
greatest good; its greatest virtue is to know God.’231  (Spinoza’s God, we recall, is 
equivalent to substance which is equivalent to nature.)  Where reason comes into 
its own is in the development of adequate ideas of the properties of things; truth 
was said to consist in such ideas.  While an adequate idea of the properties of God 
(i.e. substance, or nature) would be impossible, reason was considered by Spinoza 
to be capable of construing order between things.  Spinoza’s low opinion of the 
imagination can be seen in the derisory terms in which he couched his rejection of 
the belief that order exists independently of human cognition.  Such beliefs were 
held to have their origin in the mistaken impression that the imagination is the 
intellect, thereby giving rise to false apprehensions with regard to the nature of 
things.232  The proposition that intellectual achievement is a heightened form of 
cognition can obviously be accommodated within Spinoza’s theory.  Intuition on 
his account is higher than the other forms of cognition, and it is higher precisely 
because of the understanding it affords of the infinite being, ‘without which … 
nothing can either be or be conceived.’233  Intuitive knowledge, Spinoza says, 
‘proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God 
to the knowledge of the … essence of things.’234  In a Spinozistic world, such 
understanding would constitute the highest degree of human flourishing, and 
therefore contribute to E-order.235 
                                                 
231 The Ethics, 4p28.   
232 Although Spinoza’s denigration of the imagination is consistent with his rationalist principles, 
some who came after him realised that imagination provides a key to the understanding of history, 
and indeed of morality.  As far as history is concerned, Isaiah Berlin has shown Vico to have been 
a progenitor of the Verstehen theory and practice of Wilhelm Dilthey and others; theories that 
involve putting oneself in the place of others and their circumstances by means of ‘imaginative 
insight.’  (See Berlin’s essay, ‘Vico’s Concept of Knowledge’, in Against the Current, pp. 111-
119.)    
233 The Ethics, 4p28.   
234 The Ethics, 2p40s2.  Adequate ideas for Spinoza are true ideas (The Ethics, 2d4), and true ideas 
are those that agree with their objects (The Ethics, 1a6).     
235 Intuition was also lauded by Kurt Gödel, the twentieth century thinker who revolutionised 
mathematical and logical theory with his incompleteness theorems.  ‘I don’t see any reason,’ 
Gödel wrote, ‘why we should have less confidence in this kind of perception, i.e., in mathematical 
intuition, than in sense perception, which induces us to build up physical theories’ (cited by Palle 
Yourgrau in A World Without Time: The Forgotten Legacy of Gödel and Einstein (New York: 
Basic Books, 2005), p. 101).  Whether ‘intuition’ meant the same thing for Gödel as it did for 
Spinoza is probably open to question, not to be settled here; but both seem to have referred to it as 
some kind of immediate grasping of an object by the ‘mind’s eye’. Also, whether Spinoza would 
have endorsed Gödel’s mathematical Platonism is doubtful, although Spinoza’s proposition 
‘[s]ingular thoughts, or this or that thought, are modes which express God’s nature in a certain and 
determinate way’ (The Ethics, 2p1d) could be understood as a move towards the objectification of 
ideas, including mathematical concepts.  As expressions of God’s nature, ideas should perhaps be 
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Maslow’s conception of maximal cognition is very similar to Spinoza’s.  Maslow 
distinguished D-Cognition from B-Cognition, where, to repeat, ‘D’ stands for 
deficiency and ‘B’ for being.  The denotations obviously place B-Cognition above 
D-Cognition.  As Maslow explains it, D-Cognition consists fundamentally of 
basic cognition, as I have described it; alternatively, it could be seen as a 
combination of Spinozistic imagination and reason.  D-cognition is cognition that 
we use in our everyday interactions with the world; it actively shapes percepts, 
organises and selects them; it compares, judges and evaluates; it is concerned with 
need-gratification; it dissects, differentiates, and it employs a form of reason that 
Maslow refers to as ‘Aristotelian logic.’  By contrast, B-Cognition is said to be 
non-instrumental; its object is ‘permitted to be itself,’ i.e. minimal distortion from 
attempts to assimilate objects to existing beliefs (my gloss); it is seen ‘as 
unneeded, as purposeless, as not desired, as unmotivated perceiving;’ it looks for 
‘a higher unity or integration, … under a superordinate whole.’236  I do not think it 
would be going too far to suggest that Maslow’s B-Cognition and Spinoza’s 
intuition are very similar in nature.  Their ultimate objects are the same: intuition 
for Spinoza affords a measure of knowledge of God (= nature, substance), while 
B-Cognition for Maslow is fundamentally concerned with ‘Cosmic 
Consciousness.’237  B-Cognition might appear somewhat other-worldly, and 
perhaps even discontinuous with D-Cognition, but this was not Maslow’s view.  
In his words, there is ‘only one world, and the business of fusing “B” and “D” is 
really a matter of being able to retain both the “D” and “B” attitudes toward the 
world.’238  For a Maslovian, to achieve B-Cognition would be of the highest 
intellectual order, and assist in bringing E-order into effect. 
Cognition as concept-formation and judgement is essential to rationality, which 
stems etymologically from ‘ratio’.  The concept of ratio in turn involves the 
notions of reason, reckoning and relation, all of which feature in rationality, and it 
is rationality that provides a further link between cognition and homosapient 
order.  The link derives from an observation made by Midgley, to the effect that 
                                                                                                                                      
accorded independent status.  Then again, since the ideas are ours (though caused by God—The 
Ethics, 2pp6-8), they presumably reside in us.  I will not try to resolve the problem (if it is indeed 
a problem): the point of the note is to highlight the importance attributed to intuition by two of 
history’s foremost theorists.               
236 The Farther Reaches of Human Nature, pp. 249-253. 
237 The Farther Reaches of Human Nature, p. 249. 
238 The Farther Reaches of Human Nature, p. 247. 
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rationality means more than cleverness.  Rationality, she maintains, ‘includes a 
definite structure of preferences, a priority system based on feeling.’239  When 
Midgley says ‘based on feeling,’ she is referring to desires, wants and needs that 
may come into conflict with one another: rationality arbitrates on conflicts, and 
chooses the proper course of action according to the individual’s system of 
preferences.240  The germ of an order-based theory of morality is discernible in 
Midgley’s statement, for we again have before us the Aristotelian relationship 
between order and prioritisation, supplemented by conflict resolution.  We see, 
therefore, that rationality can be of very broad application: rather than merely 
solving puzzles, through the exercise of ‘cleverness’, it is now involved in the 
realisation of our deepest wishes and desires, which would surely include 
satisfaction of the need for homosapient order, in all of its facets.      
In sum, cognition in the form of rationality involves preferences and priorities that 
are based on our deepest desires.  Preferences are cognate with needs, and 
satisfaction of our need for homosapient order may reasonably be said to be 
deeply desired by us: our survival and well-being depend on it.  Cognition has a 
part to play in the attainment of homosapient order. 
By applying our minds to the things that concern us, a measure of orderliness is 
imposed on the world—and on us as part of the world.  Through cognitive order, 
other forms of order may also arise, including P-, S- and E-order—and, as part of 
the latter, aesthetic order as well.  Again, therefore, it can be concluded that 
cognition conduces towards homosapient order, and that the cognitive needs 
(including the need for intellectual achievement) are consequently expressions of 
the need for homosapient order.  The mention of aesthetic order brings me to the 
need for aesthetic experience, which occupies the penultimate rung of Maslow’s 
hierarchy.  
                                                 
239 Midgley, Beast and Man, p. 246. 
240 Preferences and needs are not synonymous.  As explained by Len Doyal, needs are objective 
only to the extent that their ‘theoretical and empirical specification is independent of individual 
preference.’  See Len Doyal, ‘A Theory of Human Need’, in Brock (editor): Necessary Goods: 
Our Responsibilities to Meet Others’ Needs, p. 157.  The relationship between needs and 
preferences is discussed in Section 6.2.   
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Aesthetic Experience 
The aim of this subsection is to ascertain whether satisfaction of the need for 
aesthetic experience brings homosapient order into effect.  If it does, then one 
would be entitled to regard the need for aesthetic experience as a form of the need 
for homosapient order.  The approach will be the same as before: I will start with 
a discussion of the nature of the need in question, and then endeavour to explain 
how the satisfaction of the need gives rise to homosapient order.   
What is meant by ‘aesthetic experience’?  It would be a truism to say that 
aesthetic experience consists in experiencing something in terms of either beauty 
or the sublime.  Beyond that, however, there might not be any universally 
acceptable answers.  Kant’s ideas on the matter have been widely canvassed, and I 
begin with some of them.   
According to Kant, aesthetic experience is entirely disinterested at the same time 
as involving an evaluation of its object,242 whereupon tension is immediately 
evident, perhaps to the point of paradox.  On the one hand, ‘disinterested’ implies 
that aesthetic experience is valued for its own sake rather than as a means to an 
end.  On the other hand, ‘involving an evaluation’ suggests that the experience 
does indeed have an end in view, namely the ‘value’ that might be derived from 
appreciation of the object.  Furthermore, the definition seems to exclude artistic 
activity from aesthetic experience, for such activity would rarely be disinterested.  
Perhaps, though, artistic activity would be better viewed in terms of self-
actualisation, which is the topic of the next subsection: self-actualisation 
encompasses the attainment of excellence, presumably a common aim of artists.  
Nevertheless, creative activity such as that engaged in by artists arguably involves 
aesthetic experience of some kind, and should not be lightly dismissed from 
consideration.  I will have something to say on the matter later.        
Kant considered beauty to be one of three possible sources of pleasure, the others 
being the agreeable and the good.  The agreeable gives rise to gratification, the 
good evokes esteem, while the beautiful is that which simply pleases.243  
Furthermore, the beautiful is associable with a particular kind of pleasure, namely 
                                                 
242 See Roger Scruton, ‘Continental Philosophy from Fichte to Sartre’, in Anthony Kenny (editor), 
The Oxford History of Western Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 214. 
243 Kant, Judgement, s. 5. 
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disinterested pleasure arising from contemplation of an object’s form.  Pleasure, 
Kant says, may be one of three kinds: the agreeable, the beautiful and the good.  
The agreeable gives rise to gratification, the beautiful is that which simply pleases, 
while the good evokes esteem.244  The pleasure associated with beauty derives 
from a faculty of judgement he calls ‘taste’.  Disinterested pleasure therefore 
derives from the exercise of ‘taste’, and judgements of taste are aesthetic 
judgements; they are disinterested because of their independence from concepts 
concerning the nature or purpose of the thing being judged.245   
Further light might be shed on the nature of beauty by revisiting territory that was 
traversed a short while ago in the discussion of belongingness.  Beauty and love 
were there seen on Plato’s authority to be related; similarly Aristotle, who 
maintained that the ‘pleasure of the eye is the beginning of love,’ and ‘no one 
loves if he has not first been delighted by the form of the beloved.’246  Delight in 
the form of the beloved would presumably contribute to the erotic inflow that is 
characteristic of love; and by virtue of the inflow, the lover may be said to partake 
of the being of the beloved—in Plato’s Phaedrus it is said that ‘he who loves the 
beautiful is called a lover because he partakes of it.’247  Either or both of the 
general connotations of ‘partake’ would make sense in this context: ‘participate 
in’ and ‘consume’ would both fit.  Edmund Burke also considered beauty and love 
to be inseparable, as indicated by his rather circular definitions of them.  
According to Burke, beauty is ‘that quality or those qualities in bodies by which 
they cause love, or some passion similar to it,’ while love is ‘that satisfaction 
which arises to the mind upon contemplating the beautiful, of whatsoever nature it 
may be.’248  If there had been any doubts about the universality of the need for 
aesthetic experience, then its connection with love should have dispelled them: the 
need for love is assuredly universal.   
The relationship between love and beauty provides a means of linking aesthetic 
experience to homosapient order, for we have seen how love contributes to E-
                                                 
244 Kant, Judgement, s. 5. 
245 Kant, Judgement, s. 11. 
246 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, IX.5, 1167a. 
247 Phaedrus, Jowett translation, 249d-e. 
248 See David Wolmersley (editor), Edmund Burke: A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our 
Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful and Other pre-Revolutionary Writings (London: Penguin 
Books, 2004), III.i. 
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order, S-order, and P-order.  But the search for a link need not end there.  A more 
direct connection might be possible, based on an argument of the following form. 
(1) Human beings have a need to experience aesthetic beauty; (2) experience of 
aesthetic beauty gives rise to E-order in people who experience it; (3) to 
experience E-order is to experience homosapient order; (4) the experience of 
homosapient order implies that people who experience it have a need for 
homosapient order; (5) therefore the need for aesthetic experience is a form of the 
need for homosapient order.  The steps in the argument will now be discussed. 
The first premise has already been dealt with.  The need to experience beauty is a 
universal human trait, especially in view of its connection with love. 
The second premise—that aesthetic experience culminates in E-order—could be 
contentious.  Two sets of ideas are offered in support of it.  First, an experience of 
aesthetic beauty clearly involves P-order, in the sense that the beautiful object is 
P-orderly: on Aristotle’s criteria, if it were not P-orderly it would not be adjudged 
beautiful.  Order was considered by Aristotle to be one of the three constituents of 
beauty; another was symmetry, which was found earlier to be a close relative of 
physical order.249  In a strong sense, therefore, beauty for Aristotle is derivative of 
some kind of order.  Additional characteristics have been postulated by other 
thinkers.  Aquinas, we have seen (on p. 31), associated wholeness with perfection, 
and he identified the latter as one of three conditions of beauty—the others being 
due proportion and clarity.  Wholeness and due proportion are integral to P-
orderliness, in which case P-orderliness could again be considered necessary to 
beauty.   
A question may be asked at this point: how might the P-orderliness of a beautiful 
object contribute to E-orderliness in the person who experiences it?  Aristotle’s 
third characteristic of beauty is ‘definiteness’, and that in conjunction with 
Aquinas’s ‘clarity’ holds the answer.  P-orderliness in a beautiful object will be 
accompanied by a sense of definiteness, and definiteness is conducive to clarity.  
Clarity, in turn, entails enlightenment,250, and enlightenment would usually be 
attended by flourishing.  The following case study demonstrates how that might 
happen. 
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Nicholas recently came across an account of the labels that are commonly 
attached to cloud-formations, the basic types being stratus, cirrus, nimbus and 
cumulus.  He had previously encountered the terms, but for some reason particular 
note of them was taken this time and he committed them to memory.  
Subsequently, whenever he looked at sky and its clouds there was a new and 
heightened appreciation of their beauty (or sublimity in the case of the dark, rain-
precipitating nimbus).  This new appreciation seems to have been associated with 
his ability to define more clearly what he was seeing; as if the greater conceptual 
definition augmented the aesthetic (Aristotelian) definiteness of his observations.  
Nicholas then became interested in applying his new knowledge, and paid more 
attention to the celestial shapes, patterns and colours that evoked fresh 
wonderment.  Wonderment, yes, but also respect, since taking the trouble to learn 
and remember the names of things is surely a mark of respect.  Nicholas’s 
aesthetic experience of the beauty or sublimity of the heavens was therefore 
commingled with measures of intellectual achievement and respect, both of 
which, we have seen, induce E-order.  The improved clarity of his observations 
was accompanied by a sense of joy, or flourishing.  In that way, Nicholas’s 
experience of beauty may be said to have given rise to E-order.   
The other set of ideas in support of the second premise revolves around Ernst 
Cassirer’s assertion that forms of art ‘are not empty forms.’  According to 
Cassirer, such forms ‘perform a definite task in the constitution and organisation 
of human experience;’ and he continues, ‘[t]o live in the realm of forms does not 
signify an evasion of the issue of life; it represents, on the contrary, the realization 
of one of the highest energies of life itself.’251  The notion ‘highest energies of 
life’ is consistent with that of human flourishing, and the involvement of energy 
points to the fact that aesthetic experience entails activity.  Etymologically, energy 
and activity imply one another: the root idea derives from the Greek and Latin 
terms enérgei and energia, both of which signify ‘activity’.  As Cassirer says, one 
of the fundamental features of art is ‘its constructive power in the framing of our 
human universe.’252  Activity, or energy, would be involved in the framing 
process.   
                                                 
251 Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1970 [first published 1944]), p. 
185. 
252 Cassirer, p. 185. 
                                                                                                 
98  
References to ‘energy’ are common in critiques of stage-plays, art exhibitions, 
musical performances and films.  For example: a performance by John Bell in 
Hamlet is described as ‘an unforgettably etched study, dripping with frenetic 
energy;’253 some paintings by the German Brucke group are said to have displayed 
‘vibrant, pulsating colours and deliberately crude forms,’ which ‘unleashed a new 
and spontaneous energy in art;’254 a concert given by the jazz musician Don 
Burrows is lauded for its ‘extraordinary energy and authority;’255 and Meryl 
Streep is said to have had ‘all the energy’ in her performance in Julie and 
Julia.’256  It seems that an appropriate level of energy is needed in a work of art 
before it can communicate with us; and communication, should it occur, brings 
into being a community consisting of the artwork and its audience.257  Too little 
energy, and a failure of communication occurs; too much energy, and garishness, 
or simply noise, results—again with a failure to communicate.  Subtlety is needed.  
Energy in an artwork contributes to its vitality, which in turn enlivens the 
imagination of its audience.  With its imagination enlivened, then, on Kant’s view 
of the imagination as a ‘power of representation’, the audience may come to see 
the world or some aspects of the world in a different light.  Should that happen, 
insight into the Aristotelian interconnectedness of ostensibly disparate things may 
become clearer.  In short, heightened imagination through aesthetic experience is 
conducive to enlightenment and therefore contributes to human flourishing.  In the 
words of the second premise, aesthetic experience culminates in E-order.   
The remaining premises can be dealt with briefly.  The third premise maintained 
that the experience of E-order is tantamount to the experience homosapient order: 
this follows straightforwardly from the interrelatedness of the components of 
homosapient order, as discussed in Section 4.3.  The fourth and final premise was 
that the experience of homosapient order implies that people who experience it 
have a need for homosapient order.  Now it must be acknowledged that there are 
things we experience that we have no need of experiencing, for example disease 
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and war; or, more generally, everything that runs counter to the Maslovian needs.  
But there are also things that we experience that we need to experience, and my 
argument all along has been that homosapient order belongs in that category—we 
need it in order to survive and flourish.   
This completes the argument.  If the premises are deemed valid, as I believe them 
to be, then the need for aesthetic experience may reasonably be claimed to be an 
expression of the need for homosapient order.    There is a connection between 
what human beings regard as beautiful and the kinds of creatures human beings 
are.  The Golden Ratio, for example, is regarded as aesthetic, and this is pleasing 
to the eye (as mentioned earlier, in respect of the shells of snails).  Art that makes 
use of the Golden Ratio will be regarded as good art.    
The question of whether an artist’s creative activity entails aesthetic experience 
and homosapient order will now be addressed.   
If one were to follow Dewey, activity would be deemed creative ‘in so far as it 
moves to its own enrichment’ by bringing with it a release of further activities.  In 
Dewey’s opinion, scientific inquiry, artistic production, and social companionship 
all possess this trait to a marked degree, and some amount of it is ‘a normal 
accompaniment of all successfully coordinated action.’258  Coordinated action, as 
spoken of by Dewey, can be understood to mean something like ‘orderly activity’.  
Applying these terms, orderly activity by an artist would consist in the energy that 
he or she expends in bringing structure to an object, thereby giving rise to a sense 
of enrichment.  Enrichment would conceivably involve personal flourishing: E-
order would therefore be consequent upon creative activity.   
Creative activity may itself be informed (or in-formed) by a sense of natural order.  
In an essay dealing with the sculpture of Henry Moore, the art historian and critic 
Bernard Smith writes ‘if the basis of our aesthetic pleasure derives from the 
apprehension in works of art of a formal order which springs ultimately from the 
order of the natural world, then a knowledge of the methods of nature’s sculpture 
[for example wind and water erosion] may be a key to the practice of good art.’259  
Smith’s conditional (‘if the basis … natural world’) is especially pertinent.  On 
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that basis, artistic creation can be understood to involve knowledge of the 
regularities of nature.260  As was the case with Nicholas and his clouds, such 
knowledge is indicative of some kind of relationship between intellectual 
achievement and aesthetic experience.  Elucidation of the relationship would 
require a full-length study in its own right; I will only add here that the earlier 
discussion of the role of ‘thoughtful blending’ in the creation of aesthetic order 
(see p. 52) points in the same direction, as does the application of aesthetic criteria 
in mathematical theory (see p. 51).  The meshing of intellectual achievement and 
aesthetic experience suggests that creative activity by an artist—or anyone else for 
that matter—might also be viewed in terms of self-actualisation.   
Self-Actualisation 
We have reached the top of the hierarchy.  According to Maslow, even if all of the 
other needs are satisfied, ‘we may still often (if not always) expect that a new 
discontent and restlessness will develop, unless the individual is doing what he is 
fitted for.’261  By doing what one is fitted for, one attains self-actualisation.  Self-
actualisation amounts to self-fulfillment, and bears a strong resemblance to the 
ideal of self-realisation propounded by eighteenth-century Romantic philosophers.  
As Frederick Beiser describes it, self-realisation for the Romantics was to be 
achieved first through the development of all of one’s human powers, second by 
forming those powers into a unity, and third by securing one’s individuality, or 
uniqueness.262  Flourishing, and therefore homosapient order, would clearly be 
involved in the process.   
Self-actualisation for Maslow is Janus-faced.  Unlike all of the other needs, which 
he describes solely in terms of what is, self-actualisation is also compassed in 
terms of what ought to be: as well as its factual aspect it has a normative one.  In 
Maslow’s opinion, ‘[t]he description of what one ought to be is almost the same as 
the description of what one deeply is.’263  ‘Almost’ could be the operative word 
here, because it allows for a divergence of ought from is.  And, as we will see, 
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Maslow had strong views on what ‘ought to be’ consists in.  The attainment by an 
individual of the mode of life best suited to his or her character can be regarded as 
the primary focus or objective of self-actualisation.  Its secondary focus would 
then be its normative aspect, and this, I will argue, gives rise to two alternative 
ways of understanding self-actualisation: Maslow’s way, and an alternative way.  
The first will be dealt with in this chapter under the rubric ‘Maslovian self-
actualisation’; the second will be explained in Section 6.5, where it will be 
referred to as ‘malignant self-actualisation’.  Some comments on the notion of 
‘self’ will help set the stage for a discussion of these issues.   
Maslow was of the view that the ‘real self’ is ‘partly constructed and invented:’264 
perhaps one might also say partly learned, with the other part consisting in that 
which is deep, or instinctoid, and possibly unalterable.265  Construction of the self 
would involve assimilation of inputs received from others, a subject that is 
touched on in a line from Tennyson’s poem Ulysses.    The line reads, ‘I am part 
of all that I have met.’  The idea points to the possibility of give-and-take between 
individuals in the formation of selfhood—I am part of you and you are part of me.  
A community of selves is implied, and the community may be viewed as a whole.  
Connections are formed from encounters, fleeting or otherwise, between people 
and other entities.266  Self-realisation involves openness to experience, and 
assimilation thereof, perhaps in a way that is consonant with one’s existing self-
conception—a process that culminates in self-understanding.  The self is 
essentially a dynamic, evolving entity; for most of us, it would continue to evolve 
as long as encounters last, until death renders them impossible. 
Self-construction, or self-invention, can also be understood in terms of self-
creation.  Self-creation, Richard Rorty explains, follows upon a person’s need ‘to 
come to terms with the blind impress which chance has given him, to make a self 
for himself by redescribing that impress in terms which are, if only marginally, his 
own.’267  Rorty claims that the need is universal.   ‘Blind impress’ is from a poem 
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by Philip Larkin, and presumably refers to the impressions made on a person by 
his or her unique set of experiences.  Externalities are a factor, but the experience 
is made one’s own—this is what I meant in the previous paragraph with regard to 
the possibility of experience being assimilated in a way that is consonant with 
one’s self-conception.  Rorty’s views on self-creation are reminiscent of 
Nietzsche; not surprisingly, perhaps, in view of his (Rorty’s) belief that Nietzsche 
was one of the very few ‘edifying’ philosophers ever to have lived.268  Nietzsche 
considered creativity and art to be so important that the artist-philosopher became, 
for him, the nearest thing on Earth to a deity; a creator who forms human 
beings269—the true Übermensch, one might say.  Beauty issues from art and art 
emanates from the strength of the artist’s will to power.  Beauty is held to be life-
affirming, and art is said to be the highest expression of freedom—‘how liberating 
is Dostoevsky,’ Nietzsche exclaims.270   
It is probably fair to say that most of us would be incapable of becoming a 
Nietzschean artist-philosopher, but Rorty may nevertheless have been correct in 
his assertion that the need for self-creativity is universal.  The vast majority of 
people can both create and think to some extent: in line with Dewey’s view on the 
compounding nature of creative activity (see p. 99), perhaps the more we create 
and think the greater the need becomes for us to do so.  The similarity between 
Rorty’s notion of self-creativity and Maslow’s self-actualisation is especially 
evident in the latter’s view that self-actualisation has a great deal to do with 
realising one’s potentialities, with making choices conducive to growth rather than 
regression, with taking responsibility, and with listening to and being one’s own 
self.271       
Self-actualisers are described by Maslow as ‘psychologically healthy, 
psychologically “superior” people [who are] better cognizers and perceivers.’272  
Cognition and intellectual achievement have already been paid considerable 
attention in this thesis, but an idea from Rawls could reinforce their connection 
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with self-actualisation.  The idea is referred to as the ‘Aristotelian principle’, 
which, Rawls says, stipulates that other things being equal, ‘human beings enjoy 
the exercise of their realised capacities (their innate and trained capacities), and 
their enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realised, or the greater its 
complexity.’  Excellence through (or of) intellectual achievement occupies a 
prominent place in Aristotle’s doctrine of virtue.  For Rawls, the Aristotelian 
principle constitutes ‘a basic principle of motivation.’273  It ties in with ‘the 
primary good of self-respect;’ it contributes to judgements of value; it resembles 
‘the idealist notion’ of self-realisation; and it ‘turns out to have a central position 
in the moral psychology underlying justice as fairness.’274  Self-actualisation 
would seem to be indisputably good, and good in a morally relevant way.  This is 
how Maslovian self-actualisation should be understood.  Satisfaction of the need 
for it would contribute to homosapient order, and the need for it may therefore be 
understood as an expression of the need for homosapient order.   
Maslow was in no doubt about the moral goodness of self-actualisation.  For him, 
it is an altogether salutary and compassionate state-of-being—so much so that the 
‘B’ in his formulations could reasonably be understood to signify ‘beneficence’ 
instead of ‘being’.  According to him, ‘delight in bringing about justice,’ and 
‘delight in stopping cruelty and exploitation’ are among the motivations and 
gratifications that attend self-actualisation.275  Recalling that the B-needs were 
regarded by Maslow as instinctoid (i.e. natural or innate rather than learned), 
moral goodness as a result of self-actualisation would be an outcome of entirely 
natural processes.       
The beneficent nature of the natural is not without empirical support.  The 
ethologist Frans De Waal recounts some experiments designed to determine 
whether contact between different species of primates can affect the way in which 
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conflict is resolved.  Relatively bellicose animals were exposed for a while to 
more peaceable ones, and it was found that peacemaking skills were transmitted 
from the latter to the former.276  If ‘good’ practice can rub off, might we not 
conclude that ‘bad’ practice can also be learned?  But such was not the case.  The 
transmission of methods of conflict-resolution was strictly one-way—from 
peaceable to bellicose.  The more harmonious animals remained unaffected by the 
erstwhile belligerence of their guests.  Although ‘bad’ can be undone, ‘good’ 
would seem to be more resilient.  Might we then infer that ‘good’ is instinctive 
and ‘bad’ learned?  Not really.  The naturalness of the good might be confined to 
the primates that were studied.  Nevertheless, Maslow was generally optimistic, as 
indicated by his belief in the instinctoid nature of the B-values.   
I suspect that one’s individual experience will determine whether there will be 
agreement with Maslow’s optimism.  It is hard to think of how one might argue 
for it, or against it for that matter.  Nevertheless, I believe it would be fair to say 
that the world would be quite a different place to the way most people find it if 
evil did in fact outweigh goodness.  Instead of the everyday kindnesses, 
helpfulness and sympathy that characterise civil society, there would be cruelty, 
obstructiveness and indifference.  Certainly the latter three are all too common, 
but it seems to me that civil society as we know it would never have evolved if 
they were predominant.   Support for Maslow’s optimism can also be drawn from 
philosophy.  Kant, for example, considered human nature to be fundamentally 
inclined towards moral goodness: I will expand on this in Chapter 8, where the 
relationship between personal character and morality is examined.  Many others 
besides Kant have believed goodness to be the norm (i.e., ‘norm’ in the sense of 
‘normal’ or ‘natural’).  Plato, for instance, attributed bad behaviour to disorders of 
the soul, which, in turn, were attributable to ‘want of intelligence’ and consisted 
either in madness or in ignorance.  Such pathologies were regarded by Plato as 
bodily malfunctions rather than willed wrong-doing: ‘no man is voluntarily bad,’ 
he says in the Timaeus, ‘but the bad become bad by reason of an ill disposition of 
the body and bad education.’277  For Plato, then, good education is necessary to 
orderliness of soul.  Hume might also be cited: for him, moral sense is natural, and 
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a nature inconsistent with moral sense is a perverted nature.278  I will be following 
Maslow’s lead (and Plato’s, and Kant’s, and Hume’s) in this regard when, in 
Chapter 8, I propose that human beings have, as an aspect of the need for self-
actualisation, a need for humaneness—a need to be humane and a need to be 
treated humanely.  Maslow’s optimism with regard to human nature appears to 
have been warranted: if the views that have been outlined truly reflect the facts, 
we would be entitled to think that most of us are inclined towards beneficence 
most of the time.   
Maslovian self-actualisation is indicative of a relationship between needs 
(fundamentally, the need for homosapient order) and morality.  The relationship 
will be discussed more fully in the next chapter, but before moving on, it would be 
as well to consider whether there are any significant omissions from Maslow’s list 
of needs.  If there are, the connection that I am trying to forge between 
homosapient order and morality would come under serious threat.   
5.4 Other Needs 
The hierarchy of needs shown on p. 66 makes no mention of some needs that 
would commonly be regarded as fundamental to the human condition, namely the 
need for freedom, the need for play, and the need for power.  In what follows I 
argue that places for all three can in fact be found in the Maslovian schema.    
Freedom is a need that is felt by most of us, and it would certainly be a serious 
matter if it were missing from Maslow’s schema.  As Wiggins says, ‘freedom, 
choice and autonomy are themselves vital human needs, and are candidates for 
precisely the kind of protection that is accorded qua needs to other real needs.’279  
There is little direct reference to the need for freedom in Maslow’s writings, 
although ‘aliveness’ can be found listed among his B-values, where it is 
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contrasted with ‘feeling oneself to be totally determined.’280  On the basis of the 
contrast, self-determination can be understood to be a B-value, and therefore a B-
need.  Values are needs by another name: if something is valued highly enough 
then its attainment would be felt as a need.   Self-determination consists in 
autonomy (i.e. self-legislation), and while not the same as freedom, the two 
concepts are closely related.  For instance, in a comment on Kant, Rawls remarks 
that ‘a person is acting autonomously when the principles of his action are chosen 
by him as the most adequate expression of his nature as a free and equal rational 
being.’281  In other words, autonomous action is made possible by our nature as 
free and rational beings, which enables us to choose between alternative courses 
of action.  Conversely, if we were not free and rational, we would be unable to 
choose, and our actions would be fully determined by external forces.   
Play would also appear to be a universal need.  Martha Nussbaum includes it in 
her list of ‘constitutive circumstances of the human being,’ a list that otherwise 
bears a strong resemblance to the constituents of Maslow’s hierarchy.282  Finnis 
also regards play as a basic human good, i.e. as something on which human 
fulfillment depends and therefore something we need.283  If play were indeed 
missing then Maslow’s schema would be gravely deficient.  But Maslow does in 
fact allow a place for it, not as a specific need but again as a B-value.  The 
absence of play is said by Maslow to lead to the loss of zest in life and an inability 
to enjoy,284 outcomes that would presumably prevent one from attaining self-
actualisation.  Maslow would have agreed with Kant’s assessment that play brings 
various benefits in its train, such as recovery of energy spent in work, sociability 
via party games, and physical health through athletic games.285  That leaves the 
need for power.      
The need for power will here be understood to refer to the need one has for control 
over oneself, and over other things and people.  It becomes manifest in either of 
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two ways, malignantly or benignly.  The malign and benign expressions of power 
are portrayed by the psychologist David C. McClelland in terms of ‘two faces’.  
Its malign aspect comes into view as an unsocialised ‘concern for personal 
dominance;’ its benign face is more socialised, for example through the 
empowerment of followers.286  Exploitative sex and aggression are identified as 
expressions of malignant power; running for public office is a more benign—and 
socialised—manifestation.287   
Looking more closely at benign power, we find McClelland deeming the 
empowerment of followers to be the ultimate paradox of social leadership and 
social power: ‘to be an effective leader, you have to turn all your so-called 
followers into leaders.’288  Education is a means of empowerment, and leadership 
and education are linked etymologically, through the Latin educare, which means 
‘to lead out.’289  Socialised leadership, McClelland maintains, takes its educational 
function seriously.  Socialised or benign power is concerned with learning and 
teaching, which ties in with the Maslovian need for intellectual achievement, and 
therefore self-actualisation.  It can also be linked to Spinoza’s theory of conatus, 
according to which everything strives for self-preservation and joy.  Joy consists 
in an increase in the power of acting autonomously,290 which in turn arises from 
the possession of adequate ideas.  Self-preservation and joy are the aims of the 
striving, but they can also be regarded as needs.  Seen as such, they permeate 
Maslow’s entire hierarchy: the first is especially concerned with physical needs 
and the second with social and being needs. 
The need for power issues in commands (i.e. orders) either to oneself or to others 
to fall into line with one’s conception of what counts as proper order.  But power 
can go beyond the issuance of means of attaining it; it can also become an end in 
itself.  Should that happen, the dominance-submission aspect of power delineated 
by McClelland becomes active, whereupon followers tend to be treated as ‘pawns 
rather than origins.’291  Instead of ‘origins’ McClelland might have said ‘ends’; 
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however, in either case, an obvious breach of morality will have occurred, 
especially in the form of Kant’s Categorical Imperative.  
Power can be perverted in various ways, at each of the levels of the Maslovian 
hierarchy.  At the physiological level, it may find expression as lechery or greed; 
at the social level, it would be marked by covetousness, envy and sloth; and at the 
level of being, by spiritual pride.  What have been known since biblical times as 
the seven deadly sins can all be understood as perversions of the will to power, 
and therefore of the need for power.  If one is lecherous or greedy, then one aims 
at the satisfaction of inordinate appetites for sex or material goods.  If one is 
covetous or envious, then one lusts after something that properly belongs to 
another.  If slothful, then one may fail to fulfill one’s social functions.  In these 
ways, covetousness, envy and sloth are all disruptive of social order.  Finally, if 
one is spiritually proud, then one’s sense of self-importance tends to reach 
gargantuan proportions.  Theologically, spiritual pride consists in the denial of 
God; secularly, it consists in the denial of the worth of other people and the world 
in general.  Both theologically and secularly, spiritual pride is characterised by 
extreme self-centredness and selfishness.      
The need for power need not result in evil: think, for example, of compassionate 
leaders like Martin Luther King, Mahatma Gandhi and Nelson Mandela, all of 
whom certainly attained power and arguably therefore needed it.  But the need for 
power can reach pathological degrees in some individuals.  Milton’s Satan is an 
archetype, summed up in the proposition ‘Better to reign in Hell, than serve in 
Heaven.’292  Regardless of whether good or evil, the attainment of power would 
assuredly contribute to the satisfaction of the need for self-actualisation in those 
who are motivated by some form of power, which is probably to say nearly 
everyone.       
The needs that seemed to be missing from Maslow’s hierarchy have in fact been 
found to be firmly embedded in it.  His list of needs would appear to be 
comprehensive, with the exception of the need for malignant self-actualisation.  
The latter will later be found to be significant in the formulation of the order-
based theory of morality.   
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5.5 Conclusion 
In keeping with many others, Daniel Dennett maintains that moral agency depends 
on freedom, but he finds also that it is anchored in the stability of ‘social 
conditions, individual practices, and attitudes.’293  He writes:  
The complexities of social life in a species with language and culture 
generate a series of evolutionary arms races from which agents emerge who 
exhibit key components of human morality: an interest in discovering 
conditions in which cooperation will flourish, sensitivity to punishments and 
threats, concern for reputation, high-level dispositions of self-manipulation 
that are designed to improve self-control in the face of temptation, and an 
ability to make commitments that are appreciable by others.294   
The three classes of needs, and the three components of homosapient order, are all 
implicated in Dennett’s explanation of the origin of cooperation and morality.  
Physiological needs and P-order would be implicit in the punishments and threats 
he refers to, social needs and S-order have a great deal to do with concern for 
reputation, and being needs and E-order would be vitally involved in the ‘high 
level dispositions’ he speaks of.  Flexibility of mind and social comprehension are 
other factors mentioned by Dennett.295  Mental flexibility entails imagination, 
which has been variously associated with morality,296 while social comprehension 
would contribute to the formation of cohesive societies. 
                                                 
293 Dennett, Freedom Evolves, p. 190. 
294 Dennett, Freedom Evolves, p. 218. 
295 Dennett, Freedom Evolves, p. 291. 
296 According to Darwin, moral sensitivity is dependent upon the effectiveness of the imagination; 
in his words, ‘whatever renders the imagination more vivid and strengthens the habit of recalling 
and comparing past impressions, will make the conscience more sensitive ….’ (The Descent of 
Man in Darwin (Chicago: The University of Chicago, Great Books of the Western World, 1952), 
Vol. 49, p. 593).  Dewey similarly, in his declaration that the imagination is ‘the chief instrument 
of the good,’ (quoted by Rorty in Contingency, irony, and solidarity, p. 69); and Rorty speaks of 
‘imaginative identification’ with the suffering of other human beings (Contingency, irony, and 
solidarity, p. 93).  We also see from Rawls that imagination may have been crucial to Sidgwick’s 
utilitarian conception of ‘future good’, which served as a criterion for the evaluation of possible 
courses of action.  In Rawls’s gloss, Sidgwick described ‘a person’s future good on the whole as 
what he would now desire and seek if the consequences of all the various courses of conduct open 
to him were, at the present point of time, adequately foreseen by him and adequately realized in 
imagination’ (A Theory of Justice, p. 366).  Martha Nussbaum’s concept ‘compassionate 
imagination’ is also relevant to the issue (see Liberal Education and Global Responsibility: A talk 
for a Symposium at Carleton College, in honor of the Inauguration of Robert A. Oden Jr. as 
President, October 25, 2002: file://E:\carleton.html). 
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Although all of the human needs are readily recognisable in the terms formulated 
by Maslow, the need for homosapient order itself might not be an altogether alien 
idea.  It would readily become evident, I suggest, to anyone confronted by a 
breakdown of order, in any of the senses of order discussed here.  Illness, for 
example, could evoke ideas of physical disorder, as might riot of social disorder.  
The need for homosapient order is only one remove from its Maslovian 
expressions.  The chapter that follows completes the metaethical part of the thesis 
by demonstrating that needs are morally relevant.      
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6: HUMAN NEEDS AND MORALITY 
 
6.1 The Moral Relevance of Needs 
According to John Dupré, the assumption that attention to a thing’s origins 
provides the key to understanding its nature may be a ‘hangover from theological 
cosmology.’297  Theological cosmology, of course, is very much concerned with 
the role of God in the origin of things; but theological cosmology was not the 
target of Dupré’s remark.  Rather, his aim was directed at the quest by 
evolutionary psychologists for explanations of human traits in terms of conditions 
that were prevalent in the Stone Age.  Dupré is critical of the quest because of its 
alleged failure to take subsequent contextual developments into account.  
Contextual developments include cultural change and environmental conditions: 
in conjunction with biological factors, they are responsible for the way in which 
humans have evolved.   
It is certainly not my wish to ignore the importance of contextual developments, 
but I nevertheless believe that our basic needs provide a good starting point for 
explanations of behaviour, including morally classifiable behaviour.  Our early 
Stone Age ancestors would at the very least have experienced the need for 
subsistence and safety.  Subsequently, at some stage of human development, it 
presumably occurred to people that such needs might be better satisfied if work 
were to be performed cooperatively.  In other words, the basic needs preceded the 
advent of cooperativeness.  If the needs had not been satisfied in some way before 
the formation of cooperative groups, there would have been no-one alive to form 
the groups.  S-order would have become another need once socialisation got 
started.  Since the Stone Age ended less than seven thousand years ago, long after 
the emergence of Homo sapiens, some kind of embryonic need for E-order might 
also have been emerging: Homer’s poetry, for example, may have been a product 
of those ancient times.   
Cooperative groups are groups whose members work and play together.  People 
who do these things together stick together: their groups are cohesive.  According 
to Philip Kitcher, cohesiveness within the earliest congregations of human beings 
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depended on altruism.  It is altruism that first enabled people of different ages and 
sex to live together cohesively.298  Human beings have long had a capacity for 
altruism; indeed, Kitcher maintains, ever since the ethical project began fifty 
thousand years ago.  Three kinds of altruism are identified by Kitcher: biological, 
behavioural and psychological.  Biological altruism occurs at an unconscious 
genetic level, when the reproductive success of an organism diminishes in such a 
way as to increase the reproductive success of another organism.  Biological 
altruism is of no relevance to ethics, because of the absence of a cognitive 
dimension.299  Behavioural altruism occurs when an organism acts in ways ‘that 
detract from the fulfillment of its own current desires and promote the perceived 
wishes’ of another organism.300  Perception of another’s wishes requires cognitive 
ability, so behavioural altruism occurs only within the animal kingdom.  
Behavioural altruism, Kitcher notes, may be practised ‘by Machiavellian 
egoists:’301 although the wishes of another are recognised, acts are undertaken to 
serve them only in so far as the interests of the individual performing the acts are 
also served.   
In Kitcher’s view neither biological altruism nor behavioural altruism is of much 
help in understanding the origins of the ethical project.302  For him, it is 
psychological altruism that is of most interest.  A psychological altruist is a person 
who intentionally acts towards others in ways that promote their perceived wishes 
and interests, after having aligned their wishes with his or her own wishes (my 
gloss; Kitcher’s definition is far more complicated303).  That others should benefit 
from their acts is desired by psychological altruists.  Psychological altruism and 
behavioural altruism find expression in a person’s character.     
                                                 
298 Kitcher, p. 17 ff.   
299 According to my thesis, ethics is partly based on biological order, which is a form of physical 
order.  But ethics needs much more than that; what it needs is homosapient order in its entirety.  If 
biological order were the only kind of order, ethics as we understand it and as it is being portrayed 
here would not exist.   
300 Kitcher, p. 19. 
301 Kitcher, p. 19. 
302 Kitcher, p. 19. 
303 See Kitcher, p. 22.  Based on studies by Jane Goodall and Frans de Waal, Kitcher believes that 
psychological altruism may not be limited to human beings.  My thesis is concerned with human 
morality, but the importance attributed to non-human altruism by Kitcher is worth noting.  He 
maintains that ‘there are preethical forms of altruism and that these are realized in animals who 
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On Kitcher’s thesis, altruism alone cannot ensure that members of a population 
reach the level of cooperation necessary to social stability.  Exploitation of 
altruistic individuals by others not so inclined may be one impediment.   
Normative guidance is also required,304 and this is made possible by the ability ‘to 
apprehend and obey commands,’305 including self-commands.  The emotions and 
reason would both play a part, perhaps in conjunction with one another.306  In 
Kitcher’s words, ‘[t]he simplest—and original—form of normative guidance 
consists in an ability to transform a situation that would otherwise have been an 
altruism failure, by means of commitment to following a rule: you obey the 
command to give weight to the wishes of the other.’307  Whence the rule, and why 
should anyone obey it?  The questions, of course, are of fundamental importance 
to theories of normative guidance.  The origin of the rule for behavioural altruists 
would conceivably lie in the perception of personal benefit that might be obtained 
by giving weight to the wishes of others; obedience to the rule would follow from 
the desirability of such benefit.  For psychological altruists, the rule would 
originate in the desirability of giving weight to the wishes of others, and the same 
desirability would encourage observance of the rule.    
I mentioned in Chapter 1 that Kitcher conjectures that the ‘first ethicists were 
probably concerned with the altruism failures that arose with respect to basic 
needs, but their efforts led to an evolved conception of the good life, one in which 
our interactions and relationships with others are fundamental.’308  In other words, 
physiological needs gave rise to social needs, and perhaps also to being needs (the 
latter via conceptions of the ‘good life’).  The reference to ‘basic needs’ is 
especially noteworthy.  While the needs at issue for Kitcher appear to be those at 
the nether end of Maslow’s hierarchy, we have seen that Maslow insisted on the 
basic (‘instinctoid’) nature of the complete range of needs, including those 
involving human relationships, all the way up the ladder to self-actualisation.  An 
order-based ethicist today would on that principle still be concerned with altruism 
failures with respect to basic needs.  Higher-order needs might not have been 
basic when the ethical project first got started, but they are now.    
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The question is, what have needs got to do with goodness and right?  A great deal, 
the philosophers H. L. A. Hart and John Finnis appear to have believed.  Finnis 
approvingly quotes Hart to the effect that ‘the core of the notion of right is neither 
individual choice nor individual benefit but basic or fundamental individual 
needs.’309  In other words, the needs of respondents must be taken into account in 
determining whether the actions of an agent can be considered right, and therefore 
morally commendable; moreover, the needs of respondents carry more weight in 
such determinations than an agent’s choice or benefit.       
There are several other contemporary philosophers who look upon needs as basic 
to morality, including David Braybrooke, David Wiggins, Soran Reader and 
Gillian Brock.  Braybrooke, for instance, considers needs to ‘imply conditions 
indispensable to having important freedoms,’ such as ‘the freedom to survive.’310  
Wiggins similarly, when he speaks of ‘entrenched’ needs, i.e. needs that are 
relatively (to needs that are not entrenched) unsusceptible to change.311  
Entrenched needs must be satisfied in order to avoid harm of some kind, ranging 
from illness and physical hurt to psychological damage in the form of diminished 
self-respect; they correspond to the complete range of Maslovian needs.  Wiggins 
also aligns needs with interests: ‘[i]f a person needs x, then he has an interest in 
x’s being or becoming available to him.’312  In addressing the question of the 
moral relevance of needs, I will be discussing the relationship between needs and 
interests, and between needs, preferences, values, rights and desires.   
Kitcher notes that desires are connected with intentions and actions,313  and speaks 
of the values one attributes to various outcomes.314  Since we are likely to desire 
what we need, needs would seem to precede desires in any chain of events that 
culminates in action.  Desire may be understood as a psychological state induced 
by needs, and perhaps other things besides needs (for example, wants).  Kitcher at 
least allows room for needs, in his proposition that, with regard to altruism, an 
organism’s desires and emotions ‘will adjust to reflect that organism’s perceptions 
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of the wants, needs, and feelings of … others.’315  Kitcher also refers to ‘ethical 
agents as those sympathetic individuals who respond to the needs of others.’316  
More strongly still, ‘[b]y identifying permanent human needs, analysts can 
conclude that some elements in ethical progress will probably figure in any 
progressive development of what we now have.’317  Permanent human needs are 
basic human needs.   
Many references to needs in their various guises can be found in the literature —
desires as we have just seen, but also values, preferences, and, as already 
mentioned, interests.  With respect to values, Philip Pettit notes that 
consequentialism has appeared in several forms, one of which is ‘restrictive 
consequentialism’, which he describes as ‘a form of extreme or act-
consequentialism.’318  Restrictive consequentialism holds simply that an agent 
may best promote his or her values in behavioural choices.  Values are the end; 
behaviour is the means to the end—a truism, perhaps, but it appears that ‘needs’ 
could be substituted for ‘values’, without any obvious impairment to the 
formulation of restrictive consequentialism. 
On the subject of preferences, Robert Goodin observes that modern utilitarians 
generally replace Benthamite hedonistic psychology with ‘preference 
satisfaction’.  Instead of a surplus of pleasures over pains, what is now understood 
to count is the satisfaction of preferences.319  One may ask: whose preferences, 
and preferences for what?  As far as whose preferences are concerned, agents and 
respondents would be taken into account, the aim being maximisation of the 
satisfaction of preferences across all parties.  With regard to what preferences, 
needs would seem to be the key: we desire that our needs be satisfied, and where 
alternative means of satisfying them exist, we will choose one of them in 
preference to the others.  But Goodin detects a deficiency in preference 
utilitarianism on this point: he maintains that there are ‘some things—truth, 
beauty, love, friendship—that are good, whether or not people happen to desire 
them.’320  Such was G. E. Moore’s version of ‘ideal utilitarianism’, which is 
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pluralistic in so far as right action is held to be that which maximises the good.  As 
Jonathan Dancy notes, Moore also held that that there are various things that are 
good, such as knowledge and aesthetic experience.321  The two goods mentioned 
by Dancy correspond to two of Maslow’s so-called ‘being needs’; and, as well, to 
the notion of eudaimonic order.     
Interests are the chief concern of welfare utilitarians.  Instead of preferences, 
emphasis is placed on the satisfaction of interests.322  Goodin observes that 
welfare interests ‘need not be all that far removed from preferences,’323 which 
suggests that assimilation is conceivable.  In this chapter, however, I argue that 
while interests are close in connotation to needs, preferences are less so.  Goodin 
continues, ‘[w]elfare utilitarians, by abstracting from people’s actual wants to 
their more generalized welfare interests, has given that intuitively appealing 
broader notion of utility some practical content.’324  Getting down to basics, it 
would seem.  Among the welfare interests listed by Goodin are health, money, 
shelter and sustenance—all of which arguably stem from needs, and, ultimately 
(such is my contention), also by an act of abstraction, our need for homosapient 
order. 
6.2 Needs, Preferences, Wishes, Wants, Interests, Values 
As we have just seen, needs, preferences, wishes, wants, interests and values are 
variously spoken of in terms of moral relevance.  Validly so, I believe, because 
any of them may lead to behaviour by an agent that impacts on others in ways that 
invite moral judgement.  My contention, however, is that the basic needs 
delineated by Maslow are either prior to or equivalent to each of the others.  By 
‘prior to’, I mean ‘a determinant of’.   
Preferences express some kind of ranking of wants, interests, values and needs.  
Faced with a choice, unless we are Buridan’s ass, we will prefer to have one or 
some of our wants etc. met rather than others.  Preferences are posterior to needs, 
wants, interests and values.  Alternatively, one might say ‘I need (or want) X more 
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than I need (or want) Y, therefore I prefer to have X rather than Y’.  Preferences 
reflect our underlying needs.   
Wishes are close in connotation to desires.  Something that is desired will be 
something that is wished for.  Casebeer differentiates between the desired and the 
desirable.  He writes, ‘[i]n the short term, regulating my experience by giving in 
merely to what is desired rather than to what is desirable would be disastrous and 
would lead to non-consummatory experience in the long run.  I should regulate 
my desires and resolve conflicting wants and needs, or I should triangulate a 
reasonable course of action when faced with conflicting values.’325  In other 
words, that which is desirable is that which ought to be desired, where ‘ought’ is 
determined by our beliefs with regard to the good and right.  Wants are close in 
meaning to needs, although the term ‘want’ is ambiguous.  On the one hand, when 
I say ‘I want Y’, Y may be of no consequence to my well-being; it may even be 
deleterious towards it.  ‘I want a cigarette’, for example.  In this case, my wanting 
Y has little or nothing to do with my basic needs.  (Although wanting Y may be an 
expression of my character, or physiology.  If I am a nicotine addict, I may indeed 
feel in need of a smoke.  Then, if a steal a pack because of my perceived need, my 
want will become morally relevant.  In such instances, wants are equivalent to 
needs.)  On the other hand, ‘to be in want of X’ would generally be understood to 
be in need of X, and that our well-being depends on obtaining it.  To put it another 
way, the want is equivalent to a basic need.  James Griffin distinguishes between 
‘mere wanting’ and ‘the sort of wanting that connects with values.  One way to 
see something as worth wanting is to see it under the heading of some general 
human interest.’326  The sort of wanting that connects with values and interests 
would be that which also connects with basic needs.  Mary Midgley connects 
wants with our deepest concerns.  She writes, ‘[w]e are not free to create or 
annihilate wants, either by private invention or by culture ….  Wants are not 
random impulses.  They are articulated, recognizable aspects of life; they are the 
deepest structural constituents of our characters.’327  I think what Midgley says of 
wants may also be said of needs: needs are recognisable aspects of life, and deeply 
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influential with regard to our characters.  The depth attributed by Midgley to 
wants makes them sound very much like Maslovian needs.   
Interests and values can be taken together.  If we have an interest in something it 
is because we value it.  It is hard to imagine how we could be interested in 
anything that was of no value to us.  If something is valued, then its interests are 
likely to be promoted.  If we disvalue something, then we may act (or wish others 
would act) against its interests.  The relationship between interests and values 
seems to be very strong indeed.  Where, then, do they stand in relation to needs?  I 
will follow Midgley on this: according to her, ‘values register needs.’328  In other 
words, if something is needed then it will be valued.  We will have an interest in 
seeing that the need is satisfied—which is to say, needs are prior to values and 
interests.  However, that is not to say that we will need everything that is of 
interest to us: a new book from a favourite author would be of interest and we 
would value having it, but would we really need it?  Often we would not.  In the 
event of a clash, interests and values stemming from needs would likely take 
precedence over those that do not: again, therefore, it can be concluded that needs 
are prior to values and interests.   
The relationship between needs and preferences, wishes and the rest is a causal 
one.  The fact that we have a need for something—for example a drink (and 
therefore P-order)—causes us to do something to satisfy the need.  Need 
precipitates purposeful action, mediated by feelings and beliefs about what kind of 
action might (or should) be undertaken.  Given the opportunity, we might quench 
our thirst with beer rather than wine, a choice that expresses our preference.  
Viewed from the perspective of the preference, our choice of beer expresses a 
want, which in turn expresses our need for homeostasis.  If asked why we want 
the beer, we will say: because I am thirsty.  This is the reason for our taking a 
drink.  Homeostatic disorder (felt as thirst) causes us to find a means of quenching 
the thirst.  Preference kicks in when we are given a choice as to how to quench it; 
the need is prior to the preference.  Our preference for beer will likely be due to 
contextual (for example, cultural) factors, although biology may also play a part 
(for example, we may be allergic to wine).  Another example: we see someone 
collapse in the street and rush to help them.  Why?  Because, I would say, of our 
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basic need for humaneness, which, I argue (in Section 8.3), can be classed as a 
Maslovian B-need.  If asked for a reason for our helping behaviour, we might 
refer to our belief that matters should be so.  At bottom, however, or from the 
other direction, the putative need provides a causal explanation for our action.        
Needs, then, are either prior to or equivalent to preferences, wishes, wants, 
interests and values.  And all of the latter would seem to be morally relevant.  To 
the extent that they are, needs would also be morally relevant.  They become 
morally relevant when we engage in morally classifiable behaviour in endeavours 
to satisfy our needs (or preferences, desires, wants etc.).  In Section 4.4 
homosapient order was tentatively found to be good in a morally relevant way, 
when conjoined to morally commendable behaviour.  Then, in Chapter 5, the 
various needs identified by Maslow were all traced to the fundamental need for 
homosapient order, thus pointing to the moral relevance of needs.  The foregoing 
argument relating to preferences etc. strengthens the case for their moral 
relevance.  To confirm it, I will now attempt to demonstrate that needs are closely 
related to rights, on the understanding that rights are indisputably morally 
relevant.  The argument is based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR).     
6.3 Needs and Rights 
The UDHR provides insight into what a consensus on the notion of right (and, by 
implication, the notion of wrong) consists in.329  Since its proclamation in 1948, 
the UDHR has served as the basis of the International Bill of Human Rights,330 
and as a model for bills of rights in the constitutions of many countries that have 
subsequently gained independence, especially within the British 
Commonwealth.331   
                                                 
329 The concepts ‘right’ and ‘rights’ are closely related, but not identical.  Both involve possible 
mismatches between rights and obligations, and, according to Onora O’Neill, it is only at an 
abstract level that the two converge: i.e., where whatever an agent is obliged to do because it is 
right is the same as that which a respondent has a right to expect—such is the vocabulary of right.  
However, a gap opens up in the vocabulary of rights where obligations to respondents remain 
unallocated to an agent.  See O’Neill, ‘Rights, Obligations, and Needs’, in Brock (editor), 
Necessary Goods: Our Responsibilities to Meet Others’ Needs, Chapter 5.  That may well be true, 
but there is at least justification on an abstract level for treating ‘rights’ as a surrogate of ‘right’. 
330 Formulated in 1966 in the form of two covenants, and supplemented by two voluntary 
protocols, the first also in 1966 and the second in 1989. 
331 See Finnis, p. 211. 
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Pronouncements like the UDHR may reasonably be said to be concerned more 
with political right than moral right, but the two kinds of right could also be seen 
as being continuous with one another, especially if we choose to follow Aristotle.  
The UDHR consists of thirty articles, and addresses such matters as life and 
liberty, freedom from slavery, equality in person and before the law, and 
education.  The UDHR is a remarkable achievement, because it transcends 
profound cultural, religious and political differences.  The nations that voted for it 
did so for various reasons: as David Tracy observes, ‘there proved to be no way 
for any philosopher to win agreement on anything like a common ethical, 
political, metaphysical, or religious answer to the question of why the most basic 
human rights were just that: basic human rights.’332  Christians and Jews, Liberal 
Democrats and Marxists, and others of different religious and political 
persuasions, all had recourse to a multitude of sources for their views.  In the 
circumstances, it would be too much to expect unanimous agreement to the 
UDHR in its entirety.  Griffin, for example, is critical of Article no. 24, with its 
‘right’ to paid holidays; but he nevertheless believes most of the UDHR rights to 
be acceptable.333 
A sample of the articles of the UDHR will suffice to demonstrate how they 
address the Maslovian needs.334  Article no. 2 states that ‘[n]obody should be 
discriminated against on the basis of race, religion, gender, politics, or on any 
other grounds.’  Discrimination manifests as prejudice, unfairness and intolerance.  
In condemning it on the basis of qualities like race and gender, which lie beyond 
the control of the individual, the second article aims at the advancement of justice, 
and accordingly serves the need for esteem and possibly self-actualisation.   
Religion and politics may also be beyond the control of the individual in some 
circumstances, for example in theocracies and dictatorships, where contrary views 
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Martha C. Nussbaum and Cass R. Sunstein, (editors), Clones and Clones: Facts and Fantasies 
about Human Cloning (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1998), p. 190. 
333 Griffin, p. 202. 
334 I should note that a similar exercise to the one I am engaged in has been conducted by Gillian 
Brock.  She writes, a ‘knowledge of what our human needs are must be had before we can sensibly 
have a go at defining the entitlements that will be protected as human rights’ (see Reader (editor): 
The Philosophy of Need, p. 65 ff.).  Brock’s concern was to establish that a needs-based account is 
more fundamental to global justice than a human rights account.  I think she is correct, but I wish 
to establish that there is something even more fundamental than the various needs that she, like 
Maslow, identifies, namely the need for homosapient order.   Philosophers have a penchant for 
fundamentals—the more fundamental the better.   
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sometimes attract severe punishment; otherwise, choice would generally be 
exercisable, at least to some extent.  Nevertheless, regardless of whether religion 
and politics are matters of individual choice, the article insists that one should 
keep an open mind towards them.  A difficulty arising from this is whether one 
would be entitled to be intolerant of credos that are themselves discriminatory, for 
example Nazism and various kinds of fundamentalist religion.  The article’s 
position is that one would not be so entitled; it does not follow, however, that 
rational disapproval would also be out of line.  
Article no. 3 stipulates that ‘[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of 
person.’  Again, there could hardly be rights more fundamental than these.  The 
article addresses very basic needs, such as survival and safety.  The inclusion of 
liberty with the right to life and security suggests that it too is basic.  And so it is, 
for without it, opportunities for self-respect would be severely curtailed.  Liberty, 
or freedom, is a Maslovian B-need, and therefore answers to the need for self-
actualisation in the form of human flourishing.  Observance of these rights would 
help satisfy needs from one end of Maslow’s hierarchy to the other.   
Another set of fundamental needs is the subject of Article no. 5, which states that 
‘[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
punishment.’  More than mere wrong, this article speaks against evil.  The 
pertinent needs are homeostasis and safety, belongingness and esteem; in other 
words, all of the so-called Maslovian deficiency needs.  Maslow was of the view 
that the lack of gratification of such needs can cause a ‘diminution of humanness, 
i.e., loss of some of the characteristics that define humanness.’335  The 
‘diminution’ could also be an effect of cruelty, through vitiation of self-respect 
(i.e., denial of the need for esteem).  Note that we are talking here about 
diminution, not total loss.  A person who is subjected to torture would still be a 
person, i.e. a human being, regardless of the severity of his or her suffering. 
Finally, Article no. 14 is pertinent to the vexed issue of asylum-seeking.  The 
article specifies that ‘[e]veryone has the right to seek and enjoy in other countries 
asylum from unjust persecution.’  Safety and belongingness are clearly at issue 
here, and a straightforward case of right and wrong would appear to be involved.  
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But the politics surrounding asylum-seeking complicates matters.  While it would 
seem to be unequivocally wrong to refuse to accommodate someone attempting to 
escape persecution, the conventions of the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) oblige 
refugees to fit in with the laws and customs of the host nation.  So much is 
reinforced in the right of the prospective host to refuse entry to criminals and the 
like.  In other words, the social stability of the host nation is assumed to be 
paramount, and that could conflict with the aims of Article no.14, from which the 
UNHCR takes its lead.  Whence real politick.336     
In 2010 there were about thirty-one million asylum-seekers (refugees and 
displaced persons) in the world, and an unqualified reading of Article 14 would 
presumably require a nation to permit entry to anyone who made it their 
destination.  What if all of the refugees were to select just one country?  Well, to 
accommodate such a large number would obviously give rise to the kind of social 
disorder legislated against in the refugee convention.  That of course would be an 
unrealistic scenario, but a principle is involved: it is a matter of where to draw the 
line—what would be the right number?  Order-based theory would say that the 
number would be such as not to encroach on satisfaction of the needs of the host’s 
citizens, especially their needs for homeostasis and safety.  How many refugees, 
then, would be too many?  That would be a question for social scientists to 
answer, but some sort of rational estimate should be possible.   
The foregoing samples demonstrate how the rights prescribed in the UDHR can be 
associated with Maslovian needs, and therefore with the need for homosapient 
order.  Indeed, all of the UDHR articles can be read in a similar fashion.  Physical 
needs are at issue in the rights to life, security, work, an adequate standard of 
living and freedom from torture.  Social needs are relevant to the rights to a family 
life, participation in public affairs, freedom of movement, a fair hearing in legal 
affairs, privacy, and freedom from discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, 
gender and politics.  The various freedoms are vitally concerned with self-esteem.  
Being needs are concerned with the rights to work, self-determination, gender 
                                                 
336 Contravention of the Christian principle of sacrifice could also arise, leading to moral 
dilemmas for avowedly Christian rulers of host nations.  Sacrifice under the teaching of Jesus 
requires deeds of a supererogatory nature, as in the call to give one’s cloak in addition to the coat 
that may have been forfeited under law (Matt. 5: 10). 
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equality, education and participation in the aesthetic and intellectual achievements 
of the community.   
The connection between needs and human rights appears to be very strong, in 
which case everyone would have to be seen as having the same basic needs.  This 
follows from the assumption that rights are equal across the human race: a 
justifiable assumption, in my view, by virtue of the very existence of the UDHR, 
especially its injunctions against discriminatory practice.  Equality of rights and 
needs means that each person is entitled to have their need for food satisfied as 
much as any other person is entitled to have the same need satisfied; likewise the 
need for love, the need for esteem, and all of the other needs in the Maslovian 
schema.  I am speaking here in general terms, and the qualifier ‘other things being 
equal’ would have to be applied to particular cases.  For example, a person who 
has been without food for several days would probably be in greater need than 
someone who has been fasting for a single day; their levels of satiety, prior to 
receiving sustenance, would not be equal.  Nevertheless, based on the general 
point at issue, it follows that an ethics based on needs is essentially egalitarian.     
An observation made by Finnis is also worth mentioning.  The UDHR (and 
derivative documents) generally employ two principal canonical forms: first, that 
everyone ‘has the right to …,’ and, second, ‘no one shall be ….’337  The two forms 
Finnis says, are due to the notion that the ‘exercise of rights and freedoms … is 
subject to limitation.’338  In the UDHR the limitations with regard to both forms 
stem from Article no. 29, which stipulates that the various rights must be 
exercised within the ambit of laws that protect the rights of others.  In other 
words, limitation is necessary in order ‘(i) to secure due recognition for the rights 
and freedoms of others; (ii) to meet the just requirements of morality in a 
democratic society; (iii) to meet the just requirements of public order in a 
democratic society; (iv) to meet the just requirements of the general welfare in a 
democratic society.’339  The underlying idea that public freedom involves 
limitation corresponds to the notion that personal freedom in the form of 
autonomy entails self-restraint. 
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The correlation between human needs and human rights is so strong that one may 
wonder whether rights instead of needs should be given priority in metaethical and 
ethical theory.  The question is the subject of the next section, where some ideas 
from James Griffin are considered.    
6.4 Needs or Rights? 
Griffin proposes that ‘human rights have to do with a certain minimum—the 
minimum proximately necessary for normative agency.’340  Normative agency 
consists in ‘deliberating, assessing, choosing, and acting to make what we see as a 
good life for ourselves.’341  It is important to note the qualifier ‘normative’ in 
Griffin’s formula: some people such as young children and those suffering from 
mental disablement would be agents in so far as they do things, but their actions 
would often be excluded from moral judgement for the reasons given in the 
discussion of moral classifiability in Section 2.3.  Expanding on normative 
agency, Griffin explains: 
To be an agent, in the fullest sense of which we are capable, one must (first) 
choose one’s own path through life—that is, not be dominated or controlled 
by someone or something else (call it “autonomy”).  And (second) one’s 
choice must be real; one must have at least a certain minimum education and 
information.  And having chosen, one must then be able to act; that is, one 
must have at least the minimum provision of resources and capabilities that 
it takes (call all of this “minimum provision”).  And none of this is any good 
if someone then blocks one; so (third) others must not forcibly stop one 
from pursuing what one sees as a worthwhile life (call this “liberty”).342   
The conditions of agency—autonomy, minimum provision and liberty—define 
what Griffin refers to as ‘personhood’.  Personhood, he says, provides grounds 
(but not the only grounds—‘practicalities’ is another343) in which human rights 
can be anchored.  Griffin maintains that the notion of personhood, which 
coincides with that of normative agency, is capable of generating ‘most of the 
                                                 
340 Griffin, p. 187. 
341 Griffin, p. 32. 
342 Griffin, p. 33. 
343 Griffin, p. 37. With regard to practicalities, Griffin writes, ‘[w]e need also to consult human 
nature, the nature of society, and so on ….’  Rights need to be ‘socially manageable’ (p. 38).   
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conventional list of human rights.’344  The objects of rights include life, security, 
autonomy, basic education and worship, all of which correspond to basic 
Maslovian needs.  Life and security are the homeostatic and safety needs that have 
been discussed; autonomy is concerned with the need for self-respect; basic 
education is a stepping-stone towards intellectual achievement; and worship is 
associable with spiritual fulfillment and self-actualisation.  But Griffin would not 
go as far as treating satisfaction of all of the Maslovian needs as conditions of 
personhood.  He writes, ‘[g]rounding human rights in personhood imposes an 
obvious constraint on their content: they are rights not to anything that promotes 
human good or flourishing, but merely to what is needed for human status.  They 
are protections of that somewhat austere state, a characteristically human life, not 
of a good or happy or perfected or flourishing human life.’345  On that account, 
self-actualisation would not be necessary to personhood: and by excluding it, 
aesthetic experience and intellectual achievement would also be excluded; either 
that, or present only to a very limited extent.     
I think it may be granted that Griffin’s three conditions of personhood are 
sufficient for normative agency.  In the absence of autonomy, minimum provision 
and liberty, either severally or collectively, normative agency would conceivably 
be impossible.  But normative agency does not require satisfaction of the complete 
range of Maslovian needs.  A person who has not been fortunate enough to attain 
self-actualisation through, say, maximisation of her musical potential, would not 
for that reason be disqualified from moral agency.  The question is whether the 
conditions of personhood, as well as being sufficient grounds for normative 
agency, also provide sufficient grounds for a comprehensive metaethical/ethical 
theory such as the one I am proposing—and if they are sufficient, whether they 
are also better (in the sense of ‘prior’) grounds than those provided by the need for 
homosapient order and all of its Maslovian expressions.   
First, then, do Griffin’s conditions of normative agency provide sufficient grounds 
for a comprehensive metaethical/ethical theory?  If moral significance were to be 
restricted to the rights pertaining to personhood, then I would say that the rights 
involved would not be up to the task.  All of the Maslovian needs, from 
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homeostasis through to self-actualisation, can be violated in morally classifiable 
ways; in which case, all of them require recognition in any theory that claims to be 
comprehensive (see especially Chapters 7 and 8).  Since the rights associated with 
normative agency effectively corresponds only to a subset of the Maslovian needs, 
those rights fail to provide sufficient grounds on which to base a comprehensive 
moral theory.  But that is not the end of the story: we must also bear in mind 
Griffin’s contention that the conditions of personhood and normative agency are 
capable of generating the ‘most of the conventional list of rights.’  Assuming that 
to be the case, and on the basis of the strong correlation previously found to exist 
between the UDHR and the Maslovian needs, then Griffin’s account of 
personhood and its associated rights may indeed be understood to provide 
sufficient grounds for a comprehensive moral theory.  The question of priority of 
rights relative to needs must therefore be addressed. 
The last question can be resolved fairly quickly.  Griffin himself acknowledges 
that right derives from ‘the moral structure,’ and that both right and the moral 
structure derive from good.346  Similarly Brenda Almond, who regards rights as 
part of the public or general good: in her view, the ultimate justification of rights 
‘is not that they are in fact universally accepted, but rather that, on the basis of the 
contribution they can make to the realization of human hopes and aspiration 
(human ‘flourishing’), they have the potential for securing widespread agreement 
and acceptance.’347  I have already argued for a correlation between homosapient 
order and justice, and that homosapient order is a Footian natural good.  On that 
basis, and on the further proviso that the moral structure can be satisfactorily 
explained in terms of needs and homosapient order (this being the task of the 
thesis as a whole), the question of whether needs or rights should be given priority 
in metaethical and ethical theory would appear to have been settled: the answer 
would be needs.  
Because of their connection to normative agency, Griffin’s conditions of 
personhood are morally relevant.  In which case, the related subset of Maslovian 
needs may also be understood to be morally relevant.  The concept of malignant 
                                                 
346 ‘Respecting goods, as well as promoting them, can be a teleological position; both positions can 
hold that the good is basic in the moral structure and the right derived from it’ (Griffin, p.80).   
347 Almond, p. 267.  Almond notes that a distinctive feature of rights-oriented morality is ‘that it is 
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self-actualisation affords another means of demonstrating the moral relevance of 
needs.  Malignant self-actualisation derives from Maslow’s theory of needs, and 
seeks to explain moral condemnability in terms that are consistent with our 
fundamental need for homosapient order.         
6.5 Moral Condemnability: Malignant Self-Actualisation 
I think it must be allowed that some people are decidedly maleficent, for it seems 
that utterly evil people—the likes of Adolf Hitler and Pol Pot—might also be 
regarded as self-actualisers, at least in the primary sense of the notion, i.e. 
attainment of what one is best fitted for.  Many thinkers have grappled with the 
problem of evil.  Philippa Foot, for instance, maintains that, as well as there being 
natural good, there are natural defects that we describe in terms of moral evil.348  
She believes the goodness of human actions or dispositions ‘to be simply a fact 
about a given feature of a certain kind of living thing.’349  It follows, on her thesis, 
that moral evil is also a fact about a given feature of human beings.   
In this section the problem of moral condemnability is explored from a Maslovian 
perspective: moral evil will be shown to be a feature of a kind of self-
actualisation, specifically malignant self-actualisation.  Malignancy is to be 
understood here in its usual sense of maliciousness, of being disposed towards 
harming others and making them suffer.  People motivated by a need for 
malignant self-actualisation are disposed to act in morally reprehensible ways—a 
notion that dovetails neatly with other theories of vice, such as those of Hume and 
Kant, as well as Foot’s.  Might we all be afflicted by a need for malignant self-
actualisation, at least some of the time?  Perhaps we are, to varying extents.  What 
matters is the degree to which we are.  How that comes about is too big a question 
to be pursued at any length here, but I will nevertheless touch on the matter.   
Contrary to Maslovian self-actualisation, malignant self-actualisation is 
destructive rather than constructive, maleficent rather than beneficent.  Neither 
Hitler nor Pol Pot could be said to have had much concern for justice (especially 
in the Rawlsian sense of ‘fairness’), nor with avoidance of cruelty and 
exploitation.  Rather, in them, traits such as cynicism, vulgarity, and selfishness 
reached the highest levels of expression.  Both men were responsible for mass 
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murder, the displacement of populations and untold misery.  Their 
remorselessness suggests that they were expressing their ‘true’ selves through 
their deeds.  Adolf Eichmann similarly: ‘[t]he death of five million Jews on my 
conscience gives me extraordinary satisfaction,’ he is said to have exclaimed.350  
Since his conscience was clear, Eichmann was acting in full accord with his true 
self when he arranged the executions—a clear case of malignant self-actualisation, 
when ‘cold’ reason utterly swamped any emotional warmth that might have given 
rise to a sense of fellow-feeling towards the persecuted race.351      
The Tennyson principle (see p. 101) has application to malignant self-
actualisation.  I might have had the misfortune to meet predominantly with evil 
people and iniquitous circumstances throughout the course of my life.  Evil may 
have become part of me, i.e. constitutive of my self—in which case, I might have 
proceeded to actualise that self by committing evil deeds, and the deeds 
themselves would also contribute to my selfhood.  Such a scenario is contrary to 
the association of self-actualisation with health, beauty, justice and goodness—if 
self-actualisation were only that, then the evil person I have become would have 
to be regarded as ‘not the real me’.  But the ‘real me’ is the person I now am; to 
say otherwise would surely be fallacious.  In general, the actions of evil people 
such as those mentioned would be in pursuit of goals consistent with their 
characters, and serve as steps towards their own kind of self-fulfillment.  Evil 
characters would no doubt be regarded by many as ill-formed, due wholly or 
partly to circumstances beyond their control, for example poor parenting, lack of 
education, and so on; they might also be described as sociopaths, or psychopaths, 
or otherwise impaired, but the harm they inflict would generally be considered 
morally wrong.      
The notion that malignantly inclined individuals can be self-actualisers would 
seem to diverge significantly from the Maslovian schema, but support for the 
divergence might be drawn from William James, a psychologist like Maslow but 
perhaps more of a philosopher.  James describes the healthy soul as ‘harmonious 
and well balanced,’ which gives rise to a consistency of impulse, a will that 
follows without trouble the guidance of intellect, passions that are not excessive, 
                                                 
350 Quoted in http://sprott.physics.wisc.edu/pickover/good.html (accessed 1 April 2011). 
351 Hitler could be regarded as having occupied the opposite extreme of Eichmann’s technocratic 
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and few continuing regrets.352  But the description could also apply to malignant 
self-actualisers.  James observes that the transition from dividedness of self to 
unity ‘may be from moral scrupulosity into freedom and licence; or it may be 
produced by the irruption into the individual’s life of some new stimulus or 
passion, such as love, ambition, cupidity, revenge, or patriotic devotion.  In all 
these instances,’ James concludes, ‘we have precisely the same psychological 
form of event—a firmness, stability, and equilibrium succeeding a storm and 
stress and inconsistency.’353  Now if the self were to become unified under the 
aegis, say, of cupidity or revenge, then harmful (as opposed to salutary) outcomes 
might be expected.  Single-mindedness in the pursuit of either wealth or enemies 
may end up hurting the pursuer as well as those who stand in his way.  Patriotism 
likewise, should it find expression in xenophobia, while ambition might also 
become unhealthy, at least for others.  Unification of the self on such a basis 
would be characterised by malignancy, and actualisation of such a self would be 
malignant self-actualisation.  The point was well summed up by the comedian Bill 
Cosby, when someone was extolling the virtues of cocaine to him.  The drug 
enhances the personality, it was claimed, to which Cosby responded: Yes, but 
what if you’re an asshole?354            
Support for the concept of malignant self-actualisation can even be found in 
Maslow’s writings.  In a footnote to one of his essays he observes:  
The achievement of identity, authenticity, self-realization, etc., definitely 
does not solve all ethical problems ….  Honesty with oneself and clear 
knowledge of one’s nature is an inevitable prerequisite to authentic moral 
decisions.  But I do not wish to imply that it is enough to be authentic and 
self-knowing.  Authentic self-knowledge is definitely not enough for many 
decisions; it is absolutely necessary, but not sufficient.355 
Maslow believed self-honesty and self-knowledge to be necessary to ‘authentic 
moral decisions,’ by which he probably meant morally good decisions, since it is 
unlikely that he would have felt that ‘ethical problems’ could be solved by 
morally bad decisions.  But the quotation shows that Maslow also believed that 
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354 Paraphrased from a radio broadcast, The Book Show, ABC Radio National, 6 April 2010.   
355 The Farther Reaches of Human Nature, p. 107, note 4; emphasis in original. 
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authenticity alone is not sufficient for moral goodness.  By inference, therefore, 
authenticity is also associable with morally bad decisions.  This is consistent with 
what I have been saying about malignant self-actualisation.  Wrong-doers need 
not be precluded from authenticity, in which case some character traits that 
Maslow says are necessary to morally good decisions may also contribute to 
morally bad decisions.  Either way, authenticity would conduce towards the 
expression of one’s self, and therefore help satisfy the need for self-actualisation.   
But now the question arises, is it possible for homosapient order to result from 
malignant self-actualisation?  It seems strange to think that homosapient order 
could result from patently evil deeds.  Someone would have been adversely 
affected by the malignantly self-actualising behaviour, since, by definition, 
satisfaction of the need results in harm.  Those harmed would suffer a diminution 
of homosapient order.  However, to the extent that they are like other human 
beings, evil-doers also feel the need to survive and to flourish; i.e. they need P-
order, S-order and E-order, and self-actualisation would likely encompass 
satisfaction of those needs.  Malignant self-actualising behaviour would also 
satisfy the agent’s need to fulfill his evil self, i.e. to do what he is best equipped to 
do.  From the perspective of the malignant self-actualiser, self-actualisation would 
be fulfilling, regardless of its effects on other people.  As shocking as it may be, 
Hitler by his own lights would probably have felt as though he had achieved his 
goal in life, especially following implementation of the Final Solution.  Similarly 
with malignantly self-actualising intellectual and artistic high-achievers, such as 
the Nazi doctor Josef Mengele and the Marquis de Sade, and my earlier examples 
of the Machiavellian prince and J. K. Rowling’s Voldemort.   
Now, since homosapient order has been said to be attainable by an agent by means 
of self-actualisation, regardless of the kind of self-actualisation that happens to be 
involved, a paradox would seem to have arisen.  We are confronted by the 
issuance of evil from the satisfaction of the need for homosapient order, which 
was aligned in Section 4.4 with justice and moral goodness.  But the paradox is 
easily resolved, first by recalling from Section 5.3 that self-actualisation is two-
dimensional, that it can be seen both in terms of consistency-with-agent’s-
character, and in terms of moral force.  Second, we recall that totally selfish 
actions by evil-doers either neglect or actively work against the legitimate needs 
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of others.  As mentioned in Section 4.4, alongside their need to attain homosapient 
order for themselves, evil-doers may also act as if they needed to inflict 
homosapient disorder on their respondents.   Any homosapient order attained by a 
malignant self-actualiser through his morally classifiable self-actualising 
behaviour is more than counteracted by the diminution of homosapient order 
suffered by those affected.  It follows that our species’ need for homosapient order 
cannot be satisfied by means of malignant self-actualisation.   
Malignantly self-actualising behaviour may even undermine attempts by evil-
doers to attain homosapient order for themselves.  Instead of being characterised 
by the Maslovian B-values, malignant self-actualisation manifests as an amalgam 
of metapathologies.  Justice would be missing, or, perhaps I should say, justice as 
non-malignant self-actualisers would understand it; i.e. as it would normally be 
understood by most people (those not inordinately afflicted by the Maslovian 
metapathologies).  Malignant self-actualisers may have some idea of what justice 
consists in, and perhaps even associate it with fairness—but their idea would be 
quite at odds with what most people believe justice stands for.  It can be safely 
said that the need for malignant self-actualisation is morally relevant. 
6.6 The Needs of Social Entities 
To complete the discussion of the moral relevance of needs, I wish to comment 
briefly on the needs of social entities.  The needs upon which morality is based are 
needs that reside first and foremost in individuals; the fact that the individual is 
the focus of both the textual evidence cited above and the UDHR would tend to 
confirm the point.  Nevertheless, social entities need at least some kinds of order 
for their survival (stability would be one kind), and such needs may appear to be 
morally relevant.  For example, extreme civil disturbance in the absence of a just 
cause would generally be regarded as morally reprehensible.  We also find social 
entities being spoken of as if they were morally culpable; for example, Nazi 
Germany as a whole being blamed for atrocities initiated by its leaders and their 
minions.  The examples suggest that social entities are capable of both moral 
respondency and moral agency.   
Against that, however, I would maintain that it is the ‘deeper’ needs of the 
individual human constituents of social entities that are morally relevant, rather 
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than the needs of the social entities themselves.  It is the individual who stands 
ultimately to lose, or to gain, from actions undertaken in the name of a social 
entity or against a social entity.  Furthermore, the needs of human beings range 
over the full extent of Maslow’s hierarchy, unlike those of social entities: the 
need, say, for E-order resides exclusively in individual human beings.  The greater 
the number of kinds of needs, the more the number of ways of non-satisfaction 
and therefore harm.356  On that basis, any moral culpability that might be 
attributed to a social entity would in fact rest with the individuals who kill and 
torture in its name, and with those who incite (for example through legislation or 
propaganda) such behaviour.  Excuses along the lines of ‘I was only following 
orders’ would always be met with suspicion, although actions performed under 
duress may warrant leniency.  To repeat, it is the individual member who stands 
ultimately to benefit from satisfaction of the needs of society, or suffer from their 
non-satisfaction.     
6.7 Conclusion 
In her book Necessary Goods: Our Responsibilities to Meet Others’ Needs, 
Gillian Brock observes that the contributors to the anthology emphasise that ‘the 
needs that matter morally are bounded by the idea of the necessary, the essential, 
the indispensible, or the inescapable.’357  And, as the subtitle of the book suggests, 
needs-theorists are generally concerned with the question of whether and to what 
extent one is responsible for meeting the needs of others.  The answers from the 
contributors often centre on the identification of needs that must be addressed, i.e. 
vital or basic needs, as they are usually called.  The order-based theory of morality 
takes a slightly different view, although one that converges with that of most 
needs-theorists.  According to the order-based theory, all of the needs specified by 
Maslow—not just some of them—are morally significant.  Furthermore, the order-
based theory will soon be found to have something to offer with respect to the 
needs of others.         
                                                 
356 Similarly for the liberal democrat, for whom, as Joshua Cherniss remarks in his introduction to 
a book by Isaiah Berlin, ‘”individual experience” is more valuable than “the impersonal needs of 
society”.’  (Isaiah Berlin, Political Ideas in the Romantic Age: Their Rise and Influence on Modern 
Thought, edited by Henry Hardy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. xxviii, including 
quotations from Berlin.  
357 Gillian Brock, in Brock (editor): Necessary Goods: Our Responsibilities to Meet Others’ 
Needs, p. 15. 
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This completes Part II of the thesis, which was motivated by the metaethical 
question of how human beings came to be the moral beings that we are.  The 
answer has been couched in terms of needs and order.  Like other organisms, 
human beings are needful beings, and what we need most of all is homosapient 
order.  The need for homosapient order finds expression in various basic needs, 
such as those described by Maslow.  Needs are morally relevant because of their 
connection to preferences, wants, interests, values and rights; all of which 
influence our behaviour, including morally classifiable behaviour.  In Part III of 
the thesis we will see that the metaethics of the order-based theory of morality 
gives rise to a dual-faceted ethics.  One of the facets is utilitarian and the other is 
character-based.    
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Part III: ORDER-BASED ETHICS 
 
7: HOMOSAPIENT ORDER AND MORALITY 
 
7.1 Intimations of Order-Based Ethics 
In the first chapter of the thesis I said that I believed the order-based theory of 
morality to be novel.   But I also believe that clues to the theory are detectable in 
the literature.  Some ideas that either touch indirectly on the subject, or deal with a 
particular aspect of the proposed theory, are discussed in this section.  Of course, 
virtually all of the general characteristics of morality described in Chapter 2 are 
pertinent, at least to some degree.  Nevertheless, there are some specific issues 
that can also be mentioned.  One issue concerns the hierarchical ordering of basic 
needs.  Such ordering implies that some needs are more important than others, 
with the further implication that satisfaction of the more important ones is better 
than satisfaction of those that are less important.  And this implies that ‘more 
good’ attaches to the satisfaction of the more important needs—that goods can 
themselves be hierarchically organised.  That this can or should occur has been 
denied by some ethicists: W. D. Ross, for example.     
Ross’s theory of prima facie duties opposes the notion of hierarchical ordering of 
rights or goods.  According to Ross, theory is of no assistance in the prioritisation 
of such duties as keeping one’s promises and telling the truth.  In some 
circumstances one of the duties will take precedence over the other, and in other 
circumstances the order will be reversed.  It is a matter of judgement.358     Can a 
consequentialist theory like mine meet Ross’s challenge?  I think it can: see, for 
example, the discussion of lying (in the form of perjury) at p. 153.  There I 
maintain that, in some circumstances, telling a lie is justifiable: circumstances 
vary depending on the needs of the parties involved, and the hierarchical position 
of the various needs.  Ross himself also provides a clue to how the objection 
                                                 
358 See Dancy, ‘An Ethic of Prima Facie Duties’, p. 221.  The idea can be traced back at least as far 
as Pascal, who distinguished between morality of the intellect and morality of the judgement; the 
latter knows no rules and is said to be the true morality (see Blaise Pascal, Pensées, translated by 
W. F. Trotter (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1940), section 4.  
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might be met, with his notion of ‘duty proper’.  As Jonathan Dancy explains it, an 
action for Ross ‘is a duty proper if it is one which we ought overall to do—if all 
things considered we should do it.  In deciding whether this is so we try to balance 
against each other the various prima facie duties we have in the case, deciding 
which matter more here, which side the balance comes down on.’359  In other 
words, some duties are adjudged by an agent to be more important than others, 
depending on the circumstances.   
Dancy’s words conjure up an implicit (albeit situational) hierarchy of prima facie 
duties; and the image of the falling balance raises a related issue, that of 
weighting.  For a proponent of prima facie duties, it is a matter of which duty 
carries the greatest weight.  For consequentialists in general and utilitarians in 
particular, it is a question of which outcome provides the maximum good, 
according to whatever criterion of goodness is believed appropriate.  For all of 
them, there is a problem of measurement.  Or perhaps it is a question of moral 
judgement: the scales metaphor would apply here as well.  I suspect prima facie 
duty proponents would choose the judgement option.  Matters could be different 
for utilitarians.  
The order-based theory of morality’s ethical aspect will be presented in two parts.  
The proposition at the heart of the first part is that behaviour is morally wrong 
where the overall level of homosapient orderliness diminishes as a result of an 
agent’s morally classifiable behaviour,360 and that this occurs when the needs 
denied to a respondent outweigh the needs that the agent is intent on satisfying.  
The second part of the theory’s ethics focuses on personal character, and will be 
presented in the next chapter.      
7.2 The Order-Based Theory’s Utilitarian Facet 
Morally classifiable behaviour has been defined as behaviour that is open to 
judgement in terms of commendability or condemnability.  Morally commendable 
behaviour is that which is deemed to have involved right means that are directed 
towards a good end; conversely for morally condemnable behaviour.  On what 
                                                 
359 Dancy, ‘An Ethic of Prima Facie Duties’, p. 223. 
360 Cf. Nozick, for whom ‘[w]rong puts things out of joint in that acts and persons are unlinked 
with correct values; this is the disharmony introduced by wrongdoing’ (p. 379).  The similarity is 
close: Nozick regards value as a matter of organic unity, which encompasses the notion of order.   
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basis are assessments of moral commendability and condemnability made?  A 
sense of justness, Plato might have said.  In Section 4.4 justice and homosapient 
order were shown to be analogous concepts; homosapient order was found in the 
same section to be compatible with the morally significant Footian practical 
rationality.  Then, in Section 6.5, it was argued that homosapient order cannot be 
brought into effect by malignant self-actualisation, i.e. by evil.  On these grounds, 
homosapient order may be said to be consistent with moral goodness, and 
inconsistent with evil; in which case, assessments of commendability and 
condemnability would arguably be explicable in terms of the effect of an agent’s 
action on the homosapient order of all of those affected by his or her action.  Since 
our need for homosapient order is expressed through the hierarchically-arranged 
Maslovian needs, some kind of ranking or weighting of the needs of all of those 
affected by an agent’s action would be implicit in assessments of moral right/good 
and wrong/evil.  Exposition of the order-based theory’s utilitarian facet begins 
with a discussion of the weighting of needs.  The theory will then be specified, 
followed by some case studies demonstrating its application.    
Weighting of Needs 
The concept of weighting of needs is consistent with what Wiggins refers to as the 
principle of limitation.  Wiggins’ principle prohibits the sacrifice of a person’s 
vital needs in the name of ‘lesser needs of however many others.’361  The concept 
is also reminiscent of the utilitarian standard of commendable conduct; the 
standard, John Stuart Mill explains, ‘is not the agent’s own happiness, but that of 
all concerned.’362   If happiness can be said to result from the satisfaction of needs, 
then the needs (and happiness) of agents and respondents would be relevant to the 
determination of commendability and condemnability.  But any morally 
classifiable action by an agent could well give rise to different levels of happiness 
(or satisfaction), and perhaps happiness on one person’s part and sadness on 
another’s.  Commendability and condemnability by these standards are relational 
matters; as Nozick puts it, ‘an act is right when its right-making characteristics 
                                                 
361 David Wiggins, ‘What is the Force of the Claim that One Needs Something?’ in Brock (editor): 
Necessary Goods: Our Responsibilities to Meet Others’ Needs, p. 49.   
362 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, in Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government 
(London: J. M. Dent & Sons, Everyman’s Library, 1971). 
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outweigh its wrong-making ones.’363  In Nozick’s view, there ‘is no fixed correct 
set of weights,’ but weightings with respect to values are nevertheless anchored 
and tied to ‘a formed self-conception’ of the person applying them.364  Weightings 
may be variable and imprecise, but they reliably express the moral convictions (or 
lack of them) of an agent.   
One’s convictions and ‘formed self-conception’ are matters of personal character, 
which, I have said, is the subject of the next chapter.  But their mention here is 
indicative of the interrelatedness of the order-based theory’s two ethical facets.  
As ‘facets’, they are nothing more than different faces of the same substantial 
body of hierarchically arranged human needs.  They also show that the weighting 
of needs is a complex business.  Its complexity arises partly from the fact that 
homosapient orderliness is not something that can be rigorously quantified.  
Quantification of P-order might conceivably be possible, in view of Schrödinger’s 
formulations of entropy and negative entropy, but anything of that kind would be 
out of the question with regard to S- and E-order.  Our ‘measurements’ of them 
would always be imprecise, and the imprecision would likely be greater 
prospectively than retrospectively, because of the uncertainty of future 
outcomes.365  But imprecision need not prevent us from estimating the relative 
weights of needs that were or will be satisfied and infringed—it would be a matter 
of judgement.     
Relativity between needs gives rise to the metaphor of weighting, which, of 
course, is of similar physical origin to that of force: if something has moral force 
then it also has moral weight.  The idea of weighting is not new.  Aquinas can be 
found speaking of it in relation to adjudications of moral conflict: prudence, he 
says, carefully weighs ‘degrees of need and connection.’366  In our own time, 
Midgley observes that when we decide what to do, we look either to the way in 
which ‘something is good,’ or to the more important of the alternatives that might 
be available to choose from.  She explains,  
                                                 
363 Nozick, p. 50. 
364 Nozick, pp. 448, 307. 
365 In a similar vein, Owen Flanagan informs us that no algorithm exists ‘that can tell us exactly 
how to balance competing goods’ (The Problem of the Soul, p. 318). 
366 Quoted by Pope, p. 64.  The quotation is from Summa Theologica, II.II.31.3ad1. 
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Calling something important means that it concerns us deeply, that it means 
or imports something essential to us, is linked with a central part of our 
nature.  So to decide which thing is more important, we have to weigh the 
facts about that nature and look for its central needs.367   
It seems that as soon as one starts talking about needs in connection with morality, 
the notion of weighting inevitably crops up.  This from Midgley is also worth 
noting: ‘[s]ince wants are bound to conflict, right from the start we need a system, 
a scheme of priorities to help us think about them.’368  Prioritisation, we have 
seen, is fundamental to the notion of order; it is also analogous to that of 
weighting.   
Statement of the Theory 
The notion of weighting is implicit in the hierarchical ordering of needs.  It is also 
consistent with the principle that action deemed to be morally commendable tends 
to increase the amount of homosapient order in the world; conversely for morally 
condemnable action.  Very simply, condemnability would arise when the 
satisfaction of an agent’s need occurs at the expense of the satisfaction of a 
respondent’s more basic (and weightier) need.369  A well-to-do thief’s 
misappropriation of someone’s life-savings would tend to trigger the victim’s 
most basic needs, while a brain-washed prisoner of war could permanently be 
stripped of his or her self-esteem.  More realistically, multiple needs of both agent 
and respondent may be at issue: the theft of a computer that contained a mother’s 
only photographs of her deceased child would probably impinge on her 
belongingness and esteem needs, over and above any economic and safety 
considerations.  Multiple needs would often be bound up with proprietorship, 
depending on the degree and kind of attachments that are associated with items of 
property.  But the general point nevertheless obtains: condemnability occurs when 
the disorder arising from the non-satisfaction of lower-ranked needs outweighs 
any order generated by the satisfaction of the agent’s higher-ranked needs.                   
                                                 
367 Midgley, Beast and Man, pp. 184-185. 
368 Midgley, Beast and Man, p. 175. 
369 The idea is similar to that promoted by preference utilitarians.  Kitcher writes, ‘[o]ne social 
situation is said to be superior to another just in case there is no individual whose preference 
satisfaction is diminished and at least one whose preference satisfaction is enhanced’ (p. 312).  
Kitcher doesn’t use the term ‘preference utilitarianism’, but that is clearly what he is referring to.     
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If condemnability consists in the diminution of homosapient order consequent 
upon the denial of a respondent’s needs, then morally classifiable behaviour that is 
commendable may be understood to involve no such diminution.  Behaviour that 
satisfies the needs of both agent and respondent would always be commendable.  
In effect, behaviour that is not condemnable is behaviour that is commendable.  
This is consistent with Philippa Foot’s (and Aquinas’s) view that, for goodness to 
prevail, it is sufficient for an action not to be bad.370  Perhaps people have always 
found the bad easier to define than the good: we recall, for instance, that most of 
the biblical Ten Commandments are couched in terms of ‘thou shalt not’.  If good 
is that which is not bad, then morally classifiable behaviour could never be 
neutral: it must always be either commendable or condemnable.  Against that, it 
would seem to be at least logically possible for neutrality to apply, i.e. for the 
needs denied to be equal in weight to the needs satisfied.  In practice, however, it 
would be highly unlikely that the needs of the affected parties would ever balance 
out precisely.  I will have more to say on this subject after introducing Table 1 
(see next page).   
The table is based on the simplifying premise that only one kind of need is 
affected in the case of both agent and respondent, although this assumption will 
have to be relaxed in the case of the diagonal ‘commendable or condemnable’.  
Further, the table assumes that the hierarchies of needs of agent and respondent 
are ordered in the same way.  While that will not always be the case, it often will 
be, especially where social and cultural variation is relatively small.  Nevertheless, 
the assumption poses a problem for this aspect of the order-based theory: how the 
theory deals with it will be discussed in Section 10.3, under the heading ‘Moral 
Relativism’.  Finally, the table also presupposes equality of needs between people.  
As remarked a short while ago, equality means that everyone’s needs for any one 
of the Maslovian categories are equal in weight.   
 
 
                                                 
370 Foot, p. 76. 
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Table 1: The Relationship between Moral Commendability/Condemnability and Need-
Satisfaction on the Part of Agents and Respondents 
 
 
Perhaps the first observation to be made with regard to the table is that the number 
of cells marked condemnable is the same as those marked commendable, but we 
must remember that morally classifiable behaviour that infringes no-one’s needs 
will always be commendable.  Fortunately for everyone, there are more ways of 
acting commendably than acting condemnably, which may be another way of 
saying that human nature is generally oriented towards good more than it is 
towards evil—in accordance with the views of Plato, Hume, Kant and Maslow 
(see p. 105).   
Next we see that condemnable and commendable in the table are separated by the 
diagonal ‘commendable or condemnable’, which can be explained by way of 
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example.  Whereas the theft of food by a starving person from someone in the 
same straits would certainly be regarded as condemnable by the victim, the 
perpetrator might consider the action to be justifiable, i.e. commendable.  It would 
seem inappropriate to condemn the perpetrator (might we not do the same in the 
circumstances?), but that need not prevent us from feeling sorry that either party 
suffered deprivation.  However, as I have said, it would be highly improbable for 
the needs of agent and respondent to match precisely.  Either party could have 
multiple needs that tip the decision towards either commendable or condemnable.  
Consider the following case study, for instance.  
Two men find themselves stranded in a desert.  From their GPS, they learn that 
the nearest place of human habitation is sixteen days away on foot.  They have no 
food or water, and know that they will not survive unless some is found.  Within 
two days they come across a tree with berries on it.  Their knowledge of bush 
tucker tells them that the berries are edible and life-sustaining.  But there are only 
enough berries to keep both of them going for half of the required time, or one of 
them for the entire fourteen days.  What should they do?  One possibility would be 
to share the berries equally, and hope either that someone finds them within seven 
days or that they find more food.  Another possibility would be for one of them to 
take the entire crop, based, say, on the toss of a coin.  Other possibilities are 
conceivable; the men decide to sleep on the problem.  During the night, one of 
them gets up and strips the tree of its fruit, then sets off in the direction of the 
town.  Should he be condemned for doing so?  Most of us would assuredly want 
to say that he should be, but the order-based theory appears to be without an 
answer.  The homeostatic needs of the two men are identical: the need infringed is 
the same as the one satisfied, in which case the act would seem to be neither 
commendable nor condemnable.   I believe the order-based theory in its entirety 
does in fact have an answer, but it will have to wait until Chapter 8, where the 
second part of the ethics entailed by the order-based is explained.  Very briefly, 
the putative offender’s action will be shown to be contrary to humaneness, which 
is derivative of homosapient order and therefore a kind of natural good.   
Looking either side of the diagonal, we find morally classifiable behaviour 
switching from condemnable to commendable when the need satisfied is of a 
more basic kind than the need that is infringed.  That would explain the approval 
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with which the actions of Robin Hood characters are generally met.  The cell at 
the intersection of the row ‘safety’ and the column ‘homeostasis’ is the relevant 
one: despite any threats against the victims’ safety, and any loss of esteem they 
might have suffered, the fact that the spoils finish up with those more needy 
render Robin’s robberies morally commendable, irrespective of the law.  Morality 
and lawfulness can obviously diverge.  Against Robin, however, if everyone were 
to behave like him there could be problems.  In the article ‘Equality’ in Concepts 
and Categories, Isaiah Berlin discusses the morality of a fare-evading passenger 
on a bus: instead of paying the fare, the money is given to a needy beggar.371  
Berlin doesn’t say it, but the fare-evader could be likened to Robin Hood; the bus-
company being equivalent to the wealthy victim.  As an isolated instance, the fare-
evasion and subsequent (and consequent) donation of the money involved could 
hardly be condemned.  It might even be applauded, since the beggar’s need was 
arguably greater than that of the bus-company.  However, Berlin notes that 
matters would be different if the practice were to become widespread.  The 
company could be bankrupted, and its erstwhile employees impoverished.  If it 
were adopted by enough people as a Kantian maxim, stealing from the well-to-do 
in order to give to the poor could conceivably result in a reduction in homosapient 
order.  Stealing is not something that can be willed universally without 
contradiction.   
Another character from fiction—E. W. Hornung’s Raffles—confirms that some 
robberies from the well-to-do are not morally benign.  Raffles was a gentleman 
thief, who stole from the wealthy in order to support his own luxurious life-style.  
From the victim’s point of view, the relevant row in the table would again be 
‘safety’, but Raffles’ motives would probably best be described by the columns 
‘self-actualisation’ or ‘esteem’.  In other words, Raffles’ aim was to satisfy needs 
of a less weighty kind than those infringed, and his actions therefore deserve to be 
condemned.  Dostoevsky’s anti-hero Raskolnikov (in Crime and Punishment) is a 
more extreme case: a thief like Robin Hood, he intended to give the property he 
stole to the poor; but he murdered his victim, and there is no more basic need than 
the need to survive.   
                                                 
371 Berlin, Isaiah.  Concepts and Categories, edited by Henry Hardy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1999). 
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Staying with literary fiction, let us look at a more difficult case.  In Alex Miller’s 
novel Conditions of Faith Emily is exploring the vaults beneath a cathedral when 
she encounters a priest.  She and the priest are unknown to each other, but in a 
sudden fit of passion they embrace and make love.  Emily lets her husband believe 
that the child resulting from the union is his.  Was her behaviour condemnable?  
Was the priest’s?  Each was equally responsible for the act, which presumably 
stemmed from a fierce desire for love, and perhaps personal fulfillment, on both 
of their parts.  Each of them, therefore, could be regarded as both agent and 
respondent, on the proviso that others who might have been affected by the 
adultery remain unaware of it, for example Emily’s husband and the priest’s 
superiors.  Taking the priest to be agent and Emily respondent, Emily’s 
subsequent guilt could conceivably have jeopardised the ongoing security of her 
marriage, in which case the priest’s behaviour could be considered condemnable, 
since the need for security is more basic than either the need for belongingness or 
the need for self-actualisation.  However, the thing most under threat from 
Emily’s point of view would probably be esteem, since, if what happened were to 
become known to others, she would almost certainly lose face.  Esteem lies 
between belongingness (which includes love) and self-actualisation on Maslow’s 
hierarchy, which could explain the conundrum as to whether the priest’s 
behaviour warrants condemnation.  As well as that, were her husband to become 
aware of her betrayal, the effect on his own needs, especially self-esteem, would 
have to be taken into account.  The deception would also be likely to impact 
negatively on the child.  As has been suggested, the roles could be reversed, with 
Emily as agent and the priest respondent.  But we know little about how the priest 
reacted to the event, except that he continued in office, and remained a favourite 
of the husband’s family.  Was Emily’s coupling with him condemnable?  On the 
evidence in the novel it is hard to say.  Most likely, a similar kind of ambiguity 
that characterised the converse case would apply: he would presumably suffer a 
loss of esteem in the event of exposure, and that would sit somewhere between the 
satisfaction of Emily’s need for self-actualisation and love.  Because of the 
thorough-going ambiguity from each of the perspectives, the behaviour of the two 
protagonists might best be described as morally dubious—provided always that 
others remain unaffected.  The order-based theory helps to elucidate the dilemma.     
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Now a case based on facts.  Early in 2010 there was news of an incident at sea, off 
the Australian coast, where naval personnel allegedly rescued colleagues from 
their ship in preference to some similarly stricken asylum-seekers, some of whom 
subsequently drowned.  By all reports a party from the navy ship had boarded the 
asylum-seekers’ boat, when the boat sank, casting everyone into the sea.  The 
rescue operation that followed gave rise to accusations of bias.  Assuming that 
events did transpire the way I have described them, was the action of the rescuers 
condemnable?  Those in the water, asylum-seekers and navy personnel alike, had 
identical needs—to be saved from drowning.  Besides following orders and 
protocol, the rescuers could be regarded as having operated from a need for 
belongingness with their comrades, and perhaps the esteem that would attend a 
well executed rescue.  From the conjunction of the two sets of agent/respondent 
needs, it could be concluded that the rescuers’ actions were condemnable from the 
point of view of the asylum-seekers and commendable from the perspective of the 
rescued comrades.  Both commendable and condemnable could be a fair 
conclusion, with the makings of tragedy.           
Summing up to this point, behaviour that satisfies a need increases homosapient 
order, at least from the agent’s perspective.  When the respondent’s needs are also 
taken into account, an action that enhances the overall level of homosapient order 
is commendable; conversely for condemnable.  The connection between needs 
and good is reflected in contemporary needs-theory: as Jonathon Lowe has said, ‘a 
good action is one which corresponds to need.’372  That would be true, I believe, 
provided the ‘need’ one is talking about encompasses the needs of agent and 
respondent, and that any needs denied are of less weight than those satisfied. 
There is another sense of ‘good’ that might briefly be considered, namely 
supererogation.  A difference between right and good in this latest sense (and 
therefore also between wrong and evil) might be extractable from the order-based 
theory.  The difference is not one of kind, but rather of degree; i.e. where 
supererogatory good is an extreme form of commendability, and evil an extreme 
form of condemnability.  Bravery under fire would be an example of 
supererogatory good: the supreme sacrifice is either made or risked for the sake of 
                                                 
372 Jonathon Lowe, ‘Needs, Facts, Goodness, and Truth’, in Reader (editor): The Philosophy of 
Need, p. 171. 
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others, i.e. for their well-being.  Conversely, evil would arise where the need of 
the agent that is satisfied and the need of the respondent that is infringed lie at or 
near opposite ends of Maslow’s hierarchy.  Franz Kafka’s In the Penal Settlement 
provides an illustration.  In the story, a prisoner is condemned to death for 
insulting and disobeying an officer.  The means of execution is a bizarre 
harrowing machine, which neatly inscribes the command ‘be just’ on the victim’s 
body.  The victim is thereby tortured to death in order to satisfy someone’s 
aesthetic needs, regardless of whatever perverse kind of justice might be at work.  
There is little doubt that ‘evil’ would suitably describe the situation, more than 
mere wrong.  Sade’s writings, in which debauchery and cruelty are openly 
celebrated, and which unequivocally portray wickedness as desirable, constitute 
another instance of evil: where power and aesthetic gratification are sought at the 
expense of physical and psychological harm.373  Still another case would be that of 
arson, where, for example, a bushfire is deliberately started in an area where 
houses and lives are likely to be lost.  In his quest for self-actualisation through 
the satisfaction of his private and peculiar innermost needs, the arsonist endangers 
those in the path of the fire.  The order-based theory of morality would seem 
capable of handling cases of supererogatory good and evil.   
It appears that the proposed theory might be on the right track.  The additional 
case studies that follow provide examples of condemnability for each of the 
combinations of agent-respondent needs permissible under the theory.  For the 
purposes of exposition, I will adhere to the simplifying assumption that single 
rather than multiple needs are involved.  The assumption is not altogether 
satisfactory, because multiple-need cases would be very common, perhaps the 
norm.  Furthermore, they could also explain otherwise anomalous situations where 
condemnability is perceived in spite of the agent’s need appearing to be of a lower 
                                                 
373 In Sade’s most famous work, Justine, there is a cavalcade of libertines, all of whom 
demonstrate high degrees of articulateness and philosophical literacy when defending their actions 
against the eponymous heroine’s Christianity-based arguments.  (In Sade’s world, Justine would 
be better described as an anti-heroine.)  For instance, Sade’s mouthpiece Bressac portrays nature 
as utterly indifferent to human affairs, and justifies murdering his aunt and benefactor on that 
account.  While similar in some respects to the atheistic position of the present thesis, Bressac’s 
conception of nature mistakenly (in my view) excludes the possibility of consideration by an agent 
of the needs of others.  Maurice Blanchot characterises Sade’s philosophical position as one of 
absolute egoism, which denies relevance to others on any grounds apart from service as means to 
pleasure and power.  See The Marquis de Sade, Justine, Philosophy in the Bedroom, and Other 
Writings, compiled and translated by Richard Seaver & Austryn Wainhouse, with introductions by 
Jean Paulhan & Maurice Blanchot (New York: Grove Press, 1990).           
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ranking that that of the respondent; for example, where a slave-owner seeks to 
boost his status among his confreres by adding to his stock of slaves.  The slave-
owner’s quest for esteem occurs at the expense of self-actualisation on the part of 
those enslaved (slavery being inimical to flourishing); but the self-esteem of the 
slaves could also be at stake, and their personal safety may be jeopardised as well.  
On balance, homosapient order would diminish as a result of the slave-owner’s 
action.       
Case Studies                
Since it is at the top of the hierarchy, the need for self-actualisation figures in 
more kinds of condemnability than any of the other needs; I will therefore start 
with it.  In each instance, the self-actualisation in question is of a malignant 
nature, as defined on p. 127.  By definition, Maslovian self-actualisation could 
never motivate behaviour that is morally condemnable.  Malignant self-
actualisation helps explain cases of immorality where no ‘someone else’ is 
apparent; for example gluttony, from which disorder increases without any 
apparent or immediate effects on other parties.  The epicurean bon vivant is also 
both agent and respondent in her gastronomic behaviour, but, in contrast to the 
glutton, she takes her food with loving respect for its origins and the skills of those 
involved in its cultivation and preparation.  The epicure dines expansively, 
whereas the glutton simply eats to expand.      
Martyrdom might also be considered from the perspective of single-party 
morality, on the proviso that no-one else is harmed by the act.  The martyr is 
typically willing to die for the sake of some kind of ideal, for example a deity, or 
the spiritual salvation of others.  Such ideals are constitutive of the self, and the 
motive for an act of martyrdom would conceivably be self-actualisation.  
Martyrdom for the sake of spiritual salvation of others would seem to breach 
Wiggins’ ‘principle of limitation’: the martyr’s vital need to survive is forsaken in 
order to promote fulfillment of what appear to be less basic needs.  The martyr is 
sole instigator of his sacrifice, but whether that would be enough to justify it is 
doubtful.  Justification under Wiggins’ principle, and under the order-based 
theory, would depend on whether similarly vital needs of others were deemed to 
be at stake.  Believers in life-after-death through spiritual salvation would 
conceivably think there are, and therefore commend the martyr’s action.  Non-
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believers would probably think otherwise.  However, if the martyrdom happens to 
have been forced, as in some (if not all) cases of propitiatory sacrifice, then the act 
would unreservedly be condemnable. The martyr is in effect agent and respondent 
in the act, which is morally classifiable because it occurs at the choice of the 
individual and the consequences are certainly not trivial.  On the theory presented 
here, the bare facts surrounding the act suggest that it should be adjudged 
condemnable, because of the relativities of self-actualisation and physical 
survival.  However, that may not be the whole story.  Martyrdom shows that 
satisfaction of one’s homeostatic and safety needs is not the be-all-and-end-all of 
humanness.  As I have indicated, hierarchical ordering of needs may vary between 
people (the discussion of moral relativism in Section 10.3 is pertinent to this 
issue).       
Self-actualisation by an agent may come at the expense of a respondent’s need for 
aesthetic experience—a ‘gentleman burglar’ who steals works of art simply for 
the thrill of it would be a case in point.  Like a brother-in-arms of Alfred 
Hitchcock’s protagonist in To Catch a Thief, the burglar’s fulfillment of his need 
for adventure deprives others of the opportunity to enjoy the purloined artefacts.  
More seriously, a pyromaniac who targets libraries or schools would work to the 
detriment of a respondent’s need for intellectual achievement.  The fires that 
satisfy the culprit’s inner urges, either straightforwardly self-actualising or 
because of some kind of aesthetic appeal, come at the cost of the intellectual 
development that might otherwise have been afforded by the libraries or schools.  
Wrongs committed with self-actualisation in view often stem from some kind of 
mental pathology: kleptomania and pyromania respectively in the two cases that 
have been mentioned, and paedophilia in the next one.375  Indeed, the comment 
could apply to all wrongs committed in the satisfaction of any of the relatively 
higher order needs.   
Apart from any physical harm, paedophilia often impinges on a respondent’s need 
for esteem, by undermining the victim’s self-respect—‘philia’ in the term denotes 
a perverted kind of love at best.  Victimhood is not conducive to love, and perhaps 
the point could be generalised to cover all relationships involving a lover intent on 
exploiting or otherwise harming his or her ‘beloved’.  As Spinoza says, ‘[w]hen 
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we love a thing similar to ourselves, we endeavour, as far as we can, to bring it 
about that it should love us in return.’376  Spinoza’s argument relies on the 
proposition that our love is intended to affect the beloved pleasantly.  Should that 
happen, the beloved will associate the pleasure he or she feels with the lover (an 
external cause), whereupon love will likely be returned.   
Sophocles’ tragedy Antigone provides another illustration of how self-
actualisation can occur at the expense of another party’s esteem, this time showing 
that even the dead can be wronged.  In the play, the tyrant Creon is opposed in 
battle by Polyneices.  Polyneices is slain, but retrieval of his body is forbidden by 
Creon.  Polyneices cannot be buried and is therefore dishonoured: his sister 
Antigone loses her life in an attempt to obtain justice for her brother’s memory.  
The need for esteem that a deceased person may have felt when alive can also be 
felt after death by his or her loved ones.   
The next case involves satisfaction of the agent’s need for self-actualisation at the 
expense of a respondent’s need for belongingness.  The kidnapping and 
enslavement by someone driven by a lust for power obviously impinges on the 
victim’s need for love, and could also put his or her personal safety at risk.  The 
pathology in such an instance could be egomania, or perhaps megalomania.  If not 
completely evil, acts of this kind would be very close to it.  But there can be no 
doubt about the evil of self-actualising acts that prejudice the safety and 
homeostasis of others.  An arsonist who lights bushfires on a code-red day would 
be an example.  Many dictators have also been complicit in wrongs of this kind.  
Rafael Trujillo is an instance.  Ruler of the Dominican Republic from 1930 to 
1961, Trujillo’s murderous methods and sexual predations are graphically 
described by Mario Vargas Llosa in his novel The Feast of the Goat.  Stalin’s 
destruction of Soviet agriculture for the sake of a political theory might also be 
mentioned, and enough has already been said about Hitler.       
The library fire-bug mentioned above was given as an example of the need for 
aesthetic experience being satisfied at the cost of a respondent’s intellectual 
achievement.  An agent’s need for aesthetic experience may also be involved in 
the denial of a respondent’s need for esteem, for example pornographers, who see 
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beauty where others see exploitation: those who are exploited are at risk of losing 
their self-respect.  Another example from literature illustrates the impact of an 
agent’s need for aesthetic experience on a respondent’s need for belongingness.  
Oscar Wilde’s eponymous anti-hero in Dorian Gray is presented as a supreme 
aesthete, someone primarily concerned with preserving his youthfully handsome 
appearance whilst engaging in self-indulgent orgies.  During Dorian’s lifetime, 
debauchery has only a latent (though cumulative) effect on him, as reflected in a 
portrait that he keeps hidden.  Others suffer more immediately and more 
grievously, including Lady Gwendolen, whose children are removed from her care 
because of her involvement with him.   
Moving further down Maslow’s hierarchy, aesthetic experience may come at the 
cost of someone else’s safety.  Ancient Roman gladiatorial contests, in which lives 
were endangered for the sake of the spectacle, would be one instance.  Bull-
fighting in the present day would be of the same kind, to the extent that morality is 
relevant to non-human entities.  The construction of elaborate monuments by 
slave-labour would be another example.  With them, we would again be entering 
the realm of evil, where Kafka’s infernal death-machine constitutes a paradigm 
case.  
Agents striving for intellectual achievement may impinge on a respondent’s need 
for esteem.  Holocaust-denial belongs in this category: for the sake of propagating 
a ridiculous theory, respect for Jewish survivors and descendents thereof is 
jeopardised, let alone the harm done to the memory of those who were murdered.  
Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein was also driven by the need for intellectual 
achievement: the eponymous hero’s creation of the ‘monster’ from inert matter 
comes at the expense of the created being’s need for belongingness; much sought-
after human sympathy was denied him.  Luke Rhinehart’s (a pseudonym) 
‘autobiographical’ novel The Dice Man provides an example of how intellectual 
achievement might impinge on safety and homeostasis.    The title refers to 
Rhinehart’s decision to use the results of dice-throws to determine how he should 
respond when faced with alternative courses of action.  Although boredom and 
world-weariness are given as reasons for using the dice, his initial decision 
resulted from an intellectual stance, the upshot of which ironically dispensed with 
reason—a bit like Wittgenstein’s proposition that the philosophy in his Tractatus 
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should be used as a ladder and then discarded after having scaled the heights of 
the work.  The determinations of the dice lead Rhinehart to commit various 
atrocities, including rape.   
I turn now to an examination of how an agent’s need for esteem can bear 
adversely on a respondent’s need for belongingness.  In Leo Tolstoy’s Anna 
Karenina, Anna falls in love with Vronsky and has a child by him.  Her husband 
initially insists that she remain with him, because of the social embarrassment that 
separation would entail.  Anna’s need for belongingness is consequently thwarted, 
and she ultimately commits suicide.  To cast Anna as the victim, or respondent, in 
this case may come as a surprise, since she is the one who engaged in adultery.  
But the calculating coldness of Karenin (the husband) inclines us towards 
sympathy for his wife.  Even when Karenin temporarily relents and expresses 
willingness to accept the role of guilty party in divorce proceedings (to protect 
Anna from disgrace), he undoes his magnanimity by lauding himself for it.  By 
being proud of his want of pride, Karenin indulges in what Marcus Aurelius 
referred to as ‘the most intolerable’ kind of pride.377   Nevertheless, Anna’s 
behaviour could also be deemed condemnable under the order-based theory.  Her 
attraction to Vronsky may be seen to have arisen from the desire for self-
fulfillment on the part of a passionate nature: their relationship provided her with 
a means of self-actualisation.  But her self-actualisation was gained at the expense 
of Karenin’s social position.  The complexities of the moral issues contribute to 
the depth of the story.                 
An agent’s esteem may also come at the expense of a respondent’s homeostasis or 
safety.  A case in point would be the theft of someone’s life-savings by a 
dishonest investment manager intent on preserving his social status.  Indeed, 
various kinds of deception aimed at personal gain may be placed under this head.  
Financial fraud such as that mentioned, intellectual fraud in the form of falsified 
scientific evidence, and artistic fraud through unacknowledged use of someone 
else’s work—all may have the need for esteem as cause, and the impairment of 
safety as effect.  A plagiarist might attain his goal of a prestigious literary prize, to 
the detriment of the financial security of legitimate contenders.  To the extent that 
                                                 
377 Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, translated by George Long (Chicago: The University of 
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it becomes known, dishonesty of this kind could also breed cynicism and mistrust, 
thereby damaging the social fabric.  Should that occur, dishonesty would act as a 
barrier to the satisfaction of respondents’ need for belongingness. 
We have nearly reached the end of the case studies.  Racist attacks by gangs of 
thugs would be an illustration of an agent’s need for belongingness impinging on 
a respondent’s need for safety, while the naval rescue mentioned earlier involves 
the belongingness-homeostasis dyad: some lives were lost (while others were 
saved) as a result of the sailors’ priorities.  Finally, there is the intersection of 
agent’s safety with respondent’s homeostasis.  Examples are hard to come by, 
perhaps because of the very close proximity between safety and homeostasis.  In 
the absence of safety one’s physiological stability may well suffer; alternatively, 
homeostatic imbalance would conceivably give rise to feelings of vulnerability.  A 
possible case in point would be that of colonial settlers clearing what they deem to 
be terra nullius.  The timber obtained by the settlers provides them with shelter in 
the form of houses and stockades, but the resultant loss of habitat for native 
animals places the indigenous population’s food-supply under threat.   
A similar (but more controversial) case would be the destruction of poppy and 
coca fields in Third World countries in an attempt to impede the flow of drugs to 
other nations.  The poppy and coca growers have their means of subsistence 
destroyed in order to reduce the health and economic risks posed by the drugs.  
Whether this is really condemnable would depend on whether the drugs are 
deemed to impact on the homeostasis and safety of users.  Conceivably they 
would, in which case the action could fall into the ‘either commendable or 
condemnable’ category—or, better to say, commendable from one perspective and 
condemnable from the other: whether the commendable and condemnable would 
ever balance out seems to me to be improbable.  Determining whether an action is 
condemnable or commendable can be difficult, but thinking about it in terms of 
needs (and therefore homosapient order) can at least clarify the issues involved. 
To complete this section I want to consider where falsehoods stand with regard to 
the order-based theory.  Falsehoods are lies; they are the opposite of truth.378  
                                                 
378 Following Williams, I understand truth to involve both sincerity and accuracy, and falsehoods 
their opposites.   If we are sincere, then our assertions accord with our beliefs.  If we are accurate, 
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Imagine these to be the poles of an axis, and that the axis is intersected at right 
angles by another axis, the poles of which are morally commendable and morally 
condemnable.   
 Truth 
 
 
   
   
Commendable  Condemnable 
   
   
 Falsehood  
   
Figure 4: Morality of Truth and Falsehood 
Perhaps counterintuitively, the picture thus presented indicates that as well as 
falsehoods being condemnable and truth commendable, there are some falsehoods 
that are commendable and some truths that are condemnable.  But instances are 
not hard to find.  Morally commendable falsehoods constitute the region of the 
white lie, for example where a person misleads the would-be assassin mentioned 
earlier with regard to the whereabouts of his intended victim; conversely, by 
normal standards of decency and humanity, a person would be condemned for 
responding truthfully to the assassin’s enquiries.  The other two sectors of the 
chiasmus are uncontroversial: truth/commendable and falsehood/condemnable—
harmless truth-telling does nothing to lessen homosapient orderliness, while 
injurious falsehood by definition diminishes it.  I will give three examples of the 
latter. 
In the first example, the agent is a school bully and the respondent is another 
youngster.  The bully tweets lying insults about his victim and so broadcasts them 
to the world.  The bully’s motivation is power, in conjunction with malignant self-
actualisation (such is his nature).  The victim’s self-esteem suffers, and that being 
more basic than self-actualisation on Maslow’s scale, the bully’s action would be 
deemed condemnable under the order-based theory.   
The second example concerns the ill-fitting shoes that were mentioned on p. 33.  
Although initially without moral implications (no great harm done), the shoe-
                                                                                                                                      
our beliefs are in reasonable accord with the facts.  See Bernard Williams, Truth and Truthfulness 
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maker (agent) is now assumed to know that the shoes are faulty and that he 
misleads his customer (respondent) into believing they would meet all of her 
needs, including comfort.  Perhaps business has been slow, and the sale will help 
him keep it afloat; the customer being gullible takes him at his word.  By seeking 
to preserve his livelihood the shoe-maker is primarily motivated by the need for 
sustenance, and there is nothing more basic than that.  The customer’s homeostatic 
needs are also affected, in the physical pain she suffers.  Besides that, however, 
when she realises that she has been deceived, her trust in humanity diminishes and 
her respect for others is undermined.  The physical pain might have been minimal, 
but, on the scales of homosapient order, that in conjunction with the loss of 
respect could outweigh the shoe-maker’s gain.  On the assumption that it does, the 
order-based theory would adjudicate against the shoemaker’s lie.   
Perjury is another case of injurious falsehood, though not straightforwardly so.  
Imagine a drug-runner on trial in a jurisdiction where the penalty for the offence is 
death.  He lies under oath in an attempt to save his life.  The perjuring agent’s 
need is survival, but that of the respondent—is what?  And who exactly is the 
respondent?  With respect to the perjury (as distinct from the drug trafficking), 
perhaps the state should be seen as respondent, either in its own right or on behalf 
of its citizenry.  In its own right, the state would conceivably suffer some kind of 
harm at the hand of an agent (for example breach of its perjury laws), and 
therefore nominally qualify as respondent—but such harm may not be morally 
significant.  For the harm to be morally significant, it would also need to impact 
on individual human beings.379  Taking, then, individual citizens to be respondent 
to the perjury, how might they be harmed?  A reasonable answer would be: 
through the rupture of social order that perjury entails; i.e. rupture arising from the 
breach of society’s laws, any attendant mistrust, and, if such breaches and mistrust 
were to become widespread, a possible threat to public safety.  But now a problem 
arises.  Social order is higher on Maslow’s scale (i.e. less basic) than the need for 
homeostasis, which boils down to the need for life.  In principle, the perjurer 
would seem to be in the same position as the person who tells a lie in order to 
divert an assassin; in both cases, a lie is told in the hope of saving a life.  It must 
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be concluded, I believe, that the theory of order-based morality is inconsistent 
with the death-penalty.  Order-based morality would deem all instances of the 
death-penalty to be unjust.380  Note, however, that this is where the line would 
probably be drawn with respect to perjury.  An order-based justification of perjury 
laws would likely be forthcoming wherever the possible outcome was something 
less extreme (although corporal punishment may also warrant exemption). 
This completes the exposition of the first part of the order-based theory’s ethical 
aspect.  It is obviously utilitarian in nature.  In the second part, the theory will be 
seen also to have a humane aspect that is consistent with virtue ethics.  The need 
for the second part arises from the unresolved ‘lost in the desert’ problem, and 
from two further problems.  The additional problems will now be outlined.  
7.3 Some Problems for the Order-Based Theory’s Utilitarianism 
The Unforeseen Consequences Conundrum 
Derek Parfit observes that ‘[w]e are often uncertain what the effects of our acts 
will be.’381  The uncertainty, he says, poses a problem for moral theory.  The 
problem would seem to be especially acute for utilitarian theories such as the one I 
have presented, where decisions with regard to what should be done involve 
weighing up the consequences of one’s morally classifiable behaviour.  
Uncertainty about consequences may result in unintended consequences, or 
unforeseen ones.382  Some consequences may even be unforeseeable.       
Unforeseeable consequences are in effect also unforeseen, although different 
levels of blameworthiness may be associated with them.  Unfortunate effects 
arising from what is truly unforeseeable would probably escape blame.  But 
unforeseen consequences also include consequences that one might reasonably be 
expected to have foreseen; in other words, consequences that should have been 
foreseen.  We are talking here about adverse consequences: favourable 
                                                 
380 This is consonant with a principle propounded by Rawls, to the effect that that obligations 
cannot issue from unjust institutions.   In the circumstances at hand, the drug-runner on trial would 
be under no obligation to tell the truth.      
381 This is one of ‘four facts’ that Derek Parfit says must be taken into account in moral theory, 
besides deciding ‘what we should all ideally do.’  The other three are: ‘some of us may act 
wrongly;’ ‘our acts are not the only effects of our motives;’ and ‘when we feel remorse, or blame 
each other, this may affect what we later do, and have other effects’ (Parfit, p. 99). 
382 The notion of uunintended or unforeseen consequences was popularised by the twentieth 
century sociologist Robert K. Merton. 
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consequences would be unlikely to attract moral scrutiny.   Another situation is 
also conceivable: where potentially adverse consequences pass through one’s 
mind, but are set aside because they are adjudged trivial.  Parfit uses ‘the 
fisherman’s dilemma’ to illustrate the problem.  The problem is one of 
overfishing.  There is one lake and many fishermen obtain their livelihood from it.  
If the fishermen do not restrict their catch, fish-stocks would eventually diminish 
and all would suffer, thereby offsetting any short-term increases in their haul.383  
Parfit writes, ‘[f]or the sake of small benefits to ourselves, or our families, each of 
us may deny others much greater total benefits, or impose on others much greater 
total harms.  We may think this permissible because the effects on each of the 
others will be either trivial or imperceptible.  If this is what we think, what we do 
will often be much worse for all of us.’384   
Under the order-based theory, adverse consequences arising from either kind of 
failure—of not foreseeing them at all, or foreseeing them but trivialising them—
would consist in unintended impacts on the basic needs of agents and respondents.  
Needs that are either discounted or ignored obviously pose a problem.  What 
started out as morally commendable behaviour could be turned into condemnable 
behaviour by unforeseen consequences.  To what extent should verdicts be 
influenced by unintended consequences?  The answer would depend on whether 
an agent’s ignorance was itself deemed reprehensible.  For instance, trivialisation 
of possible adverse effects would probably attract blame if it was felt that a little 
effort on the part of the agent would have enabled him to foresee what in fact 
turned out to be the case.  Resolution of the problem will have to wait until after 
the second aspect of the order-based theory’s ethical position has been explained.     
Unconsummated Intentions 
Moral culpability depends on whether harm suffered is the result of willful action 
on the part of a competent human agent.  One needs to get behind the deeds, in 
order to understand the intentions of the perpetrator and the spirit in which the act 
was performed.  Ascertainment of an agent’s intentions would often be difficult, 
but that, in conjunction with one’s assessment of the consequences, could be said 
to be what moral judgement is about.  But what if there are only intentions and no 
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consequences on which to base moral judgement?  Are intentions by themselves 
sufficient either to commend or to condemn?  In the discussion of morally 
classifiable behaviour in Section 2.3, intentions were held to be morally 
equivalent to the intended acts themselves, and the idea of moral equivalence 
appeared to be consistent with the rules of law.  The problem is that the order-
based theory as it presently stands fails to provide grounds on which a judgement 
might be based, where intended actions are not carried out.  Unless action has 
occurred, intended victims of planned misdeeds would seem to have suffered little 
if any harm.  The target of a failed conspiracy to murder remains alive, and could 
even be safer than he was before the conspiracy was uncovered: extra security 
might have been put in place.  The order-based theory’s utilitarianism is ill-
equipped to deal with circumstances like these.  Its character-based facet will be 
seen to fill the void. 
7.4 Conclusion 
With the exception of ‘commendable or condemnable’ scenarios, instances have 
been found of all of the kinds of moral condemnability deriving from the 
relationship between the weighted needs of agents and respondents.  As indicated, 
the problem of the apparently undecidable ‘commendable or condemnable’ will be 
resolved in the next chapter, as part of the discussion of humaneness.  On the 
assumption that the resolution proves satisfactory, and that the other problems that 
have been raised can also be resolved, the foregoing argument supports the 
proposition that morality originates in the need for homosapient order.  Although 
examples by themselves could never constitute definitive proof of a theory (a 
counter-example might be just around the corner), the case studies have shown 
that adjudications of condemnability under the order-based theory are consistent 
with those that might be expected of mainstream moral theories.     
My contention is that homosapient order is a natural human good that is analogous 
to justice.  Minimally, on those grounds, homosapient order stands in an 
analogous relationship to moral commendability (i.e., moral good and right).  In 
this chapter, a case has been made for a stronger relationship between them, by 
showing that moral commendability, and its converse, moral condemnability, can 
often be explained in terms of the effect that morally classifiable behaviour has on 
the homosapient order of those involved.  But I have previously claimed that our 
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need for homosapient order is pre-moral; that everyone needs it, regardless of 
their moral qualities.  How, then, might the pre-moral need result in something 
that is fully moral?  I believe an answer may be found in the character of the 
agent.  A good person’s pre-moral need for homosapient order will generally tend 
to be translated through morally classifiable behaviour into increases in 
homosapient order; only ‘generally’, because accidents can happen, as can 
exceptions to the rule.  Similarly, the morally classifiable behaviour of a 
malevolent person will generally tend to translate into decreases in homosapient 
order.  Indeed, the effect that an agent’s pattern of morally classifiable behaviour 
has on homosapient order can be understood to constitute a measure of the 
person’s goodness (or badness) of character.  The next chapter fleshes out these 
ideas.    
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8: HUMAN CHARACTER AND MORALITY 
 
 
8.1 Good Character, Bad Character 
Many thinkers from either side of consequentialist/non-consequentialist divide, 
and from either side of the cognitivist/non-cognitivist divide as well, have 
considered personal character to be of great importance to moral theory; and, 
more to the point, all of them have regarded it as a powerful determinant of how 
people behave in morally fraught situations.  The aim of this chapter is to 
demonstrate that the order-based theory of morality provides a satisfactory 
account of goodness of character, and, by implication, badness of character.  As 
an offshoot of that, the theory will be shown to provide rational justification of 
prescriptions for moral behaviour that are consistent with mainstream moral 
theory.  First some background, beginning with Aristotle.   
According to Aristotle, virtue ‘is a state of character concerned with choice, lying 
in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational 
principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would 
determine it.’385  The mean spoken of by Aristotle is one that also charts a course 
between two extremes, both of which are vices; one being a vice of ‘excess’ and 
the other of ‘defect’.  An example: if one course of action would be prodigal 
(excess) and another course niggardly (defect), then a middle course would be 
described as ‘liberal’.  Of the two extremes, one is generally more ‘erroneous’ 
than the other; therefore, the mean that constitutes virtue is not simply the mid-
point (i.e. the median) between them, but a context-sensitive judgement that steers 
the action towards the lesser of the two vices.  The virtue of courage provides 
another example.  Courage, Aristotle says, lies between cowardice and 
foolhardiness: cowardly acts would rarely if ever be seen as courageous while 
foolhardiness is inconsistent with rational decision-making.  A foolhardy person 
might appear to be courageous, but it would not be courageousness as Aristotle 
portrays it.  Cowardice and foolhardiness are not what courage is.  In sum, a 
person will be virtuous if her character is such that she exercises her reason and 
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chooses a middle path between two extremes, and then acts in accordance with the 
choice.386   
Character was also important to Hume, who gave this as a maxim: ‘no action can 
be virtuous, or morally good, unless there be in human nature some motive to 
produce it, distinct from its sense of morality.’387  And what might that motive be?  
Hume writes: ‘[a]n action, or sentiment, or character is virtuous or vicious; why? 
because its view causes a pleasure or uneasiness of a particular kind.’388  Virtuous 
action and virtuous character would seem to be inextricably linked, and together 
they are responsible for a ‘particular kind’ of pleasure.  As Foot says, the 
foundation of moral philosophy for Hume consisted in the action-guiding nature 
of moral judgement,389 and personal character would assuredly have a large 
bearing on the quality of moral judgement.  This is a very important aspect of 
morality.  From a moral perspective, a person’s character consists in the degrees 
to which it is marked by natural goodness and natural evil.  As such, character 
influences moral judgement and guides action consequent upon moral judgement.   
The notion of character entails a sense of personal identity.   If everyone existing 
at this moment of time were not in some way identical to the person they think 
they were a moment before, or a day before, or whatever other sensible unit of 
time before, then there would be no point talking about character.  I have italicised 
‘in some way’ because of the large number of theories on offer with respect to 
continuity of identity.  There are theories that focus on physical continuity, others 
that look at psychological continuity (especially with regard to memory), and 
others that consider both of these kinds.  I will not attempt to deal with them here, 
but these words from Derek Parfit on psychological continuity are worth noting:  
Some changes of character are deliberately brought about; others are the 
natural consequence of growing older; others are the natural response to 
certain kinds of experience.  But there would not be continuity of character 
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if radical and unwanted changes were produced by abnormal interference, 
such as direct tampering with the brain.390   
Changes of character on this account may occur in the normal course of events, 
including, for instance, by means of self-education and encounters with 
inspirational people.  They may also occur abnormally, in the way mentioned by 
Parfit, and perhaps as a result of indoctrination through brain-washing.   
Issues relating to character are relevant to the question of moral worthiness, or 
desert.  A person’s character may change, sometimes radically: think, for 
example, of the lascivious Augustine before his conversion to Christianity.  Some 
of his actions at that time were certainly contrary to the principles of Christian 
virtue, but he subsequently became quite a different person.  Would the post-
conversion Augustine deserve to have been punished for his earlier behaviour?  
Parfit maintains that desert should vary directly according to the degree of 
psychological connectedness between past and present selves.391  In Augustine’s 
case, since very little connectedness is apparent there would on Parfit’s principle 
be little reason to punish him.  Variability of character is a fact of life—within 
individuals themselves as we have just seen, but also across the human species.  
One would therefore seem to be drawing a very long bow if a generalisation were 
made with regard to the fundamental goodness or badness of human character.  
And yet, as I will now demonstrate, some very great thinkers have believed that 
goodness is indeed the case.  
Returning to Hume, Marcia Lind writes: ‘one way to think of what Hume wanted 
to do … was to detheologize the natural, that is, to keep the normative power of 
the natural but to do it without God.’392  Lind goes on to list some of the things 
Hume said about the natural, including (1) the natural is ‘universal and 
inseparable from the species;’ (2) the natural is ‘the foundation of all our thoughts 
and behavior and that without which human nature would crumble;’ (3) the 
natural must ‘hold and, even further, [it is] “absolutely impossible” that it not 
hold;’ and (4) the natural is ‘correct, while the nonnatural is “perverted”.’393  In 
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relation to the last, Lind notes that Timon the man-hater was cited by Hume as an 
example of someone with ‘perverted sentiments of morals,’394 and that such 
perversions were understood by him to be a form of malady, or malfunctioning—
indeed, ‘nonnatural’.  On that basis, normal and natural functioning would include 
the moral sense of benevolence that Hume promoted, and such functioning would 
warrant the ascription ‘correct’.  Moral sense would accordingly be a law of 
(human) nature, and it would be ‘requisite’ that all such laws ‘hold’ for ‘humans 
who are well functioning.’395  In Hume’s words, ‘[t]hese sentiments [of morality] 
are so rooted in our constitution and temper, that without entirely confounding the 
human mind by disease or madness, ‘tis impossible to extirpate and destroy 
them.’396   
Kant also had a great deal to say about character.  He identified three 
predispositions in the ‘fixed character’ of humankind: animality, humanity and 
personality.  Animality consists in ‘physical and purely mechanical self-love, 
wherein no reason is demanded:’397 it is concerned with self-preservation, 
propagation of the species and community with other people.  Humanity as a 
predisposition consists in self-love derived from comparing oneself with other 
people: practical reason is involved in the performance of the comparison, and 
equality is the main desideratum.  Personality is described as ‘the capacity for 
respect for the moral law as in itself a sufficient incentive of the will.’398  As a 
predisposition, personality is reflected in moral feeling, which is said to be 
incorporated by the free will ‘into its maxims;’ i.e., inculcated as a principle of 
conduct.  ‘Good character’ is its outcome, and this is something that must be 
acquired.  As mentioned earlier, Kant maintained that the will is the only thing 
that can be unqualifiedly good.  None of the predispositions were seen by him as 
being in conflict with the moral law (i.e., the Categorical Imperative), and were 
therefore regarded as basically good.  If human nature is predisposed towards the 
good, how did Kant account for moral evil?  His answer was that we also have a 
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propensity for evil, as distinct from a predisposition for it.399  Predispositions were 
seen by Kant as being essentially innate, but the propensities can be either innate 
or acquired.  Kant considered self-love, when ‘taken as the principle of all our 
maxims,’ to be the main source of evil.400  Respect is prescribed as its remedy.   
Respect as a matter of character is also of enormous importance to virtue theorists.  
As Philippa Foot says, ‘[i]t matters in a human community that people can trust 
each other, and matters even more that at some basic level humans should have 
mutual respect.  It matters, not just what people do, but what they are.’401    
Respect was discussed in Section 5.3 in terms of a basic need; trust contributes to 
respect.  Respect and trust are virtues; both are morally commendable.   
Virtues are thought by Greg Spence to consist in ‘traits of character.’402  Vices 
also, it would seem, in view of Spence’s indictment of utilitarianism for failing to 
‘explain the “data” of the life of character and its issues of courage, compassion, 
personal loyalty, and vice.’403  In making moral judgements, Spence says, there is 
a need to know what kind of person is involved, including what she thinks of other 
people and how she feels about herself.404  Why? one may ask.  What would 
prompt us to ask?  Such questions would presumably arise from an attempt to 
understand or explain the behaviour of a moral agent, and in ascriptions of praise 
or blame.  But some kind of prima facie judgement of commendability or 
condemnability would seem to be the precipitating event.  Spence is critical of 
non-virtue theories, which, he maintains, ‘pay little or no attention to the areas of 
life which form character.’405  What might those areas be?  Fairly obviously, and 
very generally, the answer would involve consideration of both nature (biology, 
including genetics) and nurture (cultural and geographical circumstances), and the 
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interaction between the two.406  The Tennyson principle pretty well summarises 
matters from the perspective of nurture: ‘I am part of all that I have met.’  From 
the perspective of nature, the principle could be expanded to include ‘and I am 
part of those who met to make me’.  But the important point for present purposes 
is that character is a determinant of moral commendability and condemnability. 
Another question from Spence is also pertinent.  He asks ‘whether all virtues are 
excellences because of their connection to a single dominant telos (goal).’407  If 
one is of a mind to form such a connection, two possible ways of doing it are 
suggested by Spence: either by linking all of the virtues to a ‘master virtue’, or by 
having them participate in some kind of ‘common essence, such as common 
sense.’408  Augmentation of homosapient order across all of the parties involved in 
morally classifiable transactions is teleological in the second sense.  Our quest for 
homosapient order generates a number of sub-goals, in the form of satisfaction of 
various Maslovian needs, all of which tend towards a common end.  The shared 
essence of the various sub-goals consists in the need for homosapient order.  Since 
the need for homosapient order is pre-moral (good and bad people alike need 
homosapient order) the need itself is not a virtue; in the same way that common 
sense (to use Spence’s example) may be directed towards either vicious or 
virtuous ends.   
Spence seems unconvinced as to whether there need be a single dominant telos: ‘a 
core of all virtue,’ he maintains, ‘is really the assumption in disguise that there is 
only one good way to live or one correct way for society to develop.’409  But is 
this really a problem?  It would not be, I suggest, if the ‘core’ consists in 
something that is common to all human beings.  Foot, for instance, makes a case 
for practical rationality as a ‘master virtue.’410  To speak of a good person, she 
writes, ‘is to speak of an individual … as concerns his rational will.’411  Practical 
rationality is said to be independent of desire and interest.412  Practical rationality 
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emanates from goodness of character and aims at the propagation of good.  Foot 
sees a connection between ‘the evaluation of human characteristics and operations 
in general’ and ‘the special subject of goodness of will.’413  Goodness of will is 
definitive of character and is a factor in moral judgement.  Goodness of will and 
good are clearly not synonymous:414 goodness of will is arguably a specifically 
human kind of good, while good in general may apply to anything that was 
consistent with an organism’s natural purpose.  My influenza would be good for 
the virus concerned, but bad for me.      
All of the foregoing suggests that character is extremely important in the 
determination of the goodness or badness of a person’s actions.  And so it is, but a 
criticism of Nietzsche made by Foot is worth noting, for it raises the possibility of 
character being paid excessive attention.  Nietzsche, Foot writes, claimed ‘that the 
true nature of an action depended … on the nature of the individual who did it,’ 
rather than the act itself.415  For Nietzsche, on Foot’s reading, behaviour that 
would generally be regarded as reprehensible may be excusable, even meritorious, 
provided the agent is someone outside the ‘herd’; i.e., a ‘master’ rather than a 
lowly ‘slave’.  It is a case of intrinsically commendable character and intrinsically 
condemnable character.  Foot maintains that ‘an action is bad if it has badness 
from its kind [for example, torture], its end [for example, inducing someone 
through hypnosis to kill one’s enemy], or its contrariety to the agent’s beliefs 
about what is good or bad to do.’416  Means, ends, and character are all relevant to 
issues of moral commendability and condemnability.  With regard to the agent’s 
beliefs, Foot writes that ‘acting as one thinks one should not is a very radical form 
of badness in the will.’417  While that may be true, there is nevertheless an 
implication that the agent knows what should have been done, or not done; that she 
knows what is good and right.   
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Against Nietzsche, Foot insists that the nature of one’s acts helps define character, 
as well as one’s character helping to determine the nature of one’s acts.  It is a 
matter of both/and, not either/or.  While ‘it matters a great deal, especially in 
personal relationships, how someone is rather than simply what he or she does,’ in 
view of the terrible things done in places like Nazi Germany, Cambodia and 
Rwanda, ‘we cannot but have a sense of the awfulness of this very fact.’418  
Character and behaviour both count.  A little further on, Foot maintains that norms 
cannot ‘be taught simply by telling children that they are to be courageous and 
“authentic”, however important it is to encourage them to be daring and also to 
allow them to discover their true desires.  The norms to be followed must largely 
be formulated in terms of the prohibition of actions such as murder or theft.’419  If 
Foot’s theory of natural good is predominantly consequentialist, then it is a form 
of consequentialism that embraces a measure of deontological prescriptiveness.   
In this chapter I argue for the notion of humaneness of character, which takes the 
form of a Maslovian being need.  Assuming for the moment that such a need 
exists, how might it arise?  Heredity, an aspect of nature, would play a part, but 
social and cultural influences may be more significant.  Kitcher believes that 
‘[c]ultural success exerts pressure to develop schemes of socialization extending 
the scope of psychological altruism.’420  When psychological altruism is culturally 
endorsed, individuals will tend to become more altruistic than they might 
otherwise have been.  Kitcher explains, ‘[a]ltruism failures can be remedied by 
harnessing a number of emotions: fear, dread of the unseen enforcer, awe and 
reverence, a positive desire to be in harmony with the deity’s plans and wishes, 
even a sense of identity with the society blessed with divine favor.  The same ends 
can be achieved by inspiring people not simply to simulate altruism, but to have 
altruistic propensities across a wider set of contexts.’421  Harnessing of emotions is 
consistent with the notion of principled consideration, which will soon be seen to 
be fundamental to humaneness: but it is important to note that the emotions are 
only harnessed, not expunged.  Well-socialised people, Kitcher writes, ‘act to help 
others through a mixture of motives—through taking others’ wishes seriously, 
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through sympathetic emotions, through respect for the supposed source of the 
ethical code, through a  sense of identity with a group, through worries about the 
results of breaking the rules.’422  Well-socialised people would generally be 
regarded as people of good character.  I would only add that the needs of others 
would also be taken seriously by them.     
The main claims that I will be making are that a person of good character is a 
humane person, and that a humane person is someone who tends towards 
Maslovian self-actualisation.  Conversely, a person of bad character is an 
inhumane person, and someone who tends towards malignant self-actualisation.   
But before getting to either of those issues there is a problem that must be 
considered.  If character is such a strong a determinant of the commendability or 
otherwise of one’s morally relevant behaviour, where might one find room for 
freedom to choose and to operate?  Since freedom to choose from alternative 
courses of action is necessary to moral classifiability, an inconsistency seems to 
have arisen.    
8.2 Character and Freedom 
Maslow can be seen as having pointed to the problem of freedom in the distinction 
he drew between coping (need-motivated and goal-directed) behaviour and 
expressive (of personality) behaviour (see p. 65).  Usually, Maslow says, a 
person’s behaviour is a mixture of both kinds of behaviour, but its expressive 
aspect would seem to militate against freedom: we do what we do simply because 
we are what we are, and we are what we are because of such determinants as our 
biology, our environment, and our cultural setting.  We may have little choice 
with regard to any of these and all of them affect our values (as well as our needs, 
wants, preferences and interests).  As Augustine said, ‘one is a slave to things in 
which one places one’s highest values.’423  If our character makes slaves of us, 
how could we possibly be free? 
Augustine’s dictum has a ring of truth about it, and, if values are indeed 
registrants of needs (see p. 118), then it would follow that we are slaves to our 
highest needs.  In the terminology of this thesis, that would mean that we are 
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slaves to our need for homosapient order.  It is necessary for us to have the need 
satisfied.  Not ‘necessary’ in the logical sense of the term; rather, it is physically 
and psychologically necessary—satisfaction of the need for homosapient order is 
necessary to our survival and to our well-being: physically, socially, and 
eudaimonically.  Necessity would seem to leave little room for freedom, perhaps 
none at all; and yet we would usually want to say that freedom in the form of free 
will is necessary to moral decision-making.  But the claim of this thesis is that the 
basic needs, including the need for homosapient order, are fundamental to 
morality.  Assuming that to be the case, the proposed theory would appear to be 
closed to freedom.  How, then, might morality be served, or even get started?   
The answer, I suggest, can be found in the personal character of agents.  Good 
character, bad character; good will or ill will, rather than free will—the subject 
was touched on in the discussion of Foot’s concepts of natural good and natural 
viciousness.  In Section 5.4 freedom in the form of self-determination was held to 
be a Maslovian B-need: everyone needs freedom, good and bad people alike.  In 
light of Augustine’s dictum, we might even say that the needs that determine our 
behaviour include our need to be free.  If that seems paradoxical, the problem can 
be circumvented by recognising that a good person also has a need to be good: 
and that the need to be good is an expression of the person’s need for homosapient 
order.  A good person’s decisions in respect of how she chooses to meet her 
preferences and wants will be guided by that need.  A person of good character is 
a Maslovian self-actualiser—she is possessed of a Kantian predisposition to 
goodness (like humankind in general, according to Kant).  Her actions are 
constrained—or, more strongly, determined—by her character, but that is no 
impediment to morality.  Her goodness inclines her to choose courses of action 
that do not infringe the needs of others, especially when those needs are more 
basic than her own.  Her goodness also encompasses the power of self-restraint, 
the exercise of which contributes to the satisfaction of her need for freedom.       
In view of the determined nature of her actions, would the good person’s good 
deeds be deserving of praise?  Perhaps not so much deserving of it, but her actions 
would nevertheless tend to be commended by similarly attuned people, which may 
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be most of us.424  Rationality would be downplayed, but not eliminated.  Reason 
would still be brought to bear in the moral decision-making (between alternative 
courses of action) of a good person, but it would not be the be-all and end-all of 
morality.  And a certain level of mature rationality would be necessary to the 
formation of moral character, either good or bad.  Young children and people with 
severe cognitive disabilities are not part of the goodness-badness scenario.  They 
may be regarded as mischievous, or loving, or withdrawn (as in cases of autism), 
or naïve, and so on: but few of us would regard traits such as these as being 
relevant to morality.  
It would seem to follow from what I have just said that a bad person, someone of 
an immoral character, has a need to be bad.  If the person could not have done 
otherwise, on what grounds could he reasonably be blamed for his vicious action?  
This is really just the obverse of the case relating to the commendation of good 
actions.  A vicious agent’s behaviour will be held to be reprehensible by the same 
people who praise the actions of a good person.  I have already said that I will not 
be discussing how a person comes to be either of bad character or of good 
character, but, to repeat, nature and nurture would both be factors, as would the 
interaction between them; in addition, a person’s choices with regard to how his or 
her basic needs should be satisfied would also be influential.   
Some of a person’s actions will not be morally relevant, including those that have 
no effect on anyone else; for example, choosing which ice-cream flavour to have 
today.  But many actions will be morally relevant, i.e. they will be instances of 
morally classifiable behaviour, because of the beneficial or harmful effects they 
have on others.  On the basis of the foregoing ideas, morally classifiable 
behaviour may be re-defined as behaviour that is either commended or 
condemned by a person of good character.  Behaviour will justifiably be 
commended if it does not impact adversely on the satisfaction of another’s basic 
needs; behaviour will justifiably be condemned if it does have an adverse 
impact.425  An adverse impact is a harmful impact. 
                                                 
424 Although Foot does not tie good to commendation (see Foot, p. 39), they are assuredly related 
in some way.  Commendation, or praise (and their opposites) are ineradicable members of our 
moral vocabulary, as are goodness and viciousness.    
425 The notion of adverse impact on needs is consistent with the so-called harm principle, which 
derives from Mill’s view that a person should be at liberty to do anything provided no harm is 
done to others (see On Liberty, Chapter 1).   
                                                                                                 
169  
With regard to the putative nexus between condemnation and harm, some 
reservations expressed by Foot are worth noting.  She recounts an incident from 
the life of an anthropologist,426 who refrained from taking a photograph of an 
indigenous assistant because of an undertaking he had given not to do so.  He 
could have taken the photograph without letting on, leaving his subject unharmed.  
The photograph would conceivably have been useful to his research, but his 
promise was more important to him.  The trust to which upheld promises 
contribute is an aspect of human good.  Now while there is no reason that I can 
think of to dispute any of this, I wonder if harm (or potential harm) might 
nevertheless have arisen if the picture had been taken.  Would not the 
anthropologist himself have exposed himself to harm—for example, from a 
feeling of shame, and perhaps remorse—if he had taken the forbidden 
photograph?  As well as harm to others, self-harm would usually be considered 
contrary to good.  If we have ever done something that is deserving of shame (as 
the vast majority of us would have done), then it would be a blot on our (hopefully 
otherwise) good character.  Untrustworthiness, Foot says, is a bad human 
disposition (as is disrespect).427 
I now want to expand on the notion that a good person has a need to be good, 
conversely for a person of bad character.  My contention is that a good person is a 
humane person, and that human beings generally have a need for humaneness: 
specifically, a need that forms part of the need for Maslovian self-actualisation, 
and which is therefore traceable to the need for homosapient order.  This 
constitutes the second facet of the proposed order-based ethics. 
8.3 The Order-Based Theory’s Humane Facet 
Humaneness Defined 
A definition of humaneness that is consistent with the order-based theory may be 
stated thus: humaneness consists in principled consideration of the needs of 
others.  Humane consideration is principled because, when adopted as a rule of 
life, it is fully informed by reason and it is maintained and acted upon with 
consistency.  Humaneness issues in guidance, or prescriptions, for action.  
Humaneness is consideration in two senses of the term ‘consideration’: 
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thoughtfulness and tolerance.  Thoughtfulness consists in thinking before acting; it 
involves attentiveness and reflectiveness.  By means of attentiveness we take in as 
much relevant information as we are able; by means of reflectiveness we become 
aware of alternative courses of action from which to choose, and by the same 
means determine what kind of action would best serve our interests and the 
interests of others.  With regard to interests, we would be aware that our own 
interests would usually be best served by attending to the interests of relevant 
others, for example those to whom we are bound by ties of affection or duty.  In 
so far as it is humane, thoughtfulness occurs against a moral background: as Owen 
Flanagan says, ‘[r]eflectiveness is good if and only if it is carried out with decent 
ethical standards.’428  The same applies to consideration in general, with tolerance 
providing material for the background, i.e. tolerance as revealed in one’s actions, 
including the words one uses when referring to other beings.  A tolerant person 
will understand that other people have needs that are similar to her own needs, and 
that their needs may be subject to different hierarchical arrangements; in some 
cases so different that ultimate ends also differ.  She will also understand that 
people may feel compelled to satisfy their needs in different ways; exemplified, as 
already mentioned, by a Muslim’s refusal to eat pork and by a Jew’s insistence on 
food that is kosher—there are many other such instances, including the custom of 
fish on Fridays practised by some Christians, and the Buddhist’s vegetarianism.  
Being both thoughtful and tolerant, a humane person recognises that the needs of 
others may sometimes outweigh his or her own needs.     
Humane rationality (or rational humaneness) will now be explained.  To this point 
thoughtfulness and tolerance have been seen to be qualities of a humane person.  
Others to be discussed are empathy and reciprocity.  
For Kitcher, empathy is a cognitive aspect of altruism, as is the capacity to 
understand ‘the nature of a social counterpart to a solitary context ….’429  
Psychological altruism occurs when one’s desires as they would have been in a 
solitary context are modified should other people become involved; and modified 
in such a way that fulfillment of the perceived desires of others is sought in any 
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action that is undertaken.  Empathy is the result.  Some ideas from J. L. Mackie 
are also apposite.  According to Mackie, ‘a humane disposition is a vital part of 
the core of morality.’430  Mackie describes three stages of universalisation of 
moral judgements, the second of which consists in ‘putting oneself in the other 
person’s place.’431  The first stage of universalisation involves the belief that 
moral judgements reached by others should be the same as one’s own.  The first 
stage would not prevent a bigot from maintaining that everyone should judge 
according to his own prejudiced mind-set, but the second stage would.  There is a 
mooted third stage, where ‘different tastes and rival ideas’432 usurp one’s own 
tastes and ideas, whereby one effectively becomes the other, with all of the other’s 
desires, beliefs, commitments and so forth.  Mackie rejects the third stage on the 
grounds of impracticability: as well as that, since it discounts one’s own desires 
and so forth to the point of irrelevance, one would be entitled to think that it 
would be a much attenuated form of universalisation.     
Like Kant, Mackie considers that universalisation of moral judgements occurs by 
virtue of the fact that people who are committed to the belief that a particular 
action is morally commendable or condemnable generally think that everyone 
should be equally committed with regard to ‘relevantly similar’ actions.433  
Mackie doesn’t use the word empathy, but empathy could be viewed as the 
emotional counterpart to the rational processes he is talking about.  A humane 
disposition is likely to be an empathetic one.   Other beings would tend to be seen 
to be like us, with similar or even identical sets of needs, albeit with diverse 
practices with respect to their satisfaction.  A sense of fellow-feeling that 
encompasses human beings in general would be a feature of a humane disposition, 
perhaps akin to the moral sense advocated by Hume and others.434  All-
encompassing fellow-feeling would arise from recognition of the 
interconnectedness of the world and its constituents; interconnectedness of the 
                                                 
430 J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (London: Penguin Books, 1990 [first 
published 1977]), p. 194. 
431 Mackie, p. 90 ff. 
432 Mackie, p. 92 ff. 
433 Mackie, p. 83. 
434 The correspondence between humaneness and various theories that hold human nature to be 
fundamentally good (those of Plato, Hume, Kant, and Maslow), was signalled earlier, in the 
discussion of homosapient order and the good. 
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kind envisaged by Aristotle (see p. 29).  Everyone would come to be regarded as a 
morally relevant being—perhaps some non-humans as well.  
Reciprocity is the next humane norm that I wish to discuss.  Reciprocity entails a 
sense of ‘evenhandedness’, where something is returned for another thing, and the 
thing returned is appropriate in the context, though not necessarily the same as the 
other thing.  Reciprocity is akin to justice, both moral and legal.  Reciprocity is a 
norm that is central to various systems of ethics.  The Confucian, for example, 
maintains that ‘when a man carries out the principles of conscientiousness and 
reciprocity he is not far from the moral law.  What you do not wish others should 
do unto you, do not do unto them.’435  Confucians call this ‘the Golden Mean’, 
and its resemblance to the Golden Rule of Christianity is obvious.  The Golden 
Mean guides so-called ‘superior’ people in the conduct of their worldly affairs.  
Although Confucian reciprocity is set within a particular cultural tradition, and the 
ideas involved are only partially applicable to other traditions, the resemblance 
between the two Golden tenets is indicative of a widespread and cross-cultural 
acceptance of the importance of reciprocity.  The principle can also be found at 
the centre of a formulation of an atheistic ethics, that of naturalism.    As Thomas 
W. Clark puts it, the so-called ‘Golden Rule of Reciprocity’ gets us ‘what we most 
want as social creatures: to flourish as individuals within a community.’436  
Flourishing through reciprocity fits comfortably within the order-based theory of 
morality.  Individual flourishing is a Maslovian being need, one that answers to 
our need for E-order.  Reciprocity within a community is a means of satisfying 
our need for S-order.  It may also be noted that the ethical principles espoused by 
humanism include valorisation of individual dignity and value, maximisation of 
freedom and choice, mutual responsibility and duty, and empathetic caring.437  
The first two involve human flourishing and therefore E-order, while the other 
two are concerned with our need for belongingness and esteem, and are therefore 
relevant to S-order.     
                                                 
435 Lin Yutang, The Wisdom of Confucius, p. 110. 
436 Thomas W. Clark, Encountering Naturalism: A worldview and its uses (Cambridge, MA: 
Center for Naturalism, 2007), p. 85.   
437 See Australian Humanist, No. 97, Autumn 2010, p. 1.  Humanism is consistent with the 
naturalism that is built into the order-based theory of morality.  The naturalistic order-based theory 
and humanism both eschew supernaturalistic explanation, and the moral principles in each of them 
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Humaneness finds expression in several of Maslow’s B-values: goodness first and 
foremost.  Evil is opposed to goodness, and manifests as nihilism, selfishness, 
hatred and cynicism.438    Nihilism, Camus explains, is indifferent to life, one’s 
own as well as that of others.439  Life is needed for morality, and, arguably, 
morality is needed for life; normal human life at least.  Selfishness, hatred and 
cynicism are indifferent to life, if not to one’s own then certainly to that of other 
beings; all of the characteristics are beset with misanthropy.   Other relevant B-
values are wholeness, and what Maslow refers to as ‘dichotomy-transcendence.’  
The dichotomy he had in mind is that between ‘us’ and ‘them’, where everything 
is seen in terms of duelling and warfare.440  Transcendence overcomes dichotomy 
by instilling a sense of wholeness: a sense of all-encompassing fellow-feeling 
results, thereby bringing empathy into play—as someone who overcomes the 
dichotomy might express it, ‘we are all in this together’.  Justice is another of 
Maslow’s B-values: reciprocity as evenhandedness would be a feature of justice, 
which was earlier seen to be analogous to homosapient order.   
Since B-needs are tied in with the over-arching need for self-actualisation, 
recognition by an agent of the needs and values of others becomes a factor in the 
agent’s own need for self-actualisation.441  As far as I can tell, Maslow makes no 
specific mention of a need for humaneness, but I believe his B-values and 
corresponding B-needs point decisively in that direction.442  Further, in the same 
way that we need to give respect as well as receive it, we need both to be humane 
and to be treated humanely.  If the Golden Rule and the Golden Mean are 
considered intuitively correct, then the benefits of reciprocal humaneness would 
be readily apparent.  As explained in this section, norms that reflect B-needed 
humaneness include thoughtfulness, tolerance, empathy and reciprocity: such 
norms provide ample guidance for the conduct of a decent and good life.   
                                                 
438 See The Farther Reaches of Human Nature, p. 308. 
439 The Rebel, p. 14.  Such was Sade’s philosophy—nihilistic naturalism that resolved into 
absolute egoism.   
440 The Farther Reaches of Human Nature, p. 308. 
441 Maslovian self-actualisation only, not malignant self-actualisation: assimilation of the needs of 
others is blocked by the selfishness inherent in malignant self-actualisation.  
442 This is consistent with Spinoza, who was one of Maslow’s philosophical muses.  According to 
Spinoza, ‘[t]he good which everyone who seeks virtue wants for himself, he also desires for other 
men …’ (The Ethics, 3p37).  Spinoza’s argument for the proposition is as always complex, but it 
invokes several themes that are central to the notion of humaneness.  The themes include 
development of the powers of understanding, kindliness, generosity and friendship. 
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A place for B-needed humaneness can be found in the ethical project propounded 
by Kitcher.  ‘Some of our desires,’ Kitcher writes, ‘are directed toward ourselves 
and our own well-being; other desires may be directed toward the welfare of other 
people.  Desires of the first type are the hallmark of egoism, but those of the latter 
sort are altruistic.’443  Character is a key: to be ‘an altruist is to have a particular 
kind of relational structure in your life—when you come to see that what you do 
will affect other people, the wants you have, the emotions you feel, the intentions 
you form, change from what they would have been in the absence of that 
recognition.’444  Principled consideration would seem to be an effective way of 
coming to see these things.  I would only add ‘needs’ to the ‘wants’ etc. 
mentioned by Kitcher.  I will have more to say about the implications of B-needed 
humaneness after further probing the notion by considering whether specific 
modes of humaneness are discernible. 
Modes of Humaneness 
People may be more or less humane, based on the extent to which they interact 
with the world in a principled and considerate manner.  Humaneness is 
conceivable as a continuum ranging from minimum to maximum—a continuum 
pervaded by B-needfulness.  Nevertheless, some fairly distinct modes of 
humaneness are also conceivable, based on the degree to which others’ needs are 
assimilated by agents.  The degrees of assimilation, or modes, that will be 
examined here are denoted ‘for-my-sake’, ‘for-our-sake’, and ‘for-your-sake’, 
where ‘my’ stands for agent, ‘our’ for agent plus respondent, and ‘your’ for 
respondent only.  The three modes will be seen to resemble the various stages of 
universalisation described by Mackie.  Humane people have a need to be humane 
and the need is reflected in their values and behaviour.  In a world devoid of a 
beneficent deity, which is the world I am assuming to be the case, humane human 
beings are the only source of moral goodness.  Under the ‘for-my-sake’ mode, 
others’ needs are recognised as being morally relevant; under the ‘for-our-sake’ 
mode, the same kind of recognition occurs but a further step is taken: others’ 
needs are integrated with one’s own needs.  The third mode, ‘for-your-sake’, 
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444 Kitcher, p. 20. 
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entails the replacement of one’s own needs and values by the other’s needs and 
values.  The three modes will now be explained.               
In cases of for-my-sake humaneness, justification for taking the needs and values 
of others into account ensues from the likelihood that a rational agent would 
appreciate that others have needs and values, and acknowledge the part played by 
the satisfaction of others’ needs in the satisfaction of his or her own needs.  
Spinoza’s theory is apposite here.  Spinoza recognised that other people are 
important to us and set about deriving an ethics from the substance he often 
referred to as ‘nature’.  The result was a naturalistic ethics—naturalistic because 
of his non-supernaturalistic interpretation of nature; and because of the emphasis 
he placed on the explanatory power of causation in his deployment of the 
principle of sufficient reason.  According to Spinoza, a being whose psyche 
includes the capacity for rational thought realises that its power of acting may be 
enhanced by other beings and other things.  Exemplified, perhaps, by students 
when they appreciate that teachers have something useful to impart, and people 
generally when their reliance on environmental circumstances becomes apparent.  
Rational beings on that account understand that their power of acting is enhanced 
or facilitated through the enhancement or facilitation of the power of acting 
enjoyed by other beings.  Consequently, rational beings strive to bring into effect 
conditions that are conducive to the satisfaction of the needs of others as well as 
their own needs.  In other words, consistent with their own interests and with the 
interests of others: a community of interests, one might say.  
Spinoza’s system can be seen as an attempt to reconcile self-interest with ethical 
life: human behaviour is fundamentally motivated by striving for self-determined 
action, which may be presumed to arise from self-interest.  While that might seem 
to be an unpromising source for an ethics, Spinoza nevertheless managed to 
produce one.  Spinoza’s was a kind of rationally-based moral egoism,445 in so far 
as acts that superficially appear to be contrary to one’s interests come to be 
justified by demonstrating that the acts concerned are or were—all things 
                                                 
445 Such was Midgley’s assessment of Spinoza’s ethics: see Beast and Man.  Cf. also Hegel, who 
placed passion between self-interest and behaviour: human activity, he maintained, is influenced 
primarily and most powerfully by passion, where passion is understood as a force arising from the 
pursuit of ‘particular interests, special aims, or, if you will, by selfish intentions’ (Hegel quoted, 
Beiser, pp. 268-269).  Hegel was an admirer of Spinoza’s work, and it is easy to see his 
predecessor’s influence in this idea. 
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considered—in fact consistent with them.446  The same principle is evident in 
Hume’s proposition to the effect that obligations should be fulfilled in order to 
secure the trust of one’s fellow beings,447 because it is in one’s interests to be 
trusted.448  Cooperation depends on trust;449 and, as Matt Ridley has said, to ‘reap 
the long-term reward of cooperation may require you to forgo the short-term 
temptation of self-interest.’450  Self-interest, it might be added, would be served by 
cooperation, also in the long-term.  Therefore, for-my-sake norms would include 
cooperativeness and trust, and, more generally, reflect a wide array of values that 
are attuned to the needs of the community.  Such needs would range over the 
complete Maslovian hierarchy and therefore entail the need for homosapient 
order.  Spinoza’s ideas point to the plausibility of for-my-sake humaneness, but 
they leave open the question of whether for-our-sake humaneness might also be 
possible.  That question will now be addressed.    
For-our-sake humaneness is characterised by a higher degree of assimilation of 
others’ needs and values, relative to that which occurs in for-my-sake 
humaneness.  A for-our-sake agent needs to satisfy others’ needs because others’ 
needs have in fact contributed to—and become part of—his own set of needs.  
The agent would have attained Mackie’s second stage of universalisation, and 
therefore be able to imagine himself placed in the situations that others find 
                                                 
446 Kurt Baier, ‘Egoism’, in Singer (editor): A Companion to Ethics, p. 201.  In a review of 
Matthew J. Kisner’s recent book Spinoza on Human Freedom: Reason Autonomy, and the Good 
Life, Matthew Homan notes that ‘Kisner locates the chief moral compass in Spinoza in the two 
“dictates of reason”: (i) seek your own advantage; and (ii) desire nothing for yourself which you 
do not desire for other men’ (Matthew Homan, in Journal of the History of Philosophy Vol. 50, no. 
3 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012), p. 460).  But the two dictates conflict 
with one another: how might the second be reconciled with the first?  Kisner is seen to reject ‘a 
purely instrumental interpretation of benevolence’, i.e. we are benevolent because it satisfies my 
(selfish) ends.  Rather, ‘we are neither merely using others when, as good Spinozists, we promote 
their advantage, nor is our activity on their behalf independent of our own.’  For Kisner, ‘acting for 
the good of others is constitutive of acting for our own good’ (Homan, p. 460).  This is consistent 
with the notion of humaneness.  The idea seems intuitively (and experientially) correct: all of those 
who take pleasure in helping others would attest it, and I think that may apply to most of us.  
447 See Finnis, p. 301. 
448 Besides this egoistic perspective, trust also has aspects that are pertinent to social 
connectedness and aspects of human flourishing: ‘In a basically moral society, trust is an integral 
part of the social and moral fabric of life,’ and it contributes ‘to one another’s flourishing by 
affirming each other’s moral worth.’ See Laurence Thomas, ‘Trust, Affirmation, and Moral 
Character: A Critique of Kantian Morality’, in Flanagan and Rorty (editors): Identity, Character, 
and Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology, pp. 249-250.   
449 Bernard Williams writes, ‘A necessary condition of co-operative activity is trust, where this 
involves the willingness of one party to rely on another to act in certain ways’ (Truth and 
Truthfulness, p. 88). 
450 Matt Ridley, The Origins of Virtue: Human Instincts and the Evolution of Cooperation (USA: 
Penguin Books, 1998 [first published 1996]), p. 133. 
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themselves in.  Maslovian dichotomy-transcendence would be characteristic of his 
outlook on the world: the sharp dichotomy between ‘he’ and ‘them’ would be 
supplanted by a sense of wholeness.  On that account, a for-our-sake humane 
person may be presumed to have a relatively high capacity for assimilation of the 
needs of others, either innately or because of effort undertaken to attain it.  In 
either case, such a person would deserve the epithet ‘magnanimous’, in the sense 
of ‘greatness of spirit’ (this is the etymological sense of magnanimity).  
Magnanimity in turn conjures up notions of human excellence and sheer goodness 
of character. 
Because of its implicit goodness, a for-our-sake life would be a life consistent 
with the tenets of Aristotelian virtue ethics and Kantian deontology.  As Gary 
Watson explains, virtues ‘are those traits that enable one to live a 
characteristically human life, or to live in accordance with one’s nature as a 
human being.’451  Virtues are also described as ‘human excellences,’ not 
dissimilarly to Philippa Foot’s notion of ‘natural goodness’.452  With regard to 
Kantian deontology, a for-our-sake agent would respect the values of other 
people.  He would be unlikely to treat other people as means to the attainment of 
his own ends.  Indeed, others’ ends are now his ends as well: a small ‘kingdom of 
ends’ would have come into being, as envisaged by Kant.453  Respect for the 
dignity of others would be likely, in the Kantian sense of dignity, i.e. irreplaceable 
or unique individuality.   
For-your-sakeness is the third mode of humaneness.  It is characterised by an 
agent’s replacing his or her own needs with those of a respondent.454  At first 
blush such a move would seem improbable, but it happens.  Parents in famine-
stricken lands who forgo food for the sake of their children would be an example; 
                                                 
451 Gary Watson, ‘On the Primacy of Character’, in Flanagan and Rorty (editors): Identity, 
Character, and Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology, p. 455.   
452 A great deal of the present thesis has been taken up with the argument that homosapient order 
constitutes the end (objective) of morality.  Homosapient order is something that is aimed at, albeit 
in the guise of satisfying our various needs.  If the argument to this stage is valid, then moral 
behaviour can be understood to culminate (end) in an increase in homosapient order.  In its accord 
with the notion of end, the order-based theory of morality asserts its consequentialist credentials. 
453 A kingdom of ends is one aspect of the Categorical Imperative. 
454 Psychological altruism as defined by Kitcher corresponds to for-our-sake humaneness and to 
for-your-sake humaneness.  Kitcher maintains that the interests of others may be adopted by an 
agent with more or less intensity (p. 23).  I would say, less for a for-our-sake humane agent and 
more for a for-your-sake agent.  Altruistic responses by an individual may vary, depending on who 
and what are involved. 
                                                                                                 
178  
more generally, sacrifices are frequently made for family members.  Not only 
family members, however, as demonstrated by ‘the custom of the sea’.  According 
to the custom, shipwrecked sailors faced with starvation choose to offer 
themselves as food for their crewmates, and the person to be killed and eaten is 
selected by drawing lots (as is the person who must do the killing).  Perhaps the 
most famous example of the custom is one that involved the ship Essex, which 
sank after being rammed by a whale early in the nineteenth century.  The incident 
served as inspiration for Herman Melville’s novel Moby Dick.  The Essex’s crew 
took to whaleboats in an attempt to reach land, many thousands of kilometres 
away.  After several weeks and in dire straits, the men in one of the boats chose to 
exercise the custom of the sea.  A young man was consequently killed and eaten.  
(Another who later died of natural causes also served as food for the survivors.)455  
By choosing to abide by the custom, at the risk of their lives and the possibility of 
having to do something they would normally find abhorrent, sailors effectively 
forfeit their own needs for the sake of others.  Shades of for-my-sake and for-our-
sake humaneness might also be detected, because of the pay-off for the participant 
in terms of survival chances, but the high probability of becoming either the 
person killed or the killer inclines me towards the more extreme for-your-sake 
mode.  The willingness shown by many people to make the supreme sacrifice 
suggests that the need for humane assimilation of others’ needs runs very deep 
indeed.               
A question that might be asked is whether one’s mode of humaneness is fixed, i.e. 
invariable for the duration of one’s mature life-span.  This would be the same as 
asking whether one’s character is variable; for example, between good and better, 
or better and worse, and so on.  Fairly clearly, variations may occur.  Augustine’s 
conversion from licentiousness to saintliness would be an example.  How might 
variations be brought about?  A short answer would be by means of changes to 
any of the determinants of character: i.e., very broadly, changes at the level of 
                                                 
455 Endorsement of the custom of the sea by participants in it accords with the legal position on the 
matter.  The Essex incident passed without legal sanction, unlike another nineteenth century 
shipwreck, that of the Mignonette.  In the latter case, some of the crew of a lifeboat chose to kill 
and eat a member who had lapsed into unconsciousness after falling ill.  Whereas the actions of 
the Essex men were based on the acquiescence of all involved, those of the Mignonette were not.  
Upon rescue, the Mignonette perpetrators were charged with murder and received life sentences: 
necessity was deemed insufficient justification for what they did, which seems right.  The 
sentences were subsequently commuted to six months imprisonment. 
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biology or psychology, changes to one’s social circumstances, and changes of 
cultural setting.  Biologically and psychologically, a once-gentle person afflicted 
by dementia may become violent.  Socially, a person known for her 
gregariousness may become morose, even vindictive, after losing her job.  
Culturally, brighter educational opportunities may enable someone to develop a 
greater awareness of the interconnectedness of things and their needs.456  I want to 
dwell on this last matter for a moment, for it leads into the next topic for 
discussion, namely whether humaneness, when understood as a need, constitutes 
grounds for optimism with regard to the propagation of morality.   
A heightened awareness of interconnectedness in the world would conceivably 
foster imaginative insight into others’ problems, i.e. the kind of imaginative 
insight spoken of by Isaiah Berlin (see footnote, p. 91).  Imaginative insight is 
akin to empathy—it involves the emotions—and were it to eventuate the emotions 
would also be elevated: emotions ranging across the entirety of Spinoza’s 
spectrum, from joy to sadness.  Joy, such as the esteem that is elicited by evidence 
of supererogatory goodness; sadness, such as the disgust that is evoked by acts of 
extreme cruelty: emulation might follow the first, and amelioration the second.  
Also joy commingled with sadness, such as the widespread generosity with which 
people sometimes respond to those affected by natural disasters.  For-my-sake 
humaneness might serve as a stage for the development of for-our-sake and for-
your-sake humaneness, although some people could by-pass the first and go 
directly to the second or third.  But none of the modes entails that another’s need-
driven morally wrong or evil behaviour should be condoned.  In the same way that 
we justifiably feel ashamed of some of the things we have done, the misdeeds of 
others may also be justifiably condemned. 
Humaneness and Hope 
Humaneness as I have defined it could entitle one to believe that morally 
commendable behaviour will inevitably become more widespread.  Understood as 
B-need, humaneness would have to be regarded as basic, i.e. a need that is 
essential to humanness as presently constituted.  That being the case, the order-
based theory of morality can be understood to imply that decency and goodness 
                                                 
456 Benevolence appears to be consequential upon education in Spinoza’s ethics.  Education was 
also seen by Plato to be a key to orderliness of the soul.   
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should prevail over crassness and evil.457  However, since B-needs are the highest 
needs on Maslow’s scale, lower-order needs such as the need for homeostasis and 
the need for safety would have to be met to the satisfaction of agents before the 
need for humaneness could attain full motivational force.  Although strife may 
have to grow to calamitous proportions before humaneness becomes totally 
dissipated, the needs of others are unlikely to be uppermost in the minds of people 
on the verge of starvation or in some other kind of extreme need.  On that account, 
inequities such as grossly disproportionate distributions of the world’s goods 
between nations and between people within nations would pose a threat to the 
propagation of humaneness—whereupon grounds become evident for tempering 
the optimism I have just proposed.   
I am not suggesting that everyone whose lower-order needs are met would 
necessarily become humane.  There have been plenty of malefactors who have not 
been victims of deprivation, and there probably always will be.  However, what I 
am suggesting is that more goodness, more homosapient order, and more 
humaneness would exist if the level of satisfaction of lower-order needs were 
universally raised, i.e. at the societal or community level.  Although individual 
Maslovian self-actualisers are by definition humane regardless of their 
circumstances, taking care of any unmet lower-order needs could enable them to 
spread their beneficence over a wider range of respondents.  From the opposite 
perspective, malignant self-actualisers—those whose characters incline them 
towards morally condemnable behaviour—may have less cause to inflict harm.  
Since political will and action would likely be required to redress inequities such 
as those mentioned, the Aristotelian continuity between ethics and politics again 
comes into view.  I said earlier that I would not be pursuing the putative continuity 
at any length, but a few words on it here would not be astray.   
                                                 
457 This assumes that the species continues to evolve in the same direction as hitherto.  As Kitcher 
makes clear, we have not always been the moral beings that we are now, from which it follows that 
the direction of evolution to date has been from less morality towards more morality.  But the 
direction could conceivably change, if by some chance inhumaneness were found to possess a 
selective advantage.  Along with moral sceptics, the countless victims of the strife that has 
pervaded the world ever since the beginning of recorded history may well doubt whether goodness 
will ever hold sway.  But the ideas of Plato, Hume and others that I have recounted, along with 
innovations such as the UDHR, are suggestive of the existence of a fundamental goodness of 
human nature, and of the possibility of its gaining the upper hand over our similarly fundamental 
susceptibility to condemnable behaviour.  The path to humaneness is not without obstacles.      
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In line with Isaiah Berlin’s description of moral values as ultimate ends (see 
footnote, p. 7), political action could perhaps be conceived of as a means of 
achieving such ends; indeed, politics is commonly understood to mean precisely 
that.  Now to describe grossly disproportionate distributions as inequitable is 
obviously to invoke a moral value, namely the value of fairness.  In cases of 
extreme inequity, political action could take the form of rebellion by ‘have-nots’, 
or perhaps initiation and acceptance by ‘haves’ of legislation that redirects some 
of their property.  David Braybrooke’s connection of social policy to needs is 
apposite here (see p. 70): redistributive legislation would be an instance of social 
policy.  In this quite minimal sense, I think Aristotle was correct in his claim of 
continuity. 
Legislation under the auspices of politics comes with reasons for acting (or not 
acting) in certain ways.  ‘That is what the law stipulates’, we might say—we 
understand that transgressions, if detected, will be punished.  Morality is also 
concerned with understanding reasons for acting (or not acting) in certain ways.  
As Philippa Foot says, morality ‘serves to produce and prevent action, because the 
understanding of reasons can do that.’458  In the case of morality, however, a 
transgression (or what would amount to such if a particular course of action were 
to be adopted) will always be known to a competent agent, regardless of whether 
anyone else knows about it.  For competent agents, therefore, moral transgressions 
will always be subject to ‘punishment’ (for example, in the form of feelings of 
guilt, shame, or remorse).  Moral transgressions would be understood to consist in 
the violation of the needs of others, and our understanding that this is the case 
would provide us with rational justification for acting in a morally commendable 
manner.  But that is not the whole story.  While such understanding can prevent us 
from straying, we might also be inspired more directly to seek the path of virtue; 
to find a way, say, between Aristotle’s vices of excess and defect.  How so?  
Humane prescriptions for conduct provide the key.     
8.4 The Nature of Humane Prescriptiveness 
According to Philip Kitcher, the moral philosopher must be prepared to meet what 
he refers to as ‘the sceptical challenge.’   Sceptical challenges are issued in the 
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form of ‘why should I be bound by a particular kind of morality?’, or perhaps by 
any kind of morality whatsoever.  Kitcher maintains that such challenges should 
be envisaged as ‘posed by ordinary people, whose socialization is reasonably 
effective and who feel the tug of ethical commands.’459  ‘Ordinary people’, I 
suggest, are those who tend more towards Maslovian self-actualisation than the 
malignant variety; they are the predominantly humane people who set our 
standards of good and right, as well as challenging them from time to time.  
Kitcher, like Foot, acknowledges that deontological prescriptions provide an 
effective measure against the sceptical challenge.  How might an order-based 
ethicist deal with the sceptical challenge?  The answer has two parts: first through 
the issuance of practicable rules of conduct; second by providing rational 
justification for adhering to the rules.  The first is the subject of the present 
section; the second will be dealt with in the next section.   
Moral rule-setting is concerned with the kinds of behaviour that should be either 
promoted or prohibited.  It is a matter of what is permissible and impermissible, 
notions that were first encountered in the discussion of moral commendability in 
Chapter 2.  The issue there was one of ‘moral breathing space’, with 
consequentialists allegedly being overloaded with obligations and left with 
insufficient breathing space by the permissibility option.  Taking that to be the 
case, that which is permissible may best be defined in terms of impermissibility—
anything that is not impermissible is permissible.  This would be consistent with 
the negative definition of the good (that which is not evil) proposed by Aquinas 
and endorsed by Foot, which I adapted for the purposes of formulating an order-
based definition of commendability (i.e. that which is not condemnable).  But 
specification of the impermissible (and therefore permissible) may not be easy.  
Even something seemingly as straightforward as ‘I must not kill’ is fraught with 
difficulties, as will now be shown.   
We generally prefer that other things not be killed—we chase the cat away if we 
see it stalking a bird.  Some people carry the tendency to extremes; for example 
Jain monks in India, who wear face-masks to prevent the destruction of microbes 
through inhalation.  But there is a deep irony in our reluctance to kill, because all 
animal life depends on death.  We rely for our existence on the death of organisms 
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below us on the food chain—similarly for every other link in the chain apart from 
most kinds of flora.  To seek the death of at least some organisms is natural to us.  
Why, then, do we shoo the cat away?  After all, it is only acting in accordance 
with its nature.  Might it have something to do with the fact that we seem to be the 
only kinds of creatures with an awareness of the death that awaits us?  Susanne K. 
Langer observed that such knowledge is a major difference between us and other 
animals; the latter certainly seek to avoid death but they have no knowledge of its 
inevitability.460  Such knowledge could reinforce the repugnance that the thought 
of death usually elicits, and prompt us to prevent it wherever practicable.  These 
are only surmises, of course, and they need not be carried any further here.461   
Notwithstanding the difficulties involved in rule-setting, a humane person will 
understand that some things are condemnable and will avoid doing them.  As far 
as the order-based theory is concerned, condemnability consists in voluntary 
behaviour that detracts from the satisfaction of the basic needs of others, when 
those needs are more basic than those of the agent.  Rules may therefore take the 
form of ‘I must not do X unless Y’; for example, ‘I must not kill (or condone 
killing) except in dire circumstances’ (harking back to the custom of the sea).  Of 
course, ‘dire circumstances’ would almost certainly be defined differently by 
different people at different times.  I realise that qualified rules are not entirely 
satisfactory, and perhaps leave too much moral breathing space; but they may be 
the best we can do, given the multiplicity of situations and circumstances anyone 
is likely to encounter in the course of a full life.  Instead of ‘rules’, ‘guidelines’ 
could be a better way of describing humane prescriptions: this would be consistent 
with the notion of principled consideration.  
Finally, might there be candidates for unqualified rules?  If there are, I suspect 
they would be few in number. ‘I must not be cruel’ could be one.  As defined by 
Judith Shklar, cruelty consists in ‘the willful inflicting of physical pain on a 
                                                 
460 Susanne K. Langer, Philosophical Sketches (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 
115. 
461 Another possible reason for frustrating the cat in its endeavours is worth noting.  Pain-
prevention could conceivably be more important to us than pleasure-attainment: this would be 
consistent with the Aquinas/Foot position on the negative definition of good.  The bird’s potential 
pain carries more weight for us than the cat’s pleasure. 
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weaker being in order to cause anguish and fear,’462 and would on that account 
encompass torture, which is widely condemned.  The stalking cat would be 
excused on the grounds that its objective is not the bird’s anguish and fear.  By 
contrast, human beings who deliberately inflict pain in order to obtain pleasure, or 
without any foreseeable offsetting benefit to the respondent (such as might be 
expected of the dentist’s drill), would certainly deserve censure.463  Griffin asks, 
‘[h]ow does one establish that I had a reason not to be cruel to you?’  And he 
answers, ‘[m]y reason comes partly from inevitable features of our conceptual 
framework: my seeing you as a person involves my accepting that there are 
certain basic values at stake in your life, and my seeing them as values produces a 
reason for me to respect them.’464  Substitute needs for values, and Griffin’s words 
sum up very accurately what humaneness consists in.        
Humane prescriptions relating to conduct can be understood as guidelines and 
rules set down by a person of good character, i.e. a Maslovian self-actualiser.  
Humane guidelines and rules will recognise the rights of others, such as those 
specified in the UDHR; they will be grounded in our basic needs, with the need 
for homosapient order being the most basic of all.  Humaneness of character 
answers the consequentialist question of ‘what kind of person should I be?’  
Humane rules and guidelines issuing from a humane character answer the 
deontologist question ‘what ought to be done?’  The two questions, and the 
responses to them, are clearly interdependent.   
Prescriptiveness requires that a necessary connection be made between moral 
judgement and action.465  In spite of its non-deontological character, the order-
based theory is equipped to provide backing for guidelines and rules of conduct 
through the posited relationship between needs and rights.  Rights are things that 
are right to respect, so it is right to act in accordance with them.  This brings me 
                                                 
462 Shklar quoted by David Owen, in Matthew Festenstein and Simon Thompson (editors): 
Richard Rorty Critical Dialogues (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), p. 94.  Cf. Hume: Where 
‘angry passions rise up to cruelty, they form the most detested of all vices’ (Treatise, 3.2.3.)    
463 Cruelty requires little or no deliberation in order for most of us to reach a judgement.  In a 
discussion of cruelty, James Griffin writes, ‘[t]here are prudential values and disvalues so basic, so 
centrally embedded in our conceptual framework—pain, for instance—that the idea of deliberation 
to reach the conclusion that it is a value or disvalue does not fit the case …..  A moral notion such 
as “cruel”, being conceptually so close to “pain”, inherits much of its obviousness’ (Griffin, p. 
125). 
464 Griffin, p. 125. 
465 Foot, p. 18. 
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the second issue that was identified at the beginning of the section, namely 
rational justification. 
8.5 Rational Justification of Humane Behaviour 
Philippa Foot imagines a sceptic asking: ‘what if I do not care about being a good 
human being,’466 or, as she prefers to express it, ‘the question is not whether we 
have reason to aim at being good human beings, but rather whether we have 
reason to aim at those things at which good human beings must aim ….’467  From 
my point of view, the word ‘must’ points to how the question, in either form, 
might be answered.  ‘Must’ implies need: for example, we must have food in 
order to survive; food is therefore needed by us.  So we get back to needs; 
ultimately, I would say, to the need for homosapient order, which issues in the 
need for humaneness as well as lower order needs such as the need for food.  
Perhaps the question asked by Foot should be envisaged as emanating from a 
person of bad character, since it is hard to imagine why a virtuous person would 
ever ask it; except, perhaps in a rhetorical sense, or in the role of devil’s advocate. 
Needs are reflected in values.  We value the satisfaction of our needs, so rational 
beings such as ourselves may generally be expected to act in ways that are 
consistent with our needs.  We act rationally when we attempt to satisfy our 
needs; that is to say, it is rationally justifiable for us to attempt to satisfy our need 
for homosapient order.  By virtue of their registration in values, needs influence 
our decisions with regard to choices between alternative courses of action.  In 
other words, and in the terminology of this thesis, needs and values are 
inescapably implicated in morally classifiable behaviour.  Individual needs and 
values tend to become embedded in social standards and rules of behaviour; i.e. in 
norms.  As mentioned in Chapter 2, some norms are moral norms, i.e. standards 
whose breach attracts moral censure.468  Norms affect behaviour for reasons 
ranging from avoidance of censure to decency and basic goodness.   
How individual needs and values become embedded in norms is a complex issue, 
but there is plenty of evidence to suggest that the embedding happens.  The case 
studies discussed in the previous chapter might be cited in this regard.  All of the 
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infractions recounted there attracted opprobrium that was both explainable and 
justifiable in terms of needs—or, more accurately, in terms of the relative 
positions (and weights) of the needs of agent and respondent on Maslow’s scale.  
The transition from values to norms could perhaps be traced to genetic similarities 
across the human species and cultural similarities within social groups.  
Accordingly, a great deal of similarity will be found between the things that 
people value, especially if one’s inspection is confined to a particular culture and a 
particular time.  But the same kinds of basic needs have long been part of the 
human condition.  For example, the need for esteem has had very wide application 
ever since the earliest recorded times.  The need for esteem can also be viewed as 
the need to avoid dis-esteem, or, as it might be expressed, the need to avoid 
censure, including moral censure.  The need to avoid moral censure could be 
regarded as a negative means of embedding moral norms.  I will now suggest how 
the embedding of such norms might also be given a positive face.          
Norms based solely on the needs and values of agents would not be morally 
credible; indeed, they could hardly be called moral norms.  However, by valuing 
the needs of others, the satisfaction of others’ needs in effect becomes a need on 
the part of the agent—as I have said, or as Midgley has said, values register needs.  
Should that occur, an agent would be rationally justified in seeking to satisfy the 
needs of others.  Even so, an agent who is heedless of the needs of others might 
sometimes—perhaps often—engage in behaviour that is ostensibly moral, i.e. 
superficially commendable.  Any behaviour that does not impinge on others’ 
needs would pass at least one test of commendability.  
How might the needs of others be assimilated by an agent?469  The answer I have 
proposed is: by way of humaneness.  I have argued that assimilation of the needs 
of others by a humane agent itself constitutes a need—a Maslovian B-need.  In its 
service as a need, humaneness itself constitutes a source of rational justification 
for adhering to any norms that emanate from it.  I have also argued that 
humaneness comes in varying degrees, ‘for-my-sake’, ‘for-our-sake’, and ‘for-
your-sake’.  In this way the order-based theory provides rational justification of 
prescriptions for conduct.   
                                                 
469 ‘Assimilate’ is used here in the sense ascribed to it by Bohm, namely ‘“to digest” or make into 
a comprehensive and inseparable whole (which includes oneself).’  See Bohm, p. 178. 
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To complete this chapter I wish to examine how the concept of humaneness deals 
with three problems that were outlined earlier: the first concerns what appeared to 
be undecidable ‘commendable or condemnable’ cases, as depicted in Table 1 (p. 
140), including the ‘lost in the desert’ case study; the second is the ‘unforeseen 
consequences conundrum’, and the third is the problem of ‘unconsummated 
intentions’.  The problem of variable ordering of hierarchies of needs will be 
discussed in Section 10.3 under the heading ‘Moral Relativism’.     
8.6 Solutions to the Utilitarian Problems 
Commendable or Condemnable 
If the needs of agent and respondent are so finely balanced that they are 
practically equal in weight, and if the agent’s action impacts adversely on the 
needs of the respondent, then, from a utilitarian perspective, the order-based 
ethicist appears to be stranded in no-man’s land, without grounds for determining 
whether the act should be commended or condemned.  Humaneness provides the 
necessary grounds.  The act would be condemned if it is contrary to the tenets of 
humaneness: i.e., if it proceeds from unprincipled consideration (or perhaps no 
consideration whatsoever), if it is characterised by intolerance, or if it is devoid of 
empathy.  If it is none of these things, then the act would be commendable.  
Similar considerations could help decide problematic cases such as the naval 
rescue that was discussed earlier, where colleagues of the rescuers were saved and 
some asylum-seekers were not.  Were the actions of the rescuers in violation of 
any of the stated tenets?  Only a detailed analysis of the evidence could tell 
whether they were breached, but the stated norms of humaneness would at least 
provide criteria on which a judgement might be based.   
On p. 141 two men were found to be stranded in the desert with a limited supply 
of food.  One of them appropriates all of the food for his exclusive use and 
decamps.  Because the needs of the two men were identical, the order-based 
theory seemed incapable of determining whether the act was commendable or 
condemnable.  But we would surely want to say that it deserves to be condemned.  
From the discussion of humaneness it can now be seen how condemnation would 
arise from the theory.  As well as infringing the homeostatic need of the 
abandoned person, the runaway also infringes his own need for humaneness.  This 
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of course assumes that he is fundamentally a Maslovian self-actualiser, and that 
his action is out of character.  If that were not the case—if he was predominantly a 
malignant self-actualiser, i.e. a person of bad character—then the negative effect 
of his self-actualising behaviour (i.e. his evil, see p. 131) would offset whatever 
increase in homeostatic order he personally managed to achieve.  However, on the 
assumption that he was usually inclined towards goodness, his action would be 
contrary to his need to be humane.  Remorse would probably be a consequence, as 
well as the likely death of his erstwhile companion.  Homosapient order would 
diminish across all parties involved in the incident, regardless of the character of 
the perpetrator.  Appropriation of the food would be morally condemnable.                
The Unforeseen Consequences Conundrum 
The unforeseen consequences conundrum consists in basic needs that are 
unintentionally and adversely impacted upon by morally classifiable behaviour.  
They may be impacted upon for any of three reasons: they are either 
unforeseeable, or unforeseen, or foreseen and ignored because they are thought to 
be trivial.  Principled consideration by a humane agent would mitigate the latter 
two.  In the earlier discussion I used Parfit’s overfishing example to illustrate the 
problem.  The problems of overfishing have been widely publicised.  If Parfit’s 
fishermen had taken notice of the issues, and perhaps discussed them among 
themselves, they might have changed their practices—they might even have 
passed on their new awareness of ecological interconnectedness to their children.  
Unforeseeable adverse consequences would seem to be simply unfortunate; but, 
again, what was once unforeseeable might become foreseeable if one were to 
think carefully about the relevant issues.  And thinking carefully about relevant 
issues is a feature of principled consideration; i.e., of humaneness. 
Unconsummated Intentions 
The problem in this case was that the utilitarian facet of the order-based theory 
provided insufficient grounds (and perhaps no grounds at all) for equating the 
morality of unconsummated intentions with the morality of the intended acts.  A 
planned intention that fails in its intent would seem to have little effect on the 
level of homosapient order in the world.  A conspiracy to murder may have no 
effect on the intended target until murder is actually attempted or carried out.  And 
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it is here that an order-based theorist must look beyond the theory’s utilitarianism: 
the issue must be confronted squarely from a character-based perspective, 
specifically on the basis of humaneness.  The conspirators violate the basic human 
need for humaneness, and it is on that footing that the order-based theory provides 
an answer to the moral condemnability of the action (or non-action).  Similarly, 
but conversely, an intended beneficent action that fails in its attempt would be 
praiseworthy.  A person who dives into dangerous surf to rescue a child who has 
fallen into the water would deserve moral commendation, regardless of whether 
the rescue proves successful.    
8.7 Conclusion 
If humaneness is as I have described it, where is the evidence that it exists, or that 
it is even possible?  Regardless of whether the logic of the metaethical theory is 
considered sound, humaneness will be better demonstrated by deeds than by 
theories.  Such was Wittgenstein’s position on ethics in the Tractatus, where he 
also observed that that the mere existence of language in the world demonstrates 
that language is possible.  Analogously, the existence of humaneness in the world 
would suffice to show that it is possible.  Just one humane act by someone at some 
time would be proof of its existence, and most of us would admit the possibility of 
humaneness on that basis.  Exemplars could be cited, for example Spinoza, who 
personified it in his humble way of life and steadfast advocacy of reason.  Other 
figures who come to mind are the Buddha, Albert Schweitzer and Desmond Tutu.  
But the order-based theory requires that there be more than isolated instances of 
humaneness; indeed, far more—it requires that it be the condition of the multitude 
of ordinary folk.  What evidence can be brought to bear in that regard?   
For an answer to the last question, I think we may refer to the same kinds—indeed 
the same set—of evidence that was presented in previous chapters for the moral 
relevance of needs, and the (generally) natural goodness of human character.  
Many thinkers—from Plato through to Kant, Hume and Maslow—have concluded 
that there is within humankind a preponderance of good over bad.  Further, and 
perhaps more convincingly, the sheer existence of the UDHR is strongly 
indicative of a general preference among people for the right and the good as 
distinct from the wrong and the bad—and of our need for humaneness.  A cynic, 
or moral sceptic, might chime in here with the contention that while an individual 
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may well prefer to be treated equitably and kindly, that would not preclude him 
from holding that everyone else may be treated inhumanely.  And there is 
probably nothing in a logical sense that would rule out such an inference.  But if 
the individual were to take a pragmatic stance, then he would surely see that 
equity and kindness must be reciprocated: if they are not, they could vanish 
altogether.  The pragmatic stance would conceivably result in the inculcation of a 
Kantian maxim, and would at least get as far as for-my-sake humaneness. 
This completes Part III of the thesis.  The order-based theory of morality has been 
seen to give rise to a dual-faceted ethics, one facet being of a utilitarian nature and 
the other being character-based.  From a utilitarian perspective, our need for 
homosapient order motivates our morally classifiable behaviour, i.e. behaviour 
that is either morally commendable or morally condemnable depending on the 
effect that it has on the needs of others.  From a character-based perspective, our 
need for homosapient order manifests as a need for humaneness in people who are 
fundamentally concerned with justice, i.e. those who tend towards Maslovian self-
actualisation as distinct from malignant self-actualisation.  As well as being 
motivated by their own need for homosapient order, malignant self-actualisers 
may also act from a need to inflict homosapient disorder on others.  Humane 
behaviour is behaviour that respects the needs of others; it is behaviour that is 
consistent with norms of thoughtfulness, tolerance, empathy, and reciprocity.  In 
effect, humane agents make the needs of others their own, thereby providing them 
with rational justification for acting in accordance with humane norms, since it is 
rationally justifiable for us to attempt to satisfy our needs.   
The fourth and final part of the thesis follows.  It begins with an investigation of 
the ontological status of homosapient order. 
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Part IV: FOUNDATIONS, CHALLENGES, CONCLUSION 
 
9: FOUNDATIONALIST CREDENTIALS 
 
9.1 To Ground or Not to Ground? 
In this chapter I will attempt to demonstrate that homosapient order provides 
grounds on which to base a secular morality, and that it therefore serves to satisfy 
the philosophical need that was spoken of in Chapter 1.  To that end, I will argue 
for the reality of homosapient order.  The reality of homosapient order will be 
established in a roundabout way: it will be shown to be the conceptual counterpart 
of something that is integral to our living experience, namely homosapient 
disorder.  By virtue of its form as a concept, I will maintain that homosapient 
order constitutes the basis of a viable ontological commitment.  According to 
Quine, ‘[o]ne’s ontology is basic to the conceptual scheme by which he interprets 
all experiences, even the most commonplace ones.’470  Moral experiences 
assuredly qualify as ‘commonplace’ experiences, from which it follows that 
clarification of one’s ontology, which is a branch of metaphysics, would help one 
understand what morality is about.  At least, I believe that it follows.  By being the 
subject of an ontological commitment, homosapient order assumes the mantle of 
an operative reality; or, perhaps, of an ‘as if’ reality.  Before getting started, there 
is a question that needs to be confronted, for a sceptic may well ask: why must 
there be a ground for morality? 
From the perspective of the present thesis, an appropriate answer to the question 
just posed would be—because it responds to the philosophical need of 
metaphysically inclined secularists.  Not all secularists are so inclined.  Richard 
Rorty, for instance, has maintained that metaphysics lapsed into unpopularity 
when historicists from the time of Hegel (i.e., early in the nineteenth century) 
drew a line under history and culture, and asserted that we need go no deeper for 
an explanation of human nature.471  According to Rorty, historicists divide into 
two camps, depending on their views on the relationship between personal 
                                                 
470 W. V. Quine, ‘On What There Is’, in Gibson (editor): Quintessence: Basic Readings from the 
Philosophy of W. V. Quine, p. 185.   
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perfectibility and socialisation.  On the one hand, there are those who reject 
socialisation as something ‘antithetical to something deep within us and instead 
advance the cause of self-creation and private autonomy.’472  On the other hand, 
there are those who consider the desire for personal perfection to be ‘infected with 
“irrationalism” and “aestheticism” and instead seek the development of ‘a more 
just and free human community.’473  Those in the first group (of which Nietzsche 
is a member) are said by Rorty to believe there is ‘something common to all 
human beings—for example, the will to power, or libidinal impulses.’474   The 
theory presented in this thesis is heavily dependent on the notion of a set of needs 
(including the need for homosapient order) that is common to humankind; in 
which case, the theory could reasonably be regarded as consistent with the first 
sense of ‘historicist’.  While that may be so, the kind of order relevant to morality 
has also been found to have a strong social element, so the order-based theory 
could also be regarded as consistent with the other sense of the term.  But the 
main point that I wish to make with respect to historicism is that the history and 
status of homosapient order could well constitute a very important aspect of 
human history and culture—even to the extent of informing and conditioning 
whatever might be understood to lie in the region above the aforementioned ‘line’.   
Like Rorty, although for different reasons, Philippa Foot also opposes 
foundationalism.  Consequentialism in general and utilitarianism in particular are 
said by Foot to have as their foundation ‘a proposition linking goodness of action 
in one way or another to the goodness of states of affairs.’  But she rejects this in 
no uncertain manner: ‘there is no room for such a foundational proposition in the 
theory of natural normativity.’475  The basis of her objection appears to be that 
mismatches can occur between good states of affairs and natural goodness.  She 
uses the example of pestilential creatures such as mosquitoes: for them, natural 
good in the form of exponential breeding would hardly be describable as a good 
state of affairs (for us and other targets of their stings).  If that is a correct reading, 
then I think the order-based theory can meet the objection.  According to the 
theory, morally relevant states of affairs are those induced by a morally relevant 
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agent; i.e., by a human being.  But Foot insists, the ‘idea of good and better states 
of affairs does not belong to the basic structure of the evaluation of human action 
….’476  My thesis attempts to show otherwise. 
Metaphysics is concerned with things of which no direct experiential knowledge 
is attainable by us.  In other words, metaphysical pursuit is of an a priori nature, 
but not necessarily a priori to the exclusion of a posteriori.  Indeed, since a priori 
is a term used to describe knowledge that is attained by thought alone, without 
input from experience, one may well wonder whether such a thing is possible.  
Human beings inevitably experience things, and consequently acquire knowledge 
in an a posteriori manner.  Knowledge derived experientially would very likely 
influence the way we think about things that are inaccessible to direct experience.   
But many people nevertheless think (and wonder) about experientially 
inaccessible things, for example ‘first causes’, and the ‘true nature’ of things.  
Speculation with regard to first causes is prompted by questions along the lines of 
‘how did the universe and life within it originate?’ and may lead to such notions 
as ‘God as uncaused cause’, as promulgated by Aristotle.  With regard to the 
nature of things, Kant argued that the cognitive equipment possessed by human 
beings necessarily conditions the way in which we perceive and think about 
things, and that the true nature of the objects of perception will therefore always 
elude us—hence his insistence on the distinction between unknowable-unknown 
noumena and knowable-and-sometimes-known phenomena.  Clearly, if 
metaphysics were solely concerned with noumena, then, on Kant’s thesis, it would 
be a futile exercise—as indeed Kant maintained it is, in his Critique of Pure 
Reason.  However, notwithstanding his disavowal of metaphysical inquiry into 
noumena, Kant himself persisted with metaphysical inquiry of the kind I am 
interested in: i.e., in discovering and understanding the foundations of morality.   
I will lead into the argument for moral foundations with some ideas from Spinoza.  
I have acknowledged Spinoza to be one of my main guiding lights, so his views 
are of interest; especially in their opposition to some of the ideas I am promoting.  
Spinoza endeavoured to locate the grounds of an ethics of benevolence in 
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something other than the will of a benign deity.  But the ‘something other’ for him 
was certainly not order.     
9.2 Spinoza on the Foundation of Ethics and the Reality of 
Order 
Spinoza’s metaphysics centres on substance monism, according to which all 
things are one, and things that are perceived to be separate and distinct entities are 
in fact modes of the single substance.  Human beings are one kind of mode of 
substance, a kind specially equipped with a capacity for reason.  Reason enables 
us to attain some understanding of reality.  Such understanding would include 
coming to grips with the principle of conatus: as noted earlier, conatus signifies 
that everyone and everything strives for survival and an increase in power.  
Power, Spinoza maintained, derives from the possession of adequate ideas with 
regard to the causes of things.  From there comes the crucial step to an ethics.  
Having attained an understanding of our true nature as modes of the single 
substance, it becomes impossible that we should wish to harm other modes, 
whence benevolence.  To harm others would, in effect, amount to self-harm, 
which would be contrary to the principle of conatus.   
Although Spinoza’s ethics is specifically concerned with interpersonal 
relationships, its embrace might be seen to encompass entities other than other 
human beings, since all things are modes of substance—grounds, perhaps, for 
extending the range of ethics to objects other than human beings.477  There are 
also consequences for education.  Since reason provides the basis of benevolence, 
it would be to everyone’s benefit if reason in the population were increased as far 
as possible.  All in all, Spinoza’s is a profoundly naturalistic478 solution to the 
problem of how ethics might be grounded in metaphysics.  Although his 
metaphysics explicitly emanates from an entity referred to as ‘God’, the deity in 
his system is effectively everything that exists, and could only be said to provide 
the inspiration for an ethics by virtue of the interconnectedness of things and our 
                                                 
477 But that is another story, not to be pursued here. 
478 ‘Naturalistic’ because of Spinoza’s overriding concern with the principle of sufficient reason, 
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understanding of the connections.  In Spinoza’s system, there is no omnipotent, 
omniscient creator from whom an ethics has been received.  However, because of 
the doubtful (modal) status of individual human beings, Spinoza’s substance 
monism might be considered too high a price to pay for a link between 
metaphysics and ethics.  The objective of the present chapter is to demonstrate 
that homosapient order provides the required link.  Spinoza would certainly have 
rejected any such connection, because, in his view, order is not real; and if order is 
not real, in some sense of the term ‘real’, then it is hard to see how homosapient 
order could perform any kind of ontological service. 
According to Spinoza, order is imagined when we project our predilection for 
order onto external phenomena.  Justice, fairness and honour, and order itself, are 
all said by Spinoza to be human constructions, and derivations from human 
nature.  Specifically with regard to order, Spinoza avowed that ‘because those 
who do not understand the nature of things, but only imagine them, affirm nothing 
concerning things, and take the imagination for the intellect, they firmly believe, 
in their ignorance of things and of their own nature, that there is order in 
things.’479  In response to that, I would suggest that the very existence (i.e. reality) 
of things-plural could be called into question by Spinoza’s substance monism.  If 
the singular substance is the only thing to which thingness may legitimately be 
attributed, then there would be no other things in respect of which prioritisation 
(i.e. ordering) could occur.  In a rather convoluted way, Spinoza’s ontology could 
be held to be consistent with his denial of the reality of order: a Spinozist might 
even derive the denial from the ontology.  However, I will soon argue for an 
ontology that is inconsistent with substance monism, and must reject the argument 
from Spinoza’s ontology.      
Whether Spinoza was entirely consistent with regard to the unreality of order 
might also be questioned.  For instance, he can be found maintaining that ‘the 
order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of 
things.’480  According to him, thought always runs in parallel with physical 
objects.  The theory is known as ‘parallelism’, and Spinoza promoted a very strict 
version of it: neither thought nor extended beings were believed by him to be 
                                                 
479 The Ethics, 1app3. 
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explainable in terms of the other.  In other words, the causal chains that give rise 
both to thought and to physical objects are totally independent of one other.  Now, 
if reality were accorded to the modes of the all-encompassing substance, instead 
of confining it to substance as I did a moment ago, and if the things that Spinoza 
speaks of here are regarded as modes, then the ‘order and connection’ between the 
things (as distinct from our ideas about order) would also be real: his parallelism 
would demand as much.   
Further, among the infinite modes of substance proposed by Spinoza were the 
laws of nature.  Laws of nature can be thought of in two senses: on the one hand, 
as human constructs; on the other hand, as real relationships (probably causal) 
between real things.  In either sense, they are indicative of order.  Laws of nature 
as we formulate them are generalisations with respect to real things and the 
relations between them.  Albert Einstein’s E = mc2 will no longer have anyone to 
reflect on it after the human species has become extinct,481 but energy and matter 
will continue to behave in the manner described by the equation (or perhaps in 
accordance with a later and better account of the physics involved).  By referring 
to laws of nature as modes of substance, Spinoza was presumably thinking of 
them in an objectively real sense, rather than human constructs.  If that is so, then 
his ascription of unreality to order would be questionable.   
Laws of nature might amount in the first instance to beliefs or conceptions 
distilled from perceptions of physical orderliness: planetary movements, seasonal 
variations in the climate, patterns of generation and degeneration, and so forth.  
Whether there are things in nature that correspond to the beliefs is the point at 
issue.  Spinozists would say there are not, but I will now argue otherwise. 
9.3 What is Real? 
What does reality consist of?  Many answers have been proposed.  The issues are 
complex, and I can only provide the briefest of sketches.  I begin with an account 
of the opposition between two principal streams of ontology, thing-based versus 
stuff-based.482   
                                                 
481 ‘All rational beings’ would probably be preferable to ‘human species’, since other species that 
are able to comprehend such things may eventually evolve.  Furthermore, other such beings may 
already exist elsewhere in the universe.     
482 The discussion is based on Theodore Sider’s Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of 
Persistence and Time (New York: Clarendon Press, 2003 [first published 2001]).   
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The dispute between the stated ontologies centres on the question of when 
fundamental reality is thought to become individuated, i.e., it is a dispute about 
wholes and parts.  An extreme stuff-based ontologist would insist that only one 
individual exists: namely, the stuff of which reality is composed.  Spinoza’s 
metaphysics of substance monism is of this kind—all things were believed by him 
to be one, while things that are commonly perceived to be separate and distinct 
entities were seen as modes of the single substance.  Extreme thing-based 
ontologists would conversely hold that reality consists in the multitude of bits (for 
example sub-atomic particles) of which aggregates are composed: such 
ontologists deny that aggregates of any kind are real, even though we talk—
mistakenly—about them as if they were.  A less extreme stuff-based ontologist 
would grant that stuff can credibly be thought of as being divided into 
assemblages that can be referred to as ‘things’.  A moderate thing-based ontologist 
would acknowledge that fundamental bits invariably merge to form composites: 
any one ‘bit’ can be a part of an array of wholes.  The less extreme versions of the 
two ontologies therefore converge on one another.   
My commitment is to the point of convergence; in other words, to the view that 
there is more than one thing in the world, where ‘thing’ consists of a portion of 
stuff.  The phrase ‘portion of stuff’ comes from Quine, and my commitment is 
based on Quine’s ontology.483  Why Quine’s?—basically because of its austerity.  
As Chris Swoyer and Francesco Orilia have said, there is a fundamental 
ontological trade-off which ‘reflects the perennial tension between explanatory 
power and epistemic risk.’484  A rich and lavish ontology may be able to explain 
many things, but at the cost of uncertainty with regard to its postulated entities.  
The explanatory power of a more modest ontology may be more restricted, but the 
greater certainty of its postulates could weigh in its favour.  Quine’s ontology is of 
the latter kind.  In Quine’s opinion, the only kinds of things that exist are physical 
objects (as distinguished by science) and sets (as used in the construction of 
mathematics).  Equal in rank to physical objects in the Quinean ontology are the 
‘states-of-being’ in which physical objects may be found to exist.  If something as 
                                                 
483 W. V. Quine, ‘Things and Their Places in Theories’, in Gibson, Jr. (editor): Quintessence: 
Basic Readings from the Philosophy of W. V. Quine, p. 239. 
484 Chris Swoyer and Francesco Orilia, ‘Properties’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 
2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/properties/, p. 
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austere as this is sufficient to generate a basis on which morality can be found to 
rest, then it seems to me that the basis would indeed be sound.  It would offer far 
harder challenges to the construction of a moral theory, and any theory that is 
consistent with it might therefore be seen to possess a high degree of rigor.     
Here is something Quine said: 
Looking at actual science as a going concern, we can fix in a general way on 
the domain of objects.  Physical objects, to begin with—denizens of space-
time—clearly belong.  This category embraces indiscriminately what would 
anciently have been distinguished as substances and modes as states of 
substances.  A man is a four dimensional object, extending say eighty-three 
years in the time dimension.  Each spatio-temporal part of man counts as 
another and smaller four-dimensional object.  A president-elect is one such, 
two months long.  A fit of ague is another, if for ontological clarity we 
identify it, as we conveniently may, with its victim for the duration of the 
seizure.485     
A state-of-being on this basis is equivalent to an ‘ancient’ mode of substance, and 
is identical to the physical object of which it is a state for as long as the state lasts.  
Quine’s ontology has an attractive simplicity about it.  I nevertheless propose to 
focus predominantly on physical objects: sets are of no significance to moral 
theory, whereas physical objects such as human beings are of utmost significance.   
Also significant are what I will refer to as ‘social entities’, which will be included 
in the ontology alongside physical objects.            
Most physical objects are composites of other physical objects, so non-composite 
things presumably form the basis of composite things.  What might the non-
composite entities be?  Science is divided between the sub-atomic particles of 
quantum physics and so-called ‘strings’.  Whether particles or strings, the most 
fundamental things go under the rubric ‘matter’, which, according to Einstein’s E 
= mc2, is equivalent to energy.486  Perhaps the formation of physical entities could 
                                                 
485 W. V. Quine, ‘The Scope and Language of Science’, in Gibson, Jr. (editor): Quintessence: 
Basic Readings from the Philosophy of W. V. Quine, p. 206. 
486 Strictly speaking, ‘m’ in Einstein’s equation stands for mass, not matter.  However, since mass 
is the exclusive property of matter (and things composed of matter), the stated equivalence is 
valid.  As well as equivalence, what the equation tells us is that mass (and therefore matter) and 
energy are transformable into one another.  Huge amounts of energy (E) are locked up in each unit 
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be regarded as an act of order-imposition, whereby inchoate, seething, disorderly 
accumulations of energy waves (i.e. electromagnetic waves) are converted into the 
things that, for us, represent physical objects.  We might even see in this a basis 
for bringing about a merger between stuff-based ontology and thing-based 
ontology, with energy waves as stuff and physical objects as things, each being 
transformable into the other.  Above the level of the most fundamental things, 
things combine to form other things.  Lower level things become parts of other 
wholes, for example when atoms combine to form molecules, and molecules are 
joined into cells.  Composite entities arising from acts of combination are wholes 
in their own right.  Composite entities can also decompose.  Composition and 
decomposition through combination and dis-combination pervade nature.     
With regard to states-of-being of physical objects, such states can be thought of in 
terms of the location within spacetime of both the entity concerned and the parts 
of which the entity is composed.  If they were otherwise located, then the entity 
would be something other than it is.  If I have ague, then, because of the presence 
of the virus in my cells, my physical constitution is not the same as when I do not 
have ague—nor would the way I feel be the same.     
I come now to social entities, which I wish to add to the Quinean ontology.  The 
term refers to organisations that have living physical objects at the lowest level of 
membership.  Ant colonies, bird flocks, whale pods, chimpanzee tribes, human 
families, corporations, and nations are just a few of the many kinds of social 
entities.  Individual ants, birds, persons and so forth are the parts that come 
together to form their respective social entities.  The concept of social entity is 
fundamental to many fields of inquiry: amongst others, it is indispensible to 
economics, sociology, anthropology, and social psychology.  Quine’s inclusion of 
sets in his ontology was based on the fact that sets are fundamental to 
mathematical science, and therefore all ‘science as currently constituted.’487  
Social entities could be admissible on similar grounds.  
Social entities may themselves be constituents of other social entities.  Student 
unions and sporting associations within a university are examples of the latter, but 
                                                                                                                                      
of mass (m), since the latter must be multiplied by the square of the speed of light (c2) in order to 
obtain the former.    
487 W. V. Quine, ‘The Scope and Language of Science’, p. 207. 
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there are always individual people at the base level of the over-arching entity.  
Social entities are wholes whose parts are held together by some kind of unifying 
principle.  Physical objects are subject to unifying principles that are generally 
explainable in terms of physics, chemistry and biology—variously for objects 
ranging from atoms to organisms.  The unifying principles applicable to social 
entities are of a different nature.  They include cooperation, custom, love, norms, 
laws, and like-mindedness—some of which would be permeated by values, and 
none of which would be satisfactorily explainable in the same terms as those 
appropriate for physical objects.   
Like physical objects, social entities are subject to various states-of-being.  They 
may be functional or dysfunctional, at war or not at war, authoritarian or 
democratic, orderly or disorderly, and so on.  Quine’s inclusion of the office of 
president-elect as an example of a state-of-being could help confirm the reality 
that I am attributing to social entities.  The office depends for its existence on the 
laws of the nation, so the state-of-being in question has a social aspect as well as 
an individual (physically objective) one.  In the terms of this argument, the social 
entity (nation) is in a particular state-of-being (of having a president-elect).  
Moreover, the social entity and state-of-being are identical for as long as the state-
of-being lasts—the nation with a president-elect is different from the nation 
without one.          
The ontology resulting from these deliberations is fundamentally Quinean, but, 
because of the inclusion of social entities, ‘Q-R’ (‘R’ for revised) could be a 
suitable label for it.  In summary, my ontological commitment with respect to 
things centres on physical objects and social entities, in conjunction with their 
various states-of-being—Peter with ague is not the same as Peter without ague; a 
nation with a president-elect is not the same as the nation without a president-
elect.  For some physical objects, states-of-being may include states-of-mind, or 
brain-states.  States-of-mind correspond to thought, and in this sense, all thoughts 
are real, i.e. exist.  Whether the things that are thought of are also real is another 
(epistemological) matter.  The question that must now be asked is whether 
homosapient order is real. 
                                                                                                 
201  
9.4 The Experiential Reality of Homosapient Disorder 
The tack I will be taking is based on the Q-R ontology, and the proposition I wish 
to defend is that disorder in general and homosapient disorder in particular are 
experiential realities for us.  By ‘experiential reality’ I mean something that is 
empirically observable and verifiable.  Disorder is experienced by us in the form 
of a need, specifically as a need to ameliorate the disorderly state.  There would 
seem little reason to doubt the reality of the various Maslovian needs, and all of 
these were shown in Chapter 5 to be symptomatic of the need for homosapient 
order—or, as it might otherwise be expressed, of the need to avoid homosapient 
disorder.  On the basis of Q-R, homosapient disorder would be real if it were 
either a physical object or a social entity, or a state-of-being of either a physical 
object or social entity.  The possibility of homosapient disorder being a physical 
object or a social entity can be dismissed, but it may plausibly be regarded as a 
state-of-being of a particular kind of physical object, namely a human being.  
Alternatively, it might be regarded either as an essential property of humanness, or 
as an internal relation thereof.488  All three are reasonable candidates (there may 
be others as well), and a case could be made for each of them.  However, I do not 
think its precise ontological specification matters all that much.  Its reality is the 
point at issue, and the fact that it is experienced by all human beings would seem 
to be sufficient confirmation of its existence.  For the purposes of exposition, I 
will continue to speak of homosapient disorder as a Q-R state-of-being.   
Since physical objects and social entities are all likely to be in some kind of state-
of-being for the duration of their existence, and since homosapient disorder 
applies to human beings, my proposition is that homosapient disorder consists in 
states-of-being of either human beings either in their own right or as members of 
social entities, and is therefore Q-R real.  The discussion that follows is based on 
Table 2, which is shown on the next page.  
  
 
                                                 
488 Refer Swoyer and Orilia, p. 34.  An essential property of an individual is such that the 
individual ‘has the property in every possible circumstance in which the individual exists.’  
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Category of 
Homosapient 
Order/ 
disOrder 
Relevant 
Object 
Associated State-of-Being: 
Homosapient Disorder 
Contrary Homosapient 
Orderly Conception 
1 2 3 4 
Physical 
(P) 
Human 
Beings 
Disunity  
Dysfunctional  
Wholeness  
Functional integrity 
Physical 
(P) 
Human 
Beings Ague Freedom from ague 
Social 
(S) 
 
Human 
Beings 
Disrespectfulness 
Rejection of law, riotousness 
Insecurity, cynicism 
Isolation 
Lawlessness 
Respectfulness 
Obedience to law 
Confidence in state 
Community-mindedness 
Justness 
Social 
(S) 
 
Human 
Beings 
within 
Social 
Entities 
Riotous 
Unjust 
Arbitrary, unlawful 
Peaceful 
Just 
Lawful 
Eudaimonic 
(E) 
 
Human 
Beings 
Disunity 
Disbelief, mistrust, cynicism 
Vulgarity, tastelessness 
Selfishness 
Selfishness 
Hopelessness, 
meaninglessness 
Wholeness 
Truth seeking 
Aesthetically vibrant 
Other-directedness 
Justness 
Self-respect 
 
Table 2: Homosapient Order as States-of Being of Physical Objects and Social Entities 
 
The question is whether the characteristics of homosapient disorder can plausibly 
be said to be states-of-being of human beings either in their own right or as 
members of social entities.  On the first row of the table, P-disorderly objects 
would be in a state of disunity and dysfunctionality, the latter in the sense of ‘poor 
working order’.  The converse P-orderly states-of-being are those shown in 
column 4; they are among the general characteristics of order identified in Section 
3.1.  Ague was one of Quine’s examples of a state-of-being, as a state of ill-health: 
it could reasonably be regarded as a state of disorder, specifically here as a state of 
P-disorder that may be suffered by human beings (and some other kinds of 
organisms as well).  The disorderliness of P-disorderly objects arguably consists 
in states-of-being such as those described. 
In the discussion in Section 3.2, social order was seen to be characteristic of many 
creatures besides human beings; for example honeybees and chimpanzees.  
However, because moral agency is confined to human beings,489 I will focus here 
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on human S-disorder.  From a human perspective, disrespectfulness may 
reasonably be inferred to be characteristic of S-disorder, and lawlessness is 
specifically mentioned by Aristotle and Maslow; lawlessness might well 
culminate in riotousness.  Insecurity and cynicism are metapathologies that 
Maslow associates with injustice (see p. 59), and they suitably describe what 
could happen if confidence in the state were lacking.  Community-mindedness has 
been included as a state-of-being associable with S-order to counterpoint isolation, 
which was considered by Aristotle to be contrary to the notion of ‘social animal,’ 
or ‘sociability’ as the general state-of-being might be called.  Justness is the last of 
the states-of-being included under S-order.  The term is intended to describe the 
state-of-being of a just person, i.e. one who is concerned with justice, but it is also 
associable with E-order: it has both a social dimension and a eudaimonic one.  Its 
social aspect might be summed up as ‘respect for and observance of the law’; its 
S-disorderly counterpart consists in rejection of the law.  
To this point I have been discussing S-disorder from the perspective of individual 
members of a social entity, but the notion of S-disorder is also applicable to social 
entities themselves.  Expressions such as ‘just society’, or, to use an expression 
from Rawls, ‘fair society’, are common enough—as are their opposites.  Similarly 
with some of the other S-disorderly states-of-being I have mentioned: for example 
lawlessness, arbitrariness and riotousness, which have obvious S-orderly 
counterparts in lawfulness and peacefulness.  All of the S-disorderly and S-orderly 
states of being that have been mentioned would both derive from and impact on 
the people that comprise the social entities in question (see Section 6.6).      
Turning now to E-disorder, the first state-of-being listed in the table is 
disintegration, in a feeling that ‘the world is falling apart.’490  Its converse 
manifests as wholeness, which is one of Maslow’s B-Values.  A feeling is a state-
of-being, like ague is.  I have suggested that E-order is attainable by means of 
intellectual achievement.  In the table, intellectual achievement is reflected in 
‘truth-seeking’, which is another of Maslow’s B-Values—disbelief, mistrust and 
cynicism are the corresponding metapathologies, and are states-of-being 
associable with E-disorder.  Next we have aesthetic vibrancy, which was said in 
Section 4.2 to be another means of attaining E-order (there expressed as ‘aesthetic 
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experience’).  Vulgarity and tastelessness are counterpart E-disorderly states-of-
being.  E-disorderliness is also characterised by selfishness, which is contrary to 
other-directedness.  Other-directedness is described by Finnis as an element of 
justice (see p. 58), and is an apt cognomen for generosity of spirit, or good-
spiritedness, the latter being a literal rendering of ‘eudaimonia’.  The ideas are 
based on those of Aristotle and Maslow.  Similarly, justness as a state of personal 
character, as distinct from justness in an S-orderly (juridical) sense, is also 
opposed to selfishness, which can be understood to be the hallmark of the 
Aristotelian self-sufficient ‘god or beast’ (see p. 47); i.e., a person who feels no 
need for anyone else’s involvement in his or her life.  Finally, there are the 
contraries ‘hopelessness’ and ‘self-respect’.  Self-disrespect may arise from 
thwarted expectations, the upshot of which could be a sense of hopelessness, or 
meaninglessness, and a feeling that there is nothing to work or live for.491  All of 
the E-disorderly conditions that have been mentioned point towards a need for 
homosapient order, and are clearly states-of-being that can be experienced by 
individual human beings. 
This completes the argument for the reality of homosapient disorder.  P-, S-, and 
E-disorder have all been found to consist in states-of-being of human beings and 
social entities composed of human beings, in which case each of them may 
reasonably be claimed to be Q-R real.  While an exhaustive list of states-of-being 
would be very hard (if not impossible) to compile, I hope that the one presented 
here will be adjudged sufficiently comprehensive to justify the claim.  Since the 
three kinds of disorder combine to form homosapient disorder, homosapient 
disorder may also be considered real.   
9.5 Homosapient Order and Ontological Commitment  
The reality of homosapient disorder is an unpleasant aspect of the human 
condition.  Homosapient disorder is a state-of-being that we attempt to ameliorate, 
by means of behaviour designed to satisfy the various Maslovian needs.  The 
design, or purpose, of such behaviour is to get as close as possible to a state of 
homosapient order.  States of perfect homosapient order are probably unattainable, 
but that need not prevent us from believing in them.  The belief forms the basis of 
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an ontological commitment.  The notion of ontological commitment is explained 
by Thomas Hofweber as follows: ‘given that we have certain beliefs, do these 
beliefs … bring with them a rational commitment to an answer to such questions 
as “Are there numbers?”  [Likewise, are there properties?  Is there order?]  If our 
beliefs bring with them a rational commitment to an answer to an ontological 
question about the existence of certain entities then we can say we are committed 
to the existence of these entities.’492  In other words, evidence for the existence of 
a thing derives from a rational commitment to it, and the rational commitment 
originates in certain beliefs about the thing in question.  I believe that enough 
evidence of needs-based homosapient order (and disorder) has been provided in 
this thesis to justify an ontological commitment to it. 
By virtue of the ontological commitment, homosapient order becomes an 
operative reality.  By ‘operative reality’ I mean something that is unified and real 
in the sense that it operates within nature so as to cause certain things to happen 
(by virtue of our commitment to it).  That it is operative in the indicated manner 
was the subject of Chapter 5, where homosapient order was linked to the basic 
needs of human beings (basic needs cause us to behave in certain ways, including 
ways that are susceptible to moral judgement).  Even Spinoza might have 
conceded as much.  A few pages ago there was mention of his having spoken 
about the human predilection for order, and about order as a construct of our 
imagination.  On that basis, the reality of the concept of order would at least have 
to be acknowledged, as would the fact that it causes us to do certain things—in 
Spinoza’s case, the reality of the concept of order causes us to imagine orderly 
states of affairs that are external to us.     
Something that is operatively real may be conceived of as if it were real, even 
while its precise ontological status remains unresolved.  More strongly, J. J. C. 
Smart is reported as having said: ‘[i]f the world behaves as if things of such and 
such a kind exist, then the best explanation of this fact is that they really do 
exist.’493  Human beings are of the world, and we behave as if disorder exists.  
Disorder exists in the form of homeostatic imbalance, in fractured social relations, 
                                                 
492 Thomas Hofweber, ‘Logic and Ontology’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 
2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/logic-
ontology/, p. 9 (accessed 12 November 2012).   
493 See Brian Ellis, The Philosophy of Nature: A Guide to the New Essentialism (Chesham: 
Acumen, 2002), p. 25. 
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in spiritual conflict, or in any of the other ways that have been mentioned.  We 
behave in ways whose purpose is to redress the disorder.  Disorder gives rise to 
the need for order, and the need for order (including homosapient order) finds 
expression in the various Maslovian needs.  Needs, and therefore disorder, are 
real.  Whether that is sufficient to make order per se (including homosapient 
order) real may be debatable, but I think it can be claimed to be a legitimate 
concept: i.e., something that can sensibly be thought about and made the subject 
of philosophical discourse.  Homosapient order on that account may be conceived 
of as the conceptual counterpart of experiential homosapient disorder.   
It is hard to imagine how there ever could be a world totally free of disorder.  
(Physically, we know, this is impossible, because of the operation of the Second 
Law of thermodynamics.)  The phenomenal world would always be characterised 
by degrees of disorder, including homosapient disorder.  A continuum of 
homosapient disorder is conceivable, with homosapient order as one of the 
extremes and maximum homosapient disorder as the other.  Neither extreme 
would be attainable by us: maximum homosapient disorder would entail the death 
of the human species; maximum order would be prevented by the Second Law. 
Disorder avoidance (including avoidance of homosapient disorder) is foundational 
in so far as human beings could not exist without it.  Since order follows upon 
disorder avoidance, order (including homosapient order) may also be considered 
foundational.  Disorder avoidance (and therefore order-attainment) is necessary to 
human existence, and therefore also to the existence of morality.  Whether it is 
also sufficient for morality is the point at issue.  This thesis can be regarded as an 
attempt to show that it is.  Morality has been shown to be explainable in terms of 
disorder avoidance in the form of satisfaction of basic needs. 
9.6 The Need for Homosapient Order as Ground for Morality 
What I am proposing is this: as something that is real, homosapient disorder 
constitutes philosophical ground on which a secular morality can be based.  But 
now it might be asked: in what sense could a state-of-being be said to be the 
ground of anything?  The being itself would appear to be ontologically prior to its 
state—the being comes first.  The objection has force, but I think it can be met by 
looking behind the state, with a view to discovering its cause—for example, the 
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ague virus, and the electoral laws and processes that bring a president-elect into 
being.  So we now have a ‘cause-of-state’ to consider—whereupon another 
question would probably arise: what was the cause of the cause-of-state?  An 
infinite regress looms.   
I believe the regress can be brought to a halt in the need for homosapient order.  
The need for homosapient order is generated by the experienced reality of 
homosapient disorder in conjunction with the operative, as if reality of 
homosapient order.  The fact of the disorder and the idea that the disorder might 
be ameliorated give rise to the need to move from the disorderly state-of-being to 
a more orderly state-of-being.  We need homosapient order in order to survive and 
to flourish.  If homosapient order is deficient in any way (for example, due to 
insufficient food), then we would in normal circumstances seek to redress the 
deficit—i.e., satisfy the need.  But now the objector would most likely ask: how, 
in principle, does the need for homosapient order differ from homosapient order 
itself?  Are they not both states-of-being in which a person might find herself?  
Furthermore, the objector might warn us against looking behind the need to find 
its cause, since that would only give rise to the same kind of regress.  Again, I 
think the objection has force.  What is the cause of the need?  How might this new 
regress be terminated?   
I suggest that it can be terminated by distinguishing between two senses of the 
term ‘need’.  On the one hand, need in the sense of requiring something to redress 
a deficit (‘lack’ for short); on the other hand, need in the sense of being 
necessarily so, or ‘could not have been otherwise’ (‘necessary’ for short).  A 
person trapped in a desert might lack the water that would keep him alive.  
Metaphysically speaking, this would be regarded as a contingent event, and his 
thirsty state-of-being a contingent phenomenon.  Matters could have been 
different: for example, if he had decided on a skiing holiday instead of trekking 
through central Australia.  However, for the same person—indeed any person—an 
adequate supply of water would always be a necessity, regardless of his or her 
circumstances.  Metaphysically, this would be considered a physically necessary 
phenomenon: it is a permanent state-of-being, one that is fully coincident with 
each and every individual.  Metaphysically, the individual himself is a physical 
contingency, since he did not have to be born; but as soon as he was born, an 
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adequate supply of water became necessary for him: it could not have been 
otherwise.  Need as lack may be transitory, but that which is necessary persists as 
long as life lasts.494  Viewed as a necessary need, the need for homosapient order 
is an essential property of humanness; in other words, it is a permanent state-of-
being for each and every human being.  Need as lack derives from need as 
necessary: if something is necessary, then it would be lacked if it were not 
obtained; but the reverse does not apply—just because we lack something (for 
example a million dollars in the bank) does not mean that it is necessary.  
Homosapient order has been shown to be ‘necessarily’ needed by human beings.  
Homosapient order is an ineradicable feature of the human condition.  In which 
case, the problem of priority dissolves: in virtue of being coincident with Homo 
sapiens, the need for homosapient order is neither prior nor posterior.  The need 
for homosapient order is a fundamental state-of-being that is uniquely human, and 
it is also pre-moral: it therefore satisfies the requirements of the philosophical 
ground I am looking for. 
The order-based theory of morality has now been fully formulated.  Before 
bringing the thesis to a conclusion, some possible objections to the theory will be 
considered.  The objections are the subject of the next chapter.     
 
 
  
                                                 
494 From the perspective of determinism, everything may be contingent, including life itself.   
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10: CONTRA ORDER-BASED MORALITY 
 
10.1 Objections Aplenty 
Some challenges to the theory of order-based morality have already been 
encountered, including the issues of asymmetric chirality (Section 3.2), the 
weighting of needs (Section 7.2), whether morality needs a secular foundation, 
and whether a secular foundation exists (Chapter 9).  Here I tackle five further 
potential obstacles: determinism, relativism, morality without needs, genetic 
fallaciousness, and naturalistic fallaciousness.  Literature relevant to them is 
examined under the respective headings.   
10.2 Determinism 
In general, determinists place causation at the centre of their theories, a move that 
some believe to be inimical to freedom, and therefore contrary to moral 
responsibility.  Those who believe that to be the case are known as 
incompatibilists.  Incompatibilists divide into two main camps: hard determinists, 
who insist on determinism and deny the possibility of objective grounds for moral 
standards; and voluntarists who insist on freedom and morality and reject 
determinism because of that.  But there are others who seek to accommodate both 
freedom and determinism: they are known as compatibilists.  Compatibilism holds 
that objective moral standards are possible, and that all phenomena have a cause 
(or chain of causes).   
‘Deterministic’ would seem to be an apt description of the order-based theory, 
because of the emphasis it places on the metaethical ‘how did we come to be 
moral beings?’ question.  The how question is distinct from the ethical what and 
why questions: what is it that we describe as morally commendable?, and why 
should morally commendable courses of action be undertaken?  Answers to the 
metaethical question centre on explanation in terms of causation; answers to the 
ethical questions focus on justification in terms of reasons.   
Metaethically, the order-based theory of morality is deterministic.  The theory 
holds that human beings are moral beings because of our need for homosapient 
order.  To put it more bluntly, our need for homosapient order is the cause of our 
morality: this is how we came to be moral.  It is a contingent fact that we are 
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moral beings, and explanation of that fact centres on homosapient order.  Our 
need for homosapient order is expressed through the various Maslovian basic 
needs, and these in turn find expression in wants, preferences, desires and 
interests, all of which are influenced by our nature and by our geopolitical, social 
and cultural circumstances.  Metaethically, there is no place for freedom in the 
order-based theory of morality.  Is it any different from an ethical perspective? 
At first sight, it would seem not.  The determinism of the how answers infiltrates 
answers to the ethical what and why questions.  According to the theory, morally 
commendable behaviour is caused by our need to be humane, which is an aspect 
of our need for homosapient order.  Our need for humaneness is encompassed by 
our need for Maslovian self-actualisation.  The need for inhumaneness is 
encompassed by the need for malignant self-actualisation.  Morally classifiable 
behaviour is determined by these needs of ours.  The same needs contribute to the 
formation of our character, and character has been shown to constrain the ways in 
which we behave.  But an opening for freedom is perceptible here.  The kind of 
constraint involved is that which feeds into self-restraint: self-restraint is 
tantamount to self-legislation, which is the literal meaning of autonomy.495  A 
humane person is someone who, when confronted with a choice among alternative 
courses of action, acknowledges the needs of others in whatever action she 
decides to undertake, or feels she should undertake.    
Character-forming decisions and courses of action provide another possible 
opening for freedom.  For example, willed avoidance of deleterious influences; or 
taking on a course of moral philosophy; or performing volunteer work; or, indeed, 
any humane behaviour whatsoever—all are constitutive of character.  Such 
actions undoubtedly depend to some extent on the quality of one’s character at the 
time of embarking on a new endeavour, and luck may also have a great deal to do 
                                                 
495 See Barbara Herman, ‘Obligation and Performance: A Kantian Account of Moral Conflict’, in 
Flanagan and Rorty (editors), Identity, Character, and Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology, p. 
319.  Self-restraint as self-legislation entails self-command.  One effectively orders oneself (i.e. 
commands oneself) either to do something or refrain from doing something.  Having said that, I 
must backtrack from a position I took earlier; or at least modify it.  In the discussion of the general 
characteristics of order I indicated that order in the sense of ‘command’ would be excluded from 
the conception of homosapient order.  It was there noted that the notion of command is central to 
Isaiah Berlin’s conception of morality.  It is now clear that the exclusion should be relaxed to 
allow ‘command’ in the sense of ‘self-command’ through.  Self-command is indeed relevant to 
homosapient order, by virtue of its involvement with freedom.   
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with whatever opportunities happen to present themselves.  Nevertheless, when 
opportunities do arise, we would generally be free (or feel that we are free) to 
decide whether or not to avail ourselves of them.   
Also from the perspective of ethics, the order-based theory holds that moral 
commendability arises when an agent’s morally classifiable behaviour produces 
an increase in the level of homosapient order across all of the parties involved.  
An increase in homosapient order in such circumstances is morally commendable 
because it is the product of humane behaviour, and humane behaviour is 
behaviour that is natural to the majority of human beings.  In Philippa Foot’s 
terminology, humane behaviour is a natural good for human beings.  The ethical 
question of ‘what is good?’ is answered by reference to the metaethical 
explanation of how we came to be moral beings.  Because of that, the order-based 
theory of morality is deterministic.  But the theory nevertheless allows a limited 
place for freedom of choice.  The theory may therefore be regarded as 
compatibilist.                      
The order-based theory of morality embraces causality in the ways that have been 
described.  The theory also accommodates freedom.  None of this is to say 
whether compatibilism is ‘better’ than either or both kinds of incompatibilism, but 
it seems to me that causation and freedom are facts about our moral life, and that 
moral theory must therefore account for both of them.     
10.3 Moral Relativism 
As David Wong explains it, moral relativism ‘often takes the form of a denial that 
any single moral code has universal validity, and  an assertion that moral truth and 
justifiability, if there are any such things, are in some way relative to factors that 
are culturally and historically contingent.’496  Such is the doctrine of metaethical 
relativism, which is distinguished from normative moral relativism.  The latter 
‘holds that it is wrong to pass judgement on others who have substantially 
different values, or try to make them conform to one’s values, for the reason that 
their values are as valid as one’s own.’497  Abstention from all such judgements 
might be described as an extreme form of normative relativism.  A more 
reasonable version, in Wong’s view, would permit the passing of judgement on 
                                                 
496 Wong, p. 442. 
497 Wong, p. 442. 
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those who have substantially different values:498 in his words, ‘[t]he mere 
existence of deep and wide disagreements in ethics … does not disprove the 
possibility that moral judgements can be objectively correct or incorrect about 
certain facts.’499  Judgements of objective correctness would presumably have to 
be based on some kind of pre-existing standards of conduct, which would 
previously have passed the test of objective correctness.  To speak of objective 
correctness involves a move away from relativism and towards absolutism; the 
latter opposes relativism by insisting on the universal validity of certain moral 
principles.   
Absolutism might be described in terms of ‘ethical exclusiveness’, where only one 
code of ethics among a number of codes is believed to be valid.  Nihilism, 
whereby all ethical codes are held to be equally invalid and therefore excluded en 
bloc could also be described as absolutist.  Against absolutism of either kind there 
would be ethical inclusiveness, or pluralism.  Because of their inclusiveness, 
pluralists would likely embrace the sort of moderate normative moral relativism 
mentioned by Wong.  Philip Kitcher is pluralist in this sense—he defends a 
position in ethics that is close to that advocated by Isaiah Berlin, ‘[o]ne important 
feature of [which] is the recognition by each of the rival traditions of the values 
taken as fundamental by the other ….’500  But recognition of another’s 
fundamental values need not, in Kitcher’s view, prevent one from believing that 
some codes of ethics are better or worse than others.  According to Kitcher, codes 
of ethics will be ‘better’ if they advance the ethical project and ‘worse’ if they 
retard it.501  ‘Better’ and ‘worse’ involve the kinds of judgements of objective 
correctness and objective incorrectness that are characteristic of moderate 
normative relativism.   
Kitcher’s pluralism also embraces a metaethical relativist position.  He associates 
the good with the circumstances in which people find themselves: the good, he 
says, ‘is local, linked to circumstances and problems; it is constructed through 
group attempts to solve problems; and it evolves.’502  In other words, good is 
variable depending on circumstances: the contents of any codes of ethics 
                                                 
498 Wong, p. 448. 
499 Wong, p. 445. 
500 Kitcher, p. 249 (footnote). 
501 Kitcher, p. 210 ff. 
502 Kitcher, p. 288. 
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emanating from the various conceptions of good would be similarly variable.  
What may not be variable in the scenario depicted by Kitcher, or indeed any other 
scenario (apart from nihilism), is the sheer existence of some kind of code of 
ethics, at least since the beginning of the ethical project fifty thousand years ago.   
In Section 6.2 I argued that values originate in needs.  Taking that to be the case, 
Kitcher’s pluralistic assertion with regard to the reciprocal recognition of 
fundamental values may be paraphrased along the lines of ‘recognition by 
members of rival traditions of the needs taken as fundamental by the other’.  And 
with the recognition of needs comes the order-based theory of morality.  As is the 
case with Kitcher, the order-based theory also contains fixed and variable 
elements.  Fixed is the existence of our basic human needs, all of which emanate 
from the need for homosapient order (basic needs may evolve, but basic they 
remain).  Variable are our hierarchies of needs.  I have conjectured that the 
hierarchical arrangement of needs may vary from one age or culture to another; 
and if variation occurs, ultimate values would likely differ.   
The commonality of the basic Maslovian needs may enable us to enhance our 
understanding of one another’s ultimate values, including those of denizens of 
different ages and cultures.  By way of illustration, an order-based ethicist would 
understand why a devout Muslim would be deeply offended by a public (and 
publicised) Koran-burning by a fundamentalist official from another religion.  Let 
us imagine that the official was driven by his belief that his is the only true 
religion and that anything precious to people of other faiths constitutes fair game.  
The need motivating his action may have been esteem (of his fellow 
fundamentalists); or perhaps self-actualisation, either in the form of a desire to 
harm through an exercise of power, or by means of expressing the religious 
zealotry that is fundamental to his character—it is hard to think of anything else 
that could inspire such a deed.  The need of the Muslim would be far more basic 
than either esteem or self-actualisation, even though religious symbolism would 
usually be regarded as catering to a spiritual need.  As well as being of spiritual 
concern, and therefore involved in self-actualisation, preservation of the sanctity 
of his holy book would probably be counted among the Muslim’s most weighty 
needs, in company perhaps with his subsistence needs.  An order-based ethicist 
would therefore deem the fundamentalist’s desecration of the Koran to be morally 
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condemnable.  Matters would be worse if the desecration provoked revenge 
attacks, resulting in collateral death and injury.  If such attacks were predictable, 
then the Koran-burner would be culpable, as would the assailants.  The basic right 
to life would have been violated.   
More generally, as a counter-measure against absolutism and extreme normative 
relativism, differences in hierarchies of needs could be transcended by focusing on 
needs of the most basic kind—basic in terms of the hierarchies of respondent 
persons.  Ultimate values may vary, but violation of them would always be 
morally suspect; though not necessarily condemnable, because of the existence of 
‘perverted’ (to use Hume’s expression again) scales of value.  This would be 
consistent with the pluralism advocated by Berlin and Kitcher.  To what extent 
should an order-based ethicist tolerate different moral standards?  It follows from 
the foregoing discussion that tolerance would vary according to the needs at stake 
and their position on his or her hierarchical scale of urgency: the more pressing 
the need, the lower the degree of tolerance of violating behaviour.  However, 
inhumane behaviour would never be tolerated.  Relativism is at the centre of 
important moral issues, but thinking about them in terms of needs, and therefore 
homosapient order, would seem capable of shedding light on them. 
In sum, as long as cultural differences persist, we will remain stuck with differing 
notions of right and good, and of wrong and evil.  Relativism, therefore, is a fact 
of life, and it is to the order-based theory’s credit that it accommodates that fact.  
Moreover, it offers an explanation as to why various moral standards exist.  
Differing hierarchical arrangements of needs and differing ultimate ends certainly 
complicate matters, but there would seem to be no requirement for morality to be 
simple.  An order-based ethicist will recognise the complexities and take them 
into account when making moral judgements.   
10.4 Morality without Needs 
Are there instances of moral commendability and condemnability that cannot be 
traced to the need for homosapient order, through the various Maslovian needs?  It 
seems that David Braybrooke would think so, for he maintains that ‘[s]elf-
development can be understood to be an important moral consideration without 
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being taken to be a need.’503  Braybrooke’s point could pose a serious challenge to 
the order-based theory, especially if it were extendable beyond the particular need 
mentioned by him.  A fundamental aspect of the theory is that moral sentiments 
and judgements are anchored in needs, at bottom the need for homosapient order.  
Here a very real difficulty must be acknowledged.  Proof of the theory has largely 
relied on empirical support in the form of case studies: the only kind of a priori 
validation that I have been able to offer consists in the sequence of ideas that 
began with the necessity of orderliness to life as expressed in the kinds of needs 
universally experienced by human beings, and ended with the moral significance 
of the needs when placed in a hierarchy.  My hope is that the position emanating 
from the ideas will be regarded as plausible; but there is nothing conceptually 
necessary about the way in which they have been combined.   
I think Braybrooke’s specific point is rebuttable, on the grounds that self-
development is something that a person undertakes with intent: a choice is made 
to work towards some kind of goal or ideal, whereupon appropriate action 
follows.  If the action affects other people, self-development can be understood to 
involve morally classifiable behaviour; the person concerned becomes open to 
morally assessable interactions, primarily as agent but also as respondent.  As 
agent, actions directed towards self-development could conceivably impact 
adversely on someone else’s needs, for example by monopolising scarce 
resources.  As respondent, if another person’s action (or inaction) impeded the 
self-developer, then, depending on the need that motivated the action (or inaction), 
moral condemnability may have occurred.  Furthermore, self-development would 
often involve intellectual achievement and aesthetic experience, and therefore, on 
Maslow’s theory, be motivated by the need for those things.   
Perhaps the most that can be said by way of general rebuttal is that disproof of the 
theory would presumably have to follow similarly empirical lines, but without the 
underpinning provided by the need for homosapient order.  Having given the 
matter some thought, I have been unable to find any instances of moral 
commendability and condemnability that cannot be accounted for by the order-
based theory.  
                                                 
503 Braybrooke, Meeting Needs, p. 191. 
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10.5 The Genetic Fallacy 
Genetic fallacies consist in the endorsement or disapproval of an idea solely on 
the basis of its origins or history.  Unless its past affects the present value of the 
idea, its merits or demerits are all that count.504  For example, if I were to say that 
my belief in the moral relevance of order was sparked by august and ancient 
Taoist texts, it would be fallacious to endorse the resultant theory solely on the 
grounds of the authority of the texts; and it would also be fallacious to condemn it 
merely because of the antiquity of the initial impetus.  Grounds like those, taken in 
isolation, would hardly constitute an argument, either for or against.   
A version of the genetic fallacy pertaining specifically to moral theory has been 
proposed by Stephen Pope.  According to Pope, a genetic fallacy would be 
committed if one were to confuse the causal origins of morality with moral 
justification.505  A causal process or mechanism is said by Pope to explain ‘the 
material factors which produce phenotypical structures or behaviors.  For 
example, one can say that, under stated conditions, a chromosomal sequence of 
nucleotide bases causes the production of a protein in particular cells.’506  Causes, 
he continues, must be distinguished from functions: the latter ‘refer to effects of a 
behavior or structure that might provide reasons for the evolution of this particular 
structure or behavior.’507 Altruism is given by Pope as an example of function: he 
writes, ‘[i]t may be the case that certain forms of altruism have provided and 
continue to provide a selective advantage to members of the species (i.e., they 
may contribute to survival and reproduction).’  However, he adds, ‘one may not 
infer from the fact of adaptation that the cause of particular assistance giving acts 
is genetic or biological.’508     
The order-based theory of morality is patently concerned with causes, and would 
therefore seem vulnerable to the kind of challenge mounted by Pope.  But the 
theory has a defence: a two-pronged one, in fact, although with shared weapons.  
                                                 
504 See http://www.fallacyfiles.org/genefall.html (accessed 7 June 2011). 
505 It seems to me that any such confusion could also be regarded as a Humean naturalistic fallacy, 
i.e. an argument from ‘is’ to ‘ought’.  See the next section.   
506 Pope, p. 104.   
507 Pope, p. 104.  Phenotype is defined by Nicholl as ‘[t]he observable characteristics of an 
organism, determined both by its genotype … and the environment.’  Genotype is simply the 
‘genetic composition of an organism.’  See Desmond S. T. Nicholl, An Introduction to Genetic 
Engineering: Second Edition (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2005 [first published 
1994]), pp. 280, 276. 
508 Pope, p. 104. 
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The first line of defence is based on the distinction between, on the one hand, 
need, and, on the other hand, satisfaction of the need.  The need causes us to try to 
satisfy the need; satisfaction of the need is our goal, which provides us with 
reasons for acting in ways that we believe will enable us to attain the goal.  
Example: Jack is on a cruise with three friends when a freak wave capsizes their 
boat.  Jack manages to get hold of a life-jacket before the boat sinks taking the rest 
of their safety equipment with it.  All four are poor swimmers; they are a long way 
from shore.  The threat to Jack’s safety and his wish to survive give rise to the 
thought that he might be able to dog-paddle all the way to land assisted by the life-
jacket’s buoyancy.  His companions would be left in the lurch, and he is 
immediately ashamed of having considered such a selfish act.  His better nature 
asserts itself, whereupon his need for humaneness coalesces with his need for 
safety.  His goal is still survival, but now it is the survival of all four instead of his 
alone: their needs are now his needs.  The altered goal gives rise to altered means.  
Perhaps, he thinks, we might all get through this if we were to take turns with the 
life-jacket, and hope that rescuers arrive in time.  Schematically, the sequence is 
this: situation leads to need which entails a goal which provides reasons for 
employing means of attaining the goal.  And while that is going on, the original 
situation might be modified in such a way as to give rise to a revised set of needs, 
whence altered goals and reasons for employing different means—and so on.  
Decisions with regard to goals and the means employed to attain them are the stuff 
of moral commendability and condemnability.  Goals and means that fall under 
the influence of the need for humaneness provide us with reasons for acting in 
ways that recognise the importance of others’ needs: they can therefore be aligned 
with the functions spoken of by Pope.        
The second line of defence also makes use of the notions of ‘cause’ and ‘goal’; in 
this case, however, ‘goal’ is subsumed under ‘cause’.  Should we be asked to give 
a reason for acting humanely, i.e. asked to justify our action, we might say 
something along the lines of ‘because I felt that it was my duty to do so’, or 
‘because I consider the needs of others to be important’.  The term ‘because’ in 
these formulations brings another kind of ‘cause’ into play; it expands the notion 
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of cause along Aristotelian lines by embracing teleological causation.509  The 
feelings and thoughts of the agent reflect his beliefs about the way in which 
people should conduct themselves, including himself.  Teleological causation 
brings our beliefs into contact with the situation at hand and provides us with 
reasons for doing what we do.  The need-driven cause would ultimately be 
attributable to a combination of biological and contextual (cultural, social, etc.) 
factors; it operates in the manner of a ‘push’.  The teleological-driven cause might 
be similarly attributable, although contextual factors would probably predominate; 
teleological causation operates in the manner of a ‘pull’.  Push-style causation 
includes the genetic and biological causes referred to by Pope.  Pull-style 
causation emanates from our past experiences and education, which give rise to 
beliefs with regard to that which is morally justifiable.  Moral good in the form of 
humaneness is our telos; we are drawn towards it when we act humanely; i.e. 
when due respect is paid to the needs of others, along with our own needs.  The 
order-based theory of morality accommodates both kinds of causation, and 
enables us to distinguish between causal (material) origins and moral justification.   
The two-pronged defence should be enough to deflect a Pope-style attack.  The 
first defence involves opening up Pope’s notion of ‘function’ to admit the goal of 
need-driven behaviour; the second extends Pope’s notion of ‘cause’ to include 
teleological causation.  While genetic fallaciousness might be safely set aside, 
naturalistic fallaciousness could pose a more serious challenge. 
10.6 The Naturalistic Fallacy 
At least two versions of what are referred to as ‘naturalistic fallacies’ are 
discernible.  One stems from Hume’s ideas and the other from those of G. E. 
Moore.  Respectively, the two kinds of fallacy may be characterised as ‘logical’ 
and ‘metaphysical’.   
Hume was troubled by the slippage in some philosophical arguments between 
factual premises and ethical conclusions, i.e., between ‘is’ and ‘ought’.510   
Kitcher refers to this as ‘Hume’s Challenge’.511 Example (mine): cruelty is 
                                                 
509 Formal causation and efficient causation would also be admitted by an Aristotelian, alongside 
material causation and teleological causation. 
510 See Hume, Treatise 3.1.1. 
511 Kitcher, §40. 
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painful; therefore one ought not to be cruel.  One way of solving the problem (if it 
is indeed a problem512) would be to begin with an ethical premise.  Example: 
people ought to be able to live their lives without being subjected to cruelty; 
therefore etc.  The inference is logically satisfactory, and the problem is shifted to 
justification of the premise—why shouldn’t people be subjected to cruelty?  Kant 
would have an answer to that: for someone to say that cruelty is acceptable, he or 
she would have to accept that they might rightfully be subjected to cruelty.  Since 
that would be unlikely, the principle would be contrary to universalisation in the 
form of a Categorical Imperative.  The order-based theory also has an answer: 
cruelty is contrary to some of our most basic needs, including homeostasis, safety 
and respect.   
Another way of dealing with Hume’s challenge would be to break down the 
distinction between fact and value.513  Needs, I maintain, are factual: they are real 
by virtue of the contribution they make to states-of-being of those who have them.  
While commendability and condemnability are incontestably value-terms, morally 
relevant values are based on morally relevant needs, from which it follows that 
such values are also facts.514  In the previous chapter, I claimed that order consists 
in bodily states that are described in terms of orderliness and disorderliness.  
                                                 
512 As Kitcher notes, nondeductive modes of inference may be employed (p. 257).  Kitcher’s 
preferred strategy, however, is to substitute ‘ethical progress’ for ‘ethical truth’ (p. 258 ff.).  
Fundamentally, if a rule works (ameliorates a problem between people in a social setting), then it 
makes sense to institutionalise it (my gloss).  The ‘inference’ is essentially pragmatic; reason and 
the emotions both contribute to it.  Ethical progress is made.  Cruelty would be prohibited because, 
if sufficiently widespread, it is socially destructive.  (Whether that is sufficient reason, or the only 
reason, for prohibiting cruelty is debatable.  It seems to me that the personal abhorrence elicited by 
it needs to be recognised: the individual must be brought into the picture, as is done by Kant and 
the order-based theory.) 
513 Casebeer writes, ‘our intuitions that Hume is on to something with the naturalistic fallacy are 
driven by either (a) implicit analytic/synthetic distinctions or (b) an inappropriate theory of 
naturalized ethics’ (Casebeer, p. 22).  Casebeer contends that Quine and Dewey effectively 
dismantled the distinction between analytic propositions and synthetic propositions, and he 
understandably believes that his own naturalised theory is not inappropriate.  If, he writes, ‘our 
beliefs are appropriately (that is, pragmatically) formed, so-called analytic statements are nothing 
more than extremely well confirmed scientific facts.  Any attempt to argue that “come what may, 
we can never infer norms from empirical judgements,” as Hume and Moore do, would entrench an 
indefensible assumption.  We should therefore be open to the possibility of a reduction of 
normative properties to natural, functional properties’ (Casebeer, p. 23).  Casebeer argues that 
moral conclusions ‘follow abductively from properly construed non-normative premises’ 
(Casebeer, p. 4.  Abduction is a form of inference introduced by C. S. Peirce; conclusions are 
drawn by abductive inference when something about a population is said to be the case based on a 
limited number of samples.  Abductive inferences are never apodictic).   
514 Not everything that we value is based on needs.  In Section 6.2 I used the example of the valued 
(but unneeded) book by a favourite author to draw a distinction between need-related values and 
other values.  Under the order-based theory, all values that are morally relevant would be based on 
needs.      
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Midgley makes a similar point in her contention that facts often go beyond ‘the 
raw data of sense,’ and beyond physical facts, i.e. facts ‘that can be stated in the 
terms of physics.’  In her view, if something is, for example, dangerous or dirty, 
unique or legal, then it is a fact that it is so.515  Such descriptions have objective 
reference, and they carry with them ascriptions of value.  Order and legality are 
right, i.e. good in a morally relevant sense of ‘right’; conversely for disorder and 
dirtiness—whereupon ought and is become reciprocally influential with respect to 
one another.  Bias or prejudice would almost inevitably infiltrate the ascriptions, 
so it could not be said that they are objective in the sense of ‘free from bias’; but 
they could nevertheless attain objectivity in another sense, i.e., as things 
accessible to cognition—as such, they become capable of contributing to the 
content of our consciousness.  By so doing, the values themselves become facts, 
and are inextricably entwined with other facts.  The logical problem perceived by 
Hume is thereby dissolved. 
Turning now to Moore’s challenge, which I have labelled ‘metaphysical’, a 
naturalistic fallacy is said by Moore to occur when an ethical concept (for 
example good) is directly derived from a natural concept (for example order).  
Even if it is demonstrable that morality is at least analogically connected to the 
physical phenomenon of order, would it follow that the common physical and 
biological impulse also helps form the basis of a universal moral principle?  That 
would require a very big leap, an unnecessary if not impossible one in Moore’s 
view.  For him, ‘the main object of ethics, as a systematic science, is to give 
reasons for thinking this or that is good ....’516  Moore’s fundamental position is 
that good is a ‘simple’ concept that is impervious to reduction to non-moral 
concepts.  By seeking to explain morality in terms of order and needs, my project 
is clearly at odds with Moore.  How might the objection be met?   
The first thing to note is that ‘good’ for Moore is something that is entirely 
natural: it occurs within the ambit of nature, and is attached as an epithet to things 
that are considered (or felt) to be good—such as food, love and music.  It is the 
task of philosophy, he says, to explain why such things are good.  This seems to 
conflict quite strongly with the order-based theory, according to which moral 
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516 G. E. Moore, ‘Principia Ethica, chapter 1’, in David E. Cooper (editor): Ethics: The Classic 
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commendability derives from (is caused by, and therefore explained by) an 
increment in homosapient order.  But the conflict may be only superficial.  For it 
is clear that homosapient order is a consequence of such things as food, love and 
music; or, more precisely, consequential upon satisfaction of our need for them.  
In other words, homosapient order is good, as was argued in Section 4.4, where it 
was found to be analogous to justice.  Moreover, homosapient order is a good that 
encompasses all of the things that are likely to be regarded as good, for the simple 
reason that it is consequential upon satisfaction of our basic needs, which is of 
fundamental value to us.  Finally, homosapient order is a good that is as natural to 
the same extent that human beings are natural, which is to say fully natural.   
By their very nature accounts of morality such as the order-based theory are 
destined to fall foul of Moore’s idea.  But a theory that satisfactorily explains the 
origins and nature of morality could lead one to wonder whether the naturalistic 
fallacy might itself be fallacious.   As well as dealing with origins, any such 
theory would also have to provide rational justification for engaging in moral 
behaviour, and for a theory to be satisfactory in all of these respects it would at 
least have to be coherent.  I think the order-based theory measures up well in that 
regard.  As well as coherence, however, the theory would have to be based on 
valid principles and formed from sound propositions.  To my mind the principle of 
homosapient order is patently valid: we would simply not exist without some 
degree of homosapient order.  The propositions that I have expounded are also 
reasonably defensible.  I have argued that homosapient order is operatively real, 
and I believe human beings have been shown to have a need for homosapient 
order, that the need for homosapient order finds expression in the various human 
needs identified by Maslow, and that moral commendability and condemnability 
can be explained in terms of hierarchical arrangements of needs (and therefore in 
terms of homosapient order).  The foregoing propositions constitute the basis of 
the explanatory or descriptive part of the theory.  In addition, I have shown that 
the need for Maslovian self-actualisation is characterised by the need for 
humaneness (defined as ‘principled consideration’), and that it is rationally 
justifiable for us to seek satisfaction of our needs.  The order-based theory seems 
to me to be satisfactory from both a metaethical point of view and an ethical point 
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of view.  I believe it has the resources to combat charges of naturalistic 
fallaciousness.   
The various challenges to the proposed theory having been discussed, I can now 
bring the thesis to a conclusion.   
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11: CONCLUSION 
 
To conclude the thesis I will consider whether the objectives that were listed in 
Sections 1.1 and 2.5 have been met.   
Objective A: Explain how we came to be moral beings  
I have argued that human needs can be traced to a fundamental need for 
homosapient order, which is an amalgam of physical order, social order and 
eudaimonic order.  I have also argued that morality can be described and justified 
in terms of needs.  The arguments culminated in the order-based theory of 
morality, which, as well as describing and justifying morality, explains the origin 
of morality—the answer being, because of the fundamental need just mentioned.   
Objective B: Demonstrate that the proposed theory explains what right and good 
consist in  
Right has been explained in terms of the effect of morally classifiable behaviour 
on the needs of agents and respondents.  Homosapient order is a natural good for 
human beings; it is also the end (telos) of morally commendable behaviour.  
Objective C: Show what kind of moral norms issue from the theory 
The theory issues in humane norms.  These include thoughtfulness, tolerance, 
empathy and reciprocity.  The theory is also fundamentally egalitarian, in its 
assertion of equality of everyone’s basic needs.  These are moral norms that are 
consistent with mainstream consequentialist and deontological theories.  
Objective D: Show why adherence to norms generated by the theory is justifiable  
The norms issuing from the theory stem from our putative need for humaneness.  
We act in a rationally justifiable manner when we act to satisfy our needs.  
Adherence to the norms of humaneness is therefore rationally justifiable. 
Objective E: Show that the norms issuing from the theory are consistent with 
extant moral theory, both consequentialist and non-consequentialist  
The rights specified in the UDHR are largely explainable in terms of our basic 
needs, and, according to order-based theory, all of our basic needs are expressions 
of the need for homosapient order.  Rights are therefore explainable in terms of 
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homosapient order.  Although some of the stipulations of the UDHR are 
controversial, those that are not would generally be embraced by deontologists.  
The order-based theory’s consequentialist credentials are more straightforward.  
The theory holds that the end of morally classifiable behaviour is homosapient 
order, which has been held to be a natural human good.  The comments on 
Objective H below are also relevant to this objective. 
Objective F: Differentiate the proposed theory from extant moral theories  
The order-based theory provides answers to the questions of what good, right, bad 
and wrong all consist in, from a metaethical perspective.  It is a broad ranging 
theory that also answers to the putative philosophical need.  Whether that is 
enough to differentiate it from extant theories may be questionable.  James Griffin 
doubts whether the sorts of ethics that can revolutionise motivation are plausible.  
And those that are plausible, he says, cannot revolutionise motivation.517  I would 
not want to claim that the order-based theory is revolutionary.  It is certainly not 
that, but plausibility may be claimed for it because of the close fit between its 
prescriptions and those of other theories of ethics.  Furthermore, the concept of 
homosapient order, which is novel, may be sufficient to warrant a claim of 
uniqueness.  The concept is deeply involved in all of the metaethical, ethical and 
philosophical issues that have been raised.  
Objective G: Show that the order-based theory provides a plausible secular 
foundation on which morality can be based 
In Chapter 9 I argued that morality stems from our need for homosapient order.  
Homosapient order was shown to be real in the sense of being a state-of-being that 
is uniquely human.  
Objective H: Show that the theory provides reasonable answers to the 
fundamental questions emanating from the consequentialist/non-consequentialist 
divide 
The fundamental questions emanating from the consequentialist/non-
consequentialist divide are, respectively: ‘what kind of person should I be?’ and 
‘what ought I to do?’  To the consequentialist, the answer would be: I should be a 
humane person, because the need for humaneness is embedded in the need for 
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homosapient order, and I will be the kind of person I want to be in the event that 
my need for humaneness is satisfied.  Conversely, I will be inhumane if I 
deliberately set about frustrating someone else’s need for homosapient order.  
Guidelines for behaviour are derivable from our basic needs (see above, Objective 
C), thereby helping us decide what ought to be done in morally fraught situations; 
accordingly, the theory addresses the main concern of deontologists.   
Objective I: Show that homosapient order is something more than merely a 
dream, that it is not too distant to be of any practical (i.e. moral) concern 
Is homosapient order an unrealistic dream?  The question arises from a point made 
by Dewey.  The entire thesis may be viewed as a response to the question, and the 
answer is no.  It is no on Dewey’s terms, because attainment of homosapient order 
by means of satisfying a basic need in effect constitutes an intermediate end.  To 
satisfy any of our basic needs is a means to an overall end, as well as an end in 
itself.  Our basic needs are certainly not distant from us: our survival and general 
well-being depend on their being met.  Furthermore, the answer is no because 
homosapient order is something that exists in the world.  It is operatively real as 
well as something that human beings need.   
It seems to me that the objectives of the thesis may reasonably be claimed to have 
been achieved.   
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APPENDIX:   A DIAGRAM OF THE THESIS 
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Notes 
(a) The arrow signifies that maleficently inclined people (as well as beneficent ones) 
may engage in morally classifiable behaviour that is commendable.  A maleficent person 
need not impinge on others’ needs all of the time. 
(b) Conversely to (a), there would be the occasional lapse into morally censurable 
behaviour by someone who is generally beneficent. 
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